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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Policy influences on farmland conversion 
The Dutch land based agricultural sector is in transition. The Netherlands has a world-wide 
leading position in agriculture; however, even though production is still increasing, its 
relative economic national importance is declining, from 3.2% of GDP in 1995 to 1.6% of GDP 
in 2012 (LEI, 2014a). So is its uptake in land, although at a slower pace (CBS, 2014). 
Agricultural land in the Netherlands still accounts for more than two-thirds of all land (LEI, 
2014b). However, land not only shifts in use between the agricultural and other sectors, but 
also within the agricultural sector. Farmland conversion is shaped by various driving factors, 
two of which are policies: the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and 
spatial policies. 
 
1.1.1 The CAP and its reforms 
Ensuring an adequate food supply was seen as a key task for governments in Europe after 
1945, due to the food shortages experienced during World War II and the need to modernize 
the economy. Each country followed its own agricultural policy until the emergence of the 
Common Market in the 1950s led to the CAP, decided upon by the Treaty of Rome. By 1962, 
three major principles had been established to guide the CAP: ‘market unity’ (meaning 
common agricultural prices), ‘community preference’ (preference for own products) and 
‘financial solidarity’ (joint financial responsibility). The common goal of the CAP was thus 
based on the idea of food security and free trade on a European scale, while ensuring a 
reasonable income for farmers. In order to achieve these twin aims, a number of common 
market-control regulations were introduced: tariffs on food imports and export subsidies to 
protect the internal market and to keep internal market prices high and stable.  
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Over the following decades, a gradual shift in the position and implementation of the CAP 
took place. The imbalance between internal and world market prices led to high public costs 
and tensions with countries outside Europe, notably in the negotiations of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), later the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Modernization of the economy led to a decreased importance of the agricultural sector in 
terms of employment, GDP and consumer spending on food and agricultural products. This 
changed the public view on the necessity of government-induced price stabilisation. Society 
started to notice the negative consequences of the CAP in terms government spending and 
wanted more attention for the positive and negative external effects of agriculture, e.g. nature 
conservation and animal welfare. The enlargement of the EU with member states with a 
relatively large agricultural sector would further increase budget expenditures, likely 
complicating future CAP reforms (Meester, 2005). Together, this led to several rounds of 
reforms aiming to control supply and eventually replace price support by direct income 
payments, with an increasing focus on sustainable agricultural production (Silvis and 
Lappere, 2010).  
Overproduction and the negotiations of the Uruguay Round of the GATT were the main 
driving forces leading to the MacSharry reform in 1992. This reform laid the foundation for 
the transition from market and price (support) policy to a direct income payment system. 
Products receiving price support, such as cereals, oilseeds, tobacco, milk, beef and lamb, saw 
a reduction in their degree of protection. In return, producers started receiving direct 
payments. This transition was restated by the reforms that followed: Agenda 2000, the Mid-
Term Review (Fischler reform), the Health Check and more recently the 2013 CAP reform. 
Agenda 2000, mainly motivated by the WTO’s Doha Round and the enlargement of the EU, 
further reduced price support and introduced cross-compliance measures. Farmers had to 
comply with standards for ‘good agricultural and environmental practice’, allowing member 
states to provide or withhold payments depending on producers’ compliance. The Mid-Term 
2
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Review of June 2003 contained a more incisive move towards direct payments. Moreover, 
further attention was paid to sustainable production, mainly through compulsory cross-
compliance measures, meaning that land receiving payments should be kept in good 
agricultural condition (Silvis and Lappere, 2010). Now that price and income support was 
converted to direct payments, overproduction was no longer an issue. The reduced need for 
production limitations led to the 2008 Health Check’s decision that production restrictions for 
milk and sugar could be gradually eased, to be eventually abolished. The 2013 CAP-reform 
was the most recent step in the transition towards decoupling. 
 
1.1.2 Spatial policies in the Netherlands 
All land-based sectors (e.g. residential, nature or agricultural land) exercise a claim on land. 
Spatial policies aim to regulate land use in an efficient manner, taking into account the 
external effects of land use, thereby determining the allocation of different types of land. These 
policies help concentrate urban areas and maintain open spaces around them. This leads to 
sectors with lower marginal returns to be allocated to areas that, without these policies, would 
have been occupied with activities with a higher shadow price (profitability) of land. This 
especially accounts for agricultural land, which is commonly understood as having a lower 
shadow price compared with residential areas. However, agricultural land may have larger 
positive externalities compared with residential areas, such as biodiversity gains or benefits 
to landscape (e.g. open space) and recreation values (OECD, 2009). The most common way to 
regulate land use is by exercising zoning laws. Zoning laws restrict the location and type of 
land use in a certain area by posing rules and regulations on the use per parcel of land. This 
is especially an effective policy in areas that are under influence of urban pressure. In the 
Netherlands, all (agricultural) land is zoned (IENM, 2011). Within the agricultural zones 
restrictions can apply with regards to the location and size of e.g. barns. Many countries apply 
spatial policies by imposing rules that directly influence the use of land. In this dissertation, I 
3
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limit the focus to the Netherlands where comprehensive spatial planning has been developed 
since 1945 (Faludi, 1991). After an initial focus on resolving housing shortage, the First White 
Paper on Spatial Planning (Eerste Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening) of 1960 served as a major 
landmark in the formation of the spatial agenda. The Spatial Planning Act (Wet op de 
Ruimtelijke Ordening, WRO), first enacted in 1965, administers spatial and urban planning. This 
can be subdivided between three governmental bodies: the national government that unfolds 
the key plans, according to which provinces position their regional plans which are translated 
into structural plans by municipalities. The new WRO of 2006 gave more authority to the 
municipal government which can now use national and provincial regulation as internal 
guidelines rather than seeking prior approval. The latest spatial policy is outlined in the 2013 
Structural Vision (Structuurvisie Infrastructuur en Ruimte).  
Spatial planning in the Netherlands consists of five key principles: concentration of 
urbanization, spatial cohesion, spatial diversity, hierarchy and spatial justice. All of these are, 
albeit to various extents, of influence to the location of agriculture. Concentration of 
urbanization, spatial cohesion and spatial differentiation all work via the Spatial Planning Act 
and aim to manifest cities and to keep them compact and well connected. This leaves more 
room for open-space concepts around cities such as for agriculture and nature areas. Spatial 
hierarchy and spatial justice locate and distribute economic activities according to their 
importance, with rural development considered as a target area. The importance of 
agriculture in spatial planning policies has however been declining. As a result of increased 
globalization and productivity growth, as well as the market liberalization of the CAP reforms 
outlined above, less agricultural land is considered necessary for production in the 
Netherlands (Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000). The decreased importance of agricultural land has 
mainly shifted towards nature areas. According to the 1994 Green Space Structure Plan 
169,000 ha of agricultural land were planned to be converted to nature areas (LNV, 1994). In 
2000, this was topped by almost 50,000 ha. However, the actual conversion of land has been 
4
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far lower (Lauw et al., 2003). Agriculture is now considered to be the most important provider 
of land use change, both towards residential and nature areas. However, at a decreasing speed 
of conversion over time (Koomen et al., 2008). 
 
1.1.3 Farmland conversion in the Netherlands 
Rising pressure on agriculture due to its decreased importance in spatial policies has led to a 
an increasing amount of competing claims on land, and consequently a slow decline in 
agricultural land of, on average, 4% per decade (OECD, 2009). In the Netherlands, a country 
with a long history of agricultural export, this decline has been more profound. Until 1967 
there was a continuous increase in the total amount of agricultural land due to land 
reclamation. Since then, however, agricultural land has declined, with about 0.4% or 8,000 
hectares per year, totalling around 1.9 million hectares of agricultural land in 2012 (see figure 
1.1). Around two-thirds of the decline in agricultural land went to increasing urbanization 
and one-third to nature development. The fact that the decline in agricultural land has not 
happened at a faster pace can be partially explained by spatial policies. Since the 1980s, there 
has been increased concern, especially for land-based sectors, to lose large parts of agricultural 
land to other functions due to, amongst others, a rising productivity of land and increased 
competition with countries with cheap land and labour available compared with the 
Netherlands (Agricola and Vereijken, 2004). However, empirical evidence shows that the high 
costs for land and labour in the Netherlands are largely compensated by the high productivity 
per unit land and labour. There is a trend towards fewer, but larger farms; land of farms that 
shrink or discontinue their agricultural operations is often bought by other farmers, as can be 
seen by the declining number and rising average size of farms in figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1 Development of agricultural price, land, farm size and number of farms between 1971-2011. 
Land conversion within the agricultural sector is largely dependent on the time-horizon of 
decision making. If a farmer’s planning horizon is short, adjustments can only be made if there 
are no large fixed capital investments involved (OECD, 2009). Indication for this can be found 
in figure 1.2, where alterations in total hectares of land are much larger within arable crops 
because that only requires small on-farm adjustments (cereals, sugar beet, potatoes, onions, 
grassland fodder maize) compared with adjustments between the arable and livestock sectors. 
Here, adjustments in fixed capital and therefore long time periods are required for the shift to 
pay off.  
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Figure 1.2 Changes in hectares of land per land use and for arable and grazing farms between 1971-
2013. 
 
Agriculture is essentially a spatial activity. The OECD (2009) distinguishes three types of 
agricultural area: land at the urban fringe, the agricultural zone and the extensive margin. 
Pressure for farmland conversion is at its highest in the urban fringe and the extensive margin. 
The Netherlands is highly urbanized, and therefore most agricultural land is considered to be 
located in the urban fringe; the area where transition between agriculture and residential areas 
takes place. Within the agricultural sector, activities in the Netherlands still largely follow the 
conventional model of Von Thünen with high-value agriculture using large transportation 
costs, such as greenhouse farming, located in urban areas and low-value agriculture, such as 
arable farming, located in the relatively rural areas. Strong zoning policies distinguish 
agriculture in the urbanized West into two types: greenhouse farming and land-based 
farming, mainly dairy farming (Alterman, 1997). These two types differ in terms of profits and 
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externalities: dairy farming has large positive externalities in terms of landscape but relatively 
low returns per hectare, whereas greenhouse farming has low positive externalities but high 
returns per hectare. Another main geographical differentiation in land-based agriculture is 
that between arable farming and grazing livestock (mainly dairy farming), with arable 
farming mostly located in the South-West and North-East (provinces of Zeeland, Flevoland 
and Groningen) and dairy farming mostly located in the North-West and Mid-East (provinces 
of Friesland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, and Friesland) (see figure 1.3). However, with 
dairy farmers increasingly buying land of arable farmers, this geographical differentiation has 
declined in importance. 
Figure 1.3 Agricultural land use in the Netherlands in 2013 (LEI, 2014c). 
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1.2 Driving factors of land use and price changes 
The spatial planning (zoning) policies and the CAP have led to a more secure position of land-
based agriculture in the allocation of land. However, policy changes, especially the CAP 
reform, lead to more risk and uncertainty, affecting producers’ decision-making and 
consequently their land use. Naturally, there are many driving factors of land use change and 
analysing all of them would go beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the elements CAP 
reform, risk and uncertainty and agricultural land use (change) led to the selection of the 
following four factors: increased price volatility and resulting uncertainty, production 
limitations, direct payments and the need for risk management. These factors influence the 
shadow price (i.e. profitability) of agricultural land for individual sectors and therefore induce 
land-use changes. 
 
1.2.1 Increased price volatility and resulting uncertainty 
The EU’s reduced intervention in agricultural markets has led to increasingly volatile output 
prices and more income uncertainty (Havlik et al., 2005; Hennessy, 1998). Uncertainty about 
output prices differs per activity and over time. Land-based activities such as dairy and arable 
farming are less volatile than non-land based sectors such as poultry or greenhouse farming 
(LEI, 2014d). However, for an individual producer, increased output price volatility does not 
necessarily imply changes in the level and variance of income, because income also depends 
on input costs and yields, and the correlation between them (Pennings et al., 2010). More 
specifically, a producer faces different kinds of uncertainty: production uncertainty, due to 
uncontrollable elements such as weather; price uncertainty, because the output price is 
unknown at the time decisions have to be made; technological uncertainty; and policy 
uncertainty (Moschini and Hennessy, 2001). Depending on the correlation between different 
kinds of uncertainty, the increased price volatility may result in more overall uncertainty for 
producers. The resulting uncertainty in producers’ incomes leads to rising income risk 
9
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(Hardaker et al., 1997). However, the increased risk perceived does not only depend on current 
activities, but is also relative to other activities. In selecting potential alternative land uses, it 
may be of importance whether these land uses are substitutes or complements compared with 
current land-use activities. Hence, the likelihood for land-use change depends on the degree 
to which the producer is risk-averse and on whether the crops are complements or substitutes. 
 
1.2.2 Production Limitations 
Due to the price and income support overproduction occurred for certain products. One of 
the most well-known are dairy products, where measures such as subsidies for livestock sales, 
slaughter premiums and price reductions could not prevent large overproduction. This led to 
the introduction of milk quotas in 1984. The total quota amount in the EU was secured at the 
1981 level (+1%), while the distribution was country-specific. If a farmer produced more than 
his quota amount, he had to pay a ‘super levy’, initially set at 115% of a target price. With the 
transition from price support towards decoupled direct income support, quota remained 
binding in only a few countries. This implied that only for these countries, among others the 
Netherlands, national production was restricted to the level set by the quota. The fact that the 
difference between EU and world market prices had disappeared led to the decision to 
expand, and eventually abolish, the milk quotas. The 2003 Fischler reform and 2008 Health 
check contained several quota increases until eventual abolition takes place in 2015.  
Like the introduction, the abolition of milk quota is expected to affect farms. When milk 
quotas are no longer present, land is likely the scarcest production factor in dairy farming in 
the Netherlands, thereby determining the level of dairy production. Although the impact of 
milk quotas is complex, they are likely to hamper changes on dairy farms (Piet et al., 2012). 
Existing research on the influence of milk quotas includes the impact on changes in farm size 
(Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; Huettel and Jongeneel, 2011; Zimmermann and Heckelei, 2012), 
production (Ooms and Peerlings, 2005; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; Huettel and Jongeneel, 
10
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2011) and farm characteristics (Gale, 2003; Ooms and Peerlings, 2005; Huettel and Jongeneel, 
2011). However, the impact on land or the time at which land-use changes occur has not been 
addressed. In light of the assumed transition from milk quotas to land as the scarcest 
production factor, it is of importance to analyse the dynamics of land-use change in dairy 
farming. 
 
1.2.3 Land prices 
So far, a surplus of agricultural land has not occurred in the Netherlands. This is mainly 
because the land of producers who exit farming is bought by other producers. The real price 
of agricultural land has remained stable between the late ‘70s and mid ‘90s, after which a 
fluctuating but steep rise in prices followed (DLG, 2014; LEI, 2013). The increase in farmland 
prices goes hand in hand with an increase in farm size for land-based agriculture (see figure 
1.1). To a certain extent, this provides an explanation for the rise in land prices: increased farm 
size, caused by increasing returns to scale, leads to a larger Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
shadow price of land. However, the fluctuations and rapid rise in the price of agricultural 
land over the past two decades cannot be explained by changes in the NPV alone: several 
other factors help explain the price of agricultural land. A widely researched example is the 
capitalization of direct payments in the price of agricultural land (Clark et al., 1993; Goodwin 
et al., 2003; Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2009). However, also non-income generating factors are of 
importance, such as location characteristics (Shi et al., 1997; Livanis et al., 2006), price cycles 
(LEI, 2013), macro-economic and demographic variables (Devadoss and Manchu, 2007), land-
use and institutional and transaction regulations (Ay and Latruffe, 2013; Just and Miranowski, 
1993). Together, these factors try to explain the ‘farmland valuation puzzle’ (Power and 
Turvey, 2010). 
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1.2.4 Direct Payments 
Direct payments can be seen as the embodiment of the move away from support measures for 
specific products towards a less market-distorting system where agricultural subsidies are 
paid directly to farmers, conditional upon certain practices but decoupled from production. 
This system was gradually introduced between January 2005 and January 2007 under the 
name Single Payment Scheme (SPS). While the European Commission expressed a preference 
for regional area-based payments, countries could choose between a historical, regional or 
hybrid model (Matthews et al., 2013). The majority of countries opted for the historic model, 
where entitlements depend on farm-specific historical reference amounts.  
One would expect that, when subsidies are completely decoupled from production, the level 
of output with subsidies should equal that without subsidies. Hennessy (1998) found that 
impacts of these income-support programs can be divided into a wealth, insurance and 
coupling effect. Decoupled payments add a stable part to the producer’s income, removing 
part of the uncertainty about the level and variance of income, thus leading producers to 
optimize their portfolio of activities to one closer to a risk-neutral situation. Chavas and Holt 
(1990) found indication of this wealth effect by estimating risk preferences together with 
production-function parameters. The effects of decoupling have been extensively researched. 
These include impacts on investment decisions (Sckokai and Moro, 2009), changes in labour 
allocations (Key and Roberts, 2009; Hennessy and Thorne, 2005), increased land and rental 
prices (Brady et al., 2009), and the competition for land within the agricultural sector (Gohin, 
2006). Except for the effect of decoupled payments on land prices, various studies found 
limited impacts of decoupled payments on farm operations (see Bhaskar and Behin, 2009 for 
an overview). However, this may also be due to the different ways decoupling was 
implemented among different member states. 
The CAP reform of 2013 entails a gradual implementation of the regional model where the 
same level of support applies to every hectare of agricultural land, independent of the crops 
12
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cultivated (i.e. flat rate). In addition, producers are compensated for providing public goods 
in the form of environment-friendly farming practices – a so-called greening component that 
is added to the new SFP if farmers are in compliance (European Commission, 2014a). For 
countries which used to have the historical model, such as the Netherlands, this implies a 
move from coupled support to support decoupled from crop yield but not crop allocation 
and, finally, to support decoupled from choice of crop activities but with more emphasis on 
environment-friendly practices (Helming et al., 2010). Therefore, the effects on land use of a 
transition towards a flat-rate payment according to the 2013 CAP reform might be more 
significant than the introduction of the SPS under the Mid-Term Review. 
 
1.2.5 The need for risk management 
Producers are generally considered to be risk averse, meaning they will give up some level of 
expected income in order to reduce the possibility of a negative outcome (Arrow, 1996). The 
most common way for them to do so is by altering their production plan. This is why, upon 
analysing land allocation decisions, producers’ preferences have often been characterized 
using an expected utility function (Chavas and Pope, 1985; Coyle, 1999; Oude Lansink, 1999; 
Sckokai and Moro, 2006). Although there has been quite some critique on the approach of an 
expected utility function (see e.g. Buschena and Zilberman, 1994), it is still one of the leading 
frameworks to describe producers’ economic choices. 
The increased instability of agricultural incomes strengthens the need for risk management. 
Risk management is used to control the possible adverse consequences of uncertainty that 
may arise from production decisions. A producer may adopt several measures to decrease 
rising income risk, such as crop diversification, forward and future contracts. Government 
policies are also aimed at reducing production risk. To shift risk away from producers, 
government intervention is necessary, due to failures in the ideal competitive market for risk-
shifting (Arrow, 1996). This is especially the case for catastrophic events, such as floods and 
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droughts, which are characterised by systemic risk, meaning that there is a large geographical 
correlation between farms (Meuwissen et al., 2003; Glauber, 2004; Miranda and Glauber, 1997). 
A well-known measure supported by governments to provide assistance in risk management 
is the possibility for farmers to insure (part of the) farm operations. These may protect against 
the risk of losing (part of the) income due to catastrophic events (such as livestock diseases) 
or common fluctuations (such as whole-farm insurance). Programs reducing income 
variability entail both a wealth and an insurance effect that may lead to different land 
allocation decisions (Hennessy, 1998; Chavas and Holt, 1996; Adams et al., 2001). The recent 
spikes in agricultural prices caused an increased appeal for financial safety nets among 
member states. Although eventually not adopted, the proposals of the 2013 CAP reform 
entailed a risk management toolkit, including whole-farm income insurance. 
 
1.3 Objective and research questions 
The location and use of agricultural land in the Netherlands is partly due to two protective 
policies: zoning policies and the CAP. Changes in these policies influence both the use and 
the price of agricultural land. At the changing interplay between the CAP and spatial policies 
this study aims to investigate driving forces of agricultural land use and price changes in the 
Netherlands. For this purpose the following objective is defined:  
 
“To investigate farmer’s decision-making on agricultural land use changes in the Netherlands, 
accounting for the role of the EU’s CAP reform”. 
 
Five driving factors influencing decision making on both on-farm land adjustments and 
changes to the size of the farm are selected: increased price volatility and resulting 
uncertainty, production limitations, land prices, direct payments and the need for risk 
14
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management. From the main objective the following five research questions are defined and 
worked out in subsequent chapters: 
1. What is the effect of volatile agricultural output prices on agricultural land use 
over the past decade? 
2. What is the effect of the abolition of milk quota on the time period between 
agricultural land-use changes?  
3. How can farmland prices, and more specifically the effect of the financial crisis 
on the land market price, be explained? 
4. What is the effect of the transition from a historic-reference payment to a single 
(per ha) farm payment, including a green payment (GP) option, on the way the farmer 
allocates his land to various crop activities? 
5. What is the effect of insurance possibilities, more specifically crop-specific and 
whole farm insurance, on agricultural land use? 
 
1.4 Data and models 
Driving factors of land use change impact different types of farms in various ways. In order 
to study the socio-economic drivers of land use change, models and data are required that 
explicitly take individual producers’ behaviour into account.  
This study utilises three different datasets, all describing factors relating to land use of land-
based farms in the Netherlands. The Farm Structure Survey (FSS) considers production 
activities of all farms in the Netherlands from 1971 onwards. It contains the amount of land 
and its allocation and a limited number of production factors (e.g. livestock, labour) and farm 
characteristics (e.g. age of the farmer). A more detailed account of on-farm production can be 
found in the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). This dataset is available from 
2000 onwards and contains economic details on farm production activities for a representative 
sample of farms. The third dataset is LEI’s land transaction database which is based on 
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cadastral data, considering all transactions to and from farmers between 1998 and 2011. 
Besides the price and number of hectares transacted, it contains information on the parcel of 
land transacted and the buying/selling farmer. Depending on the research question, the most 
suitable methodology and (combination of) data is chosen.  
To analyse the aforementioned research questions, several quantitative methods are 
employed that take systematic differences between farms into account. Panel-data 
econometrics, using historic data, explain land use changes using various explanatory 
variables. Land-use models based on mathematical programming enable to make statements 
on hypothetical land-use changes, mainly because constraints and policy instruments can be 
added and no large amount of data is required. Spatial econometric techniques further help 
assess the influence of location.  
 
1.4.1 Volatile output prices 
The EU’s CAP reforms to liberalize markets and decouple payments from production have 
thus led to increasingly volatile output prices, and therefore more price and income risk. There 
is an extensive amount of literature on the estimation of models that analyse the influence of 
output price volatility on agricultural land allocation decisions. Broadly, two lines of thinking 
can be distinguished: estimating a system of output supply, input demand, and land-use 
equations (Coyle, 1992; Oude Lansink, 1999; Sckokai and Moro, 2006), and estimating land-
use response equations (Moore and Negri, 1992; Wu and Segerson, 1995; Fezzi and Bateman, 
2011). The two approaches were integrated by Chambers and Just (1989) and extended by 
Arnade and Kelch (2007) and Fezzi and Bateman (2011). Estimating land-use response 
equations that account for the effect of price uncertainty on alternative land uses has not yet 
been undertaken. To assess the income and risk effects of volatile output prices on agricultural 
land-use I therefore estimate a multiple-equation panel data model. The land-response 
equations are based on a restricted profit function, taking both risk and farm technology into 
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account. Data from the FSS on 66 Dutch agricultural regions from 2000 through 2013 is used 
to analyse the land-use decisions of producers. 
 
1.4.2 Milk quota 
The uncertainty regarding the abolition of production limitations impacts the dynamics of 
producers’ decision-making. Most studies analysing the impact of quota abolition focus on 
the magnitude of change in certain factors, but not on the timing of changes. Here, the analysis 
comprises the time period between two changes in land used for milk production on dairy 
farms and the direction of change, either positive or negative, before, during and towards the 
abolition of milk quota. In the FSS, all farms remain in the sample until they decide to exit 
farming or continue farming under a different name (e.g. in case of a merger). Because of this 
latter possibility, it is not possible to study farm entry and exit decisions. It is however possible 
to study growth, both in its positive and negative meaning. A dataset from the FSS comprising 
farm-level data of the Netherlands between 1971 and 2011 is used to estimate two duration 
models, analysing the time period between increases and decreases in dairy land use. 
 
1.4.3 Land prices 
Farmland prices can only to a limited extent be explained by the discounted shadow prices of 
land (NPV), where the NPV is usually comprised of the average stream of discounted net 
revenues and direct payments (see Latruffe and Le Mouel, 2009, for an overview of studies 
using the NPV approach). Previous studies have noted that the purchase and rental prices of 
farmland may entail spatial effects that need to be further explained (Patton and McErlean, 
2002; Breustedt and Habermann, 2011; Guastella et al., 2013). In order to better assess how 
farmland prices are composed, it is of importance to distinguish the part explained by 
revenues directly obtained from farming from all other factors explaining farmland prices. In 
this chapter, three categories influencing the price of land are used besides those factors that 
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directly influence the returns from land; institutional regulations, the spatial environment and 
local market conditions. Using the land transactions database covering the period between 
2004 and 2011, all transactions where the purchaser practices land-based agriculture are 
selected. These are divided in two equal periods to distinguish the effect of the crisis on the 
agricultural land market. 
 
1.4.4 Direct payments 
For the Netherlands, the flat-rate payment may lead to a lower level of income support and 
an increase in income uncertainty. Thus, it is prudent to investigate if, and under what 
circumstances, this implies land-use changes, and more specifically the adoption of greening 
practices, for farms of different sizes. This chapter analyses the effect that the different 
payment mechanisms, including both SFP and green payments (GP), have on land use (crop 
allocation) decisions. In essence, the effects of the 2003 Mid-Term Review is compared with 
the single-farm payment of the 2013 CAP reforms on cropping decisions using the 
Netherlands as a case study. Using FADN data for representative Dutch arable farms of 
different sizes, a farm-level crop allocation model is developed that is calibrated using positive 
mathematical programming. 
 
1.4.5 Insurance 
Insurance possibilities ultimately reduce risk in farmer’s land-use decision-making. The 
methodologies used in the literature on the influence of insurance measures on production 
and land-use decisions can be divided into simultaneous equation models investigating 
acreage response of different types of insurance schemes (Goodwin et al., 2004; Wu, 1999; Wu 
and Adams, 2001) and mathematical programming models that examine changes in a farmer’s 
crop portfolio (Turvey, 2012). New agricultural policies might be better modelled using a 
mathematical programming framework (Heckelei et al., 2012). In order to analyse the uptake 
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and impact of crop-specific and whole-farm insurance, a farm management model with the 
objective to maximize utility is developed, where insurance depends on crop allocation, while 
at the same time crop allocation depends on the type of insurance provided. Using the same 
FADN data for representative Dutch arable producers of different sizes, optimal crop 
portfolio changes are analysed as the insurance instrument changes. The model is calibrated 
using positive mathematical programming, and random revenue outcomes based on Monte 
Carlo simulation of crop prices and yields, thereby explicitly accounting for trends in prices 
and variability in prices and yields.  
 
The outline of this thesis is as follows. Chapters 2 through 6 deal with the specific research 
questions 1 through 5 introduced above, respectively. The last chapter provides conclusions 
and a general discussion. 
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CHAPTER 2. EFFECT OF OUTPUT PRICE VOLATILITY ON 
AGRICULTURAL LAND USE1 
 
Abstract 
The EU’s CAP reform to liberalize markets and decouple payments from 
production has led to increasingly volatile output prices, and therefore, more 
price and income risk. In this study, eight land use share equations are 
specified and estimated using regional data from 2000 through 2013. A 
multiple-equation panel data model is used to determine the contribution of 
increased price volatility and risk to land-use change. More specifically, it is 
investigated how relative perceived risk affects land use change. We found 
opposite effects between complementing and substituting land uses, leading 
to competition within the dairy sector and within crop production. 
 
  
1 Paper by Esther Boere, Jack Peerlings, Stijn Reinhard, Tom Kuhlman and Wim Heijman, 
Forthcoming in New Medit 
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2.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade in the Netherlands, volatile output prices have led to fluctuating 
profitability of agricultural land and may therefore have affected land-use decisions. For a 
producer, the shadow price of land represents the land's marginal contribution to profit. If a 
producer has no constraints on land use, profit maximization occurs at the point where 
shadow prices are equal among all alternative land uses. However, the equality of shadow 
prices among land uses only accounts for expected output prices because producers do not 
know output prices at the time they choose their production activities, and must base their 
expectation on past experience. This causes uncertainty for the producer about the difference 
between the actual and expected output price, which may differ per activity and through time. 
For a risk-neutral producer uncertainty will not influence his production decisions. For a risk-
averse producer, production activities with a high expected output price and a low profit 
variability are preferred. A risk-averse producer, faced with increased volatility in output 
prices, is therefore more likely to switch to less volatile production activities. 
The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is shifting away from market and 
price support to liberalized markets and decoupled payments from production. This is likely 
to result in an increased volatility of output prices and hence, farm profits, which affects the 
competitive positions of agricultural and non-agricultural land uses (Ridier and Jacquet, 2002; 
Sckokai and Moro, 2006; Brady et al., 2009). However, because the degree of volatility is crop-
specific, the effect on farm plans has so far remained unclear. 
Competing agricultural and non-agricultural claims arise, especially in areas such as the 
Netherlands where land is scarce. In this chapter our focus is solely on agricultural land use, 
ignoring competition with other sectors and taking the total (decreasing) amount of 
agricultural land as given.  
There is an extensive literature on the estimation of models that analyse multiple-output 
supply decisions and agricultural land allocation decisions. Broadly, two lines of thinking can 
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be distinguished: estimating a system of output supply, input demand, and land-use 
equations (Coyle, 1992; Oude Lansink, 1999; Sckokai and Moro, 2006), and estimating land-
use response equations (Moore and Negri, 1992; Wu and Segerson, 1995; Fezzi and Bateman, 
2011).  
Estimating a system of output supply, input demand, and land-use equations has been 
applied by Coyle (1990; 1992; 1999), who combined the effects of risk aversion, price 
uncertainty, and yield uncertainty on crop production decisions in mean-variance duality 
models of production. Oude Lansink (1999) elaborated on Coyle’s work by using a linear 
mean-variance utility function that incorporated risk to determine the input demand, output 
supply, and area allocation simultaneously among various crops. More recently, Sckokai and 
Moro (2006) adapted Coyle’s framework to account for the increased output price volatility 
caused by CAP reforms in a study of crop production.  
Estimating land-response equations has been applied by Moore and Negri (1992) to develop 
land and water allocation equations based on a flexible functional form of a multi-crop 
production function. Wu and Segerson (1995) elaborated on this model by adjusting it to 
account for land heterogeneity.  
The two approaches were integrated by Chambers and Just (1989), who used a two-step 
modelling framework: this approach allocates land among different production activities after 
the optimal levels of outputs and inputs have been determined. Arnade and Kelch (2007) 
extended this framework by deriving shadow price equations for crop areas. Fezzi and 
Bateman (2011) used the Chambers and Just framework to establish a joint profit function to 
derive equations for "land-use share" (the proportion of the land area allocated to each use) 
that can be estimated as a system. There also exists a great body of literature on yield risk (Just 
and Pope, 1979; Chavas and Holt, 1990). However, in order to focus on price risk, we choose 
to ignore yield risk. Estimating land-use response equations that not only account for the effect 
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of price uncertainty on its own land use (e.g. price uncertainty of wheat on the land use of 
wheat), but also on alternative land uses (e.g. sugar beets) has not yet been undertaken.  
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the effect of volatile agricultural output prices on 
changes in agricultural land use since 2000 in the Netherlands by estimating a system of land-
response equations. The land-response equations are based on a restricted profit function, 
taking both risk and farm technology into account. We used data on 66 Dutch agricultural 
regions from 2000 through 2013 to analyse the land-use decisions of producers. 
In the next section we establish land use share functions that account for the risks that result 
from increased price volatility. Moreover, we hypothesize that the effect of agricultural 
outputs being complements and substitutes affects land use decisions. Next, we describe the 
study area and data sources. We then develop an empirical model in which the producer 
optimizes his profit by allocating land among different uses while accounting for risk. In the 
final sections, we econometrically estimate the land-use share equations, discuss the results, 
provide a general discussion, and present the main conclusions drawn from our study.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
Building upon the work of amongst others Chavas and Pope (1982), Coyle (1990, 1992) and 
Wu and Segerson (1995) we derive a system of land use share equations based on a utility 
maximizing producer. We assume a profit function with multiple outputs (land uses or crops), 
where the producer must decide how to allocate his hectares among different land uses in 
order to maximize total profits (Wu and Segerson, 1995). The profit function is elaborated by 
accounting for risk in production decisions; the producer therefore becomes a utility-
maximizer (Oude Lansink, 1999). Expected utility is determined by the expected profit, the 
variance of profit, and the coefficients of absolute risk aversion per crop (see e.g. Coyle, 1990, 
1992). Based on utility maximization we derive land-use share functions that represent the 
proportion of the land that producer h allocates to land use i in year t:  
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The land-use share of producer h for crop i in year t ( Uhits ) depends on all expected output 
prices ( tpˆ ) and known variable input prices ( tw ) in year t, yields ( htq ) of producer h in year 
t, fixed input quantities ( htz ) of producer h in year t, the variance of prices ( Vp ), and the 
degree of risk-aversion. The land use shares equal the number of hectares Uhitn  of producer h 
allocated to crop i in year t divided by the total number of hectares Nht of producer h in year 
t. When Vp=0, the land-use share equation for the utility-maximizing producer equals the 
land-use share equation for the profit-maximizing producer. For the mathematical derivation 
from the profit function to the land use shares, we refer the reader to the Appendix.  
 
2.2.1 Ratio of coefficient of variations 
Figure 2.1 shows that for all output prices there is some degree of volatility. We assume that, 
when determining optimal land use, the producer looks at the relative price volatility between 
crops; hence the variation of a crop compared with the variation of the alternative crops. To 
take this into account, we take the ratios of the coefficients of variation as elements of Vp:  
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where Cvr is the 3-year moving average of the coefficient of variation, the standard deviation 
divided by the average, of the output price of the alternative (substitute or complement) crop 
and Cvi is the 3-year moving average of the coefficient of variation of the output price of the 
crop of interest. Hence, in ‘the ratio of the coefficients of variation’ the CV of the alternative 
crop is in the numerator and that of the crop of interest in the denominator. 
25
2 
We used coefficients of variation instead of variances because, in comparison to variance, the 
coefficient of variation is a unitized measure of risk. So, dividing the ratio of two coefficient 
of variations (see equation 2) does not lead to a violation of the homogeneity assumption. 
 
2.2.2 Substitutes and complements 
In the model presented, land use change depends on the factors determining the land shares, 
i.e. expected output prices, variable input prices, yields, quantities of fixed factors and the 
variance of output prices. Implicit is also farm technology relevant, showing to what extent 
the producer is able to adjust activities within his enterprise. One aspect of farm technology 
is whether production activities are complements or substitutes. Complements are defined as 
those activities that are in joint supply, either because of crop rotation requirements or because 
one output is needed as an input in producing another output. Substitutes are defined as (sets 
of) activities that are rival to each other. 
For arable production in the Netherlands, the common rotation system is the joint production 
of cereals, potatoes and sugar beets. For dairy production, fodder maize and grassland can be 
viewed as complementary to milk production. When facing a larger expected utility, it is likely 
to be easier for a producer to switch activities within these two sets of production rather than 
between them. 
Based on the ratios of coefficients of variation we can examine whether two land uses are 
substitutes or complements. For substitutes and in case of risk-aversion a producer will 
increase the share of a crop when the ratio of coefficients of variation increases (the coefficient 
of variation of the crop being in the denominator). For complements the opposite is true. 
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2.3 Data 
We divided the Netherlands into 66 agricultural regions using an existing classification based 
on homogeneity of soil types (Helming, 2005; Helming and Reinhard, 2009). One of the 
advantages of using this classification for the types of agricultural regions is the relative 
homogeneity of the soil within these regions. All regions can be classified based on the soil 
type (clay, sand, or mixed soil that includes peats and loams). Different soil types generate 
different crop yields and therefore attract different production activities. 
We aggregated farm structure survey (FSS) data for all farm households in the Netherlands 
from 2000 through 2013 into the 66 agricultural regions (Statistics Netherlands, 2013). Based 
on the available data, we defined eight agricultural outputs as the different types of land use. 
Specifically, we grouped the agricultural land uses into cereals, grassland, sugar beets, 
potatoes, fodder maize, onions, vegetables, and "other" (Table 2.1). In the Netherlands, 
grassland is mainly used for dairy production. Although beef and other cattle are also grazed 
in Dutch grassland areas, they account for a small proportion of the total grassland use. 
Moreover, nitrate regulations require a minimum amount of land per cow and thereby make 
dairy farming heavily dependent on the availability of grassland. Thus, in the rest of the 
chapter, we will refer to grassland exclusively in the context of dairy cattle.  
For each year and each region, we calculated the amount of land (ha) for each land use using 
Dutch FSS data. We converted that area (ha) into land-use shares by dividing the area of each 
land use in a given region and year by the corresponding total amount of agricultural land. 
Table 2.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the agricultural land uses for the first and 
last years of the panel and for the panel as a whole. Table 2.3 summarizes the descriptive 
statistics for the explanatory variables. 
The aggregation from individual crops to the eight land uses led us to use price indices instead 
of absolute prices for each land use. We first standardized all nominal absolute prices using 
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2000 as the base year before we normalized output prices by dividing them by the output 
price index of fertilizer (Eurostat, 2014; LEI, 2014c).  
 
Table 2.1: Specification of land uses and their outputs 
Land Use Crops Output price and yield 
Cereals Winter wheat, Summer wheat Summer wheat 
 Winter barley, Summer barley  
Grassland Permanent grassland Milk 
Temporary grassland 
Sugar beets Sugar beets Sugar beets 
Potatoes Seed potatoes, Main crop potatoes 
Consumption potatoes 
Fodder maize Fodder maize Fodder maize 
Onions Seed onions, Seed onions Seed onions 
Vegetables Endives, cauliflowers, leeks, broccoli, 
Brussels sprouts 
Cauliflowers 
Other All other crops Overall index 
 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to retrieve all data on output and input prices from the 
same database. Therefore, data on absolute output prices for several land uses (cereals, 
grassland, potatoes, fodder maize, and onions) were retrieved from LEI (2014c), whereas data 
on absolute output prices for the other land uses (sugar beet, vegetables, and other) were 
retrieved from Eurostat (2014). Data on the input price of pesticides was retrieved from LEI 
(2014c), whereas data on the input price of fertilizer was retrieved from Eurostat (2014). We 
only include fertilizer and pesticides as variable inputs because all selected crops require these 
inputs. 
For some land uses, we chose a proxy for output price (see Table 2.1). For onions, there was a 
limited amount of price data available. This led us to replace the output prices for onions from 
2000 through 2004 with the corresponding prices from 1995 through 1999. The resulting 
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output price indices are shown in figure 2.1. As a measure of the expected output prices, we 
calculated an annual 3-year moving average (ending with the year previous from the year 
being studied) of the output prices.  
 
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for agricultural land uses at the start and end of the period 
and whole panel. 
 2000 2013 Whole panel 
Sharea) 
Absolute 
(1000 ha) 
Share 
Absolute 
(1000 ha) 
Share 
Mea
n 
S.D. Min. Max 
share 
non-
zero 
obs 
share 
left-
censor
ed obs 
Cereals 183.64 0.10 182.37 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.41 0.99 0.00 
Grassland 1010.02 0.52 982.95 0.54 0.53 0.27 0.09 0.99 1.00 0.00 
Sugar beets 110.95 0.06 73.19 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.97 0.03 
Potatoes 180.16 0.09 155.82 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.40 0.99 0.02 
Fodder 
maize 205.30 0.09 229.74 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.40 1.00 
0.00 
Onions 19.27 0.01 28.17 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.84 0.22 
Vegetables 6.44 0.00 6.70 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.93 0.08 
Other 235.68 0.14 188.67 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.62 1.00  
Total 1951.45 1.00 1847.61 1.00 1.00           
a) (absolute = the actual area; share = absolute area divided by the total area) 
 
Producer expectations about price fluctuations are based on past experience. We assumed that 
price variation was equal across regions. The coefficient of variation of the normalized output 
price indices over the 3 years previous to the year being studied was used as a proxy for the 
expected variation in output prices. In addition to the output and input prices, we included 
the quantity of fixed inputs, yields and the presence of direct payments as explanatory 
variables. As a proxy for fixed inputs, we used the average size of a farm in a region, which 
was obtained from the FSS data. Size is measured by the standardized annual revenue of a 
specific production type per hectare of land or per animal. The average size was calculated as 
the sum of all farm sizes in a region, divided by the number of farms in the region and 
subsequently converted into an index. For each land use, the production (yield in kg/ha; Table 
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2.3) was converted into an index value similar to that for output prices (with the value in 2000 
= 100). The presence of direct payments is referenced to as a dummy trend, starting in 2006 
when direct payments were introduced, and taking the value zero prior to 2006. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2.2 show that average land use shares of the different 
agricultural land uses over all regions have changed only slightly over time. However, some 
land uses have changed considerably more than others. In particular, the area of sugar beets, 
potatoes and other decreased, whereas the area of grassland and fodder maize increased. This 
indicates a tendency towards dairy production. Grassland remained the main land use 
throughout the study period, with a share of more than 50% of the total agricultural land. The 
columns representing standard deviations, minimum and maximum shares of land use in 
Table 2.2 indicate large regional differences in land uses. This may be because of the division 
of regions based on homogeneity of soil. In varying degrees, almost all land uses are prevalent 
in each region during the whole period (see last column Table 2.2). 
Compared to the relatively small changes in the land-use shares, figure 2.1 shows relatively 
large changes in output prices. The output prices seemed to follow some common trends in 
their fluctuations, such as decreases between 2003 and 2005 and between 2007 and 2008 and 
an increase over the last two years. However, large differences in the volatility of the output 
prices can be observed. Output price volatility was especially high for onions and potatoes, 
both in terms of the largest increase between two years (respectively 237.5 and 172.7 percent) 
and the largest decrease between two years (respectively -56.7 and -79 percent), compared to 
an average increase of 31.8 and an average decrease of 15.7 percent over all land uses between 
two years. 
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics of explanatory variables over the whole time period 
Land-use  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Expected output price indices (normalized by the price of fertilizer) 
Cereals 0.838 0.134 0.624 1.126 
Grassland 0.770 0.182 0.493 1.159 
Sugar beets 0.770 0.208 0.451 1.189 
Potatoes 2.500 0.633 1.511 4.023 
Fodder maize 0.930 0.231 0.600 1.472 
Onions 2.015 0.413 1.445 3.128 
Vegetables 0.818 0.156 0.530 1.115 
Other 0.876 0.113 0.653 1.069 
Expected yield indices (/100 in estimation for scaling purposes) 
Cereals 100.910 3.382 92.647 104.902 
Grassland 103.237 4.099 94.691 109.078 
Sugar beets 106.949 8.335 91.952 127.030 
Potatoes 94.576 1.904 90.386 97.193 
Fodder maize 106.612 3.987 100.480 115.588 
Onions 92.550 3.282 85.323 101.882 
Vegetables 108.451 7.744 83.548 218.187 
Input price indices (normalized by the price of fertilizer) 
Pesticides 0.724 0.147 0.450 1.000 
subsidies 0.571 0.495 0.000 1.000 
Fixed cost indices (/100 in estimation for scaling purposes) 
Farm size 118.000 18.000 48.000 198.000 
Coefficient of variation of the normalized expected output price indices a) 
Cereals 0.182 0.121 0.058 0.469 
Grassland 0.124 0.074 0.044 0.309 
Sugar beets 0.129 0.077 0.021 0.329 
Potatoes 0.397 0.200 0.063 0.816 
Fodder maize 0.116 0.060 0.037 0.200 
Onions 0.542 0.155 0.242 0.840 
Vegetables 0.121 0.067 0.030 0.340 
Other 0.121 0.093 0.047 0.314 
a) For scaling purposes and clarity of estimation results, the ratio of coefficients of variation are divided 
by 10. 
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The large differences in output price volatility are reflected in the coefficients of variation of 
output prices (Table 2.3). Potatoes and onions experienced much larger price variations than 
other land uses. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Changes in nominal output prices from 2000 to 2013. Values are normalized by setting the 
price in the base year (2000) to 100 
2.4 Empirical Model 
As indicated in equation 1 the allocation of land among different production activities for a 
utility-maximizing producer does not depend only upon output and input prices, and fixed 
input quantities, but also depends upon the variation in output prices in relation to farm 
technology and the producer's degree of risk-aversion. Given the land-use share equations for 
a utility-maximizing producer developed in the theoretical model we have specified the 
following reduced-form land-use share equations:  
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 , h=1,…,H; i=1,…,I; t=1,…,T  (3) 
Where *hitS  represents the Nht land-use shares of crop i in region h in year t; ?hi represents the 
region-specific intercept for region h and land use i; ?ij represents the coefficients for 
normalized input and output prices j for crop i; jtx  represents the normalized input and output 
prices j in year t; ?im represents the coefficients of yields m for crop i; qmt represents the yields 
m in year t; ?hk represents the coefficients of fixed factors k for region h; zkht represents the fixed 
input factors k for region h in year t; ?i represents the coefficient for crop i for the presence of 
direct income payments, gt represents the direct income payments dummy trend, ?ir 
represents the coefficients for the ratios of the coefficients of variation of the expected prices r 
for crop i; ?irt represents the ratios of the coefficients of variation of the expected alternative 
prices r with respect to expected prices i in year t???i represents the coefficient of crop i for the 
trends; Tt represents the time trend; and uit represents the unobservable effects that affect land-
use change for crop i in year t. 
Equation 3 specifies the share of land use for each crop i in region h in year t. Because only 
relative prices matter, the model has been made homogeneous of degree zero by normalizing 
the standardized output prices and the standardized price of pesticides using the price of 
fertilizer. Each land use share equation only includes expected output price of its own land 
use and not expected output prices of alternative land uses in order to avoid multicollinearity. 
Due to data limitations, the fixed input quantities (zhkt) are only represented by the average 
farm size per region per year and not allocated to individual land uses. A time trend has been 
included to account for crop-specific trends in land-use shares. 
We assume the covariances of output prices to be zero. In reality, the covariances are not zero, 
but the large amount of covariance values caused multi-collinearity problems. For a producer, 
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the covariance of alternative products may be of importance in deciding upon land allocation. 
However, by estimating the effect of the ratios of the coefficients of variation all alternative 
land uses are taken into account.  
We tested for censoring from below, meaning that there is a lower bound of zero for all land 
use shares. In case many land use shares actually take the value zero this could lead to 
inconsistent estimates of the parameters (Fezzi and Bateman, 2011). The results, provided in 
Table 2.2, show that censored observations are only present for vegetables, but not enough 
that inconsistent estimates of the parameters may be expected. This, together with the few 
non-zero observations for crop shares (see Table 2.2) means that we do not have to take sample 
selection problems into account. We therefore estimated the land-use share equations as a 
system using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique taking into account that the 
disturbances from different share equations are likely to be correlated because of common 
unobservable factors (Fiebig, 2001). This correlation could have several causes, such as 
weather, policy changes affecting the agricultural sector as whole, or economy-wide shocks. 
The yearly observations over the same study areas lead to a panel that required a fixed-effects 
transformation of the SUR regression. Because we deal with national values for both price and 
yield indices, a fixed effects transformation using deviations from the mean was not possible. 
We therefore chose a first-difference transformation on the model of the eight land-use shares:  
 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
*
1
*
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
???????
???????
??
??
ititi
R
r
irtirtir
K
k
hkthkthk
tt
M
m
mtmtim
J
j
jtjtijhithit
uuvvzz
ggqqxxSS
???
???
h=1,…,H; i=1,…,I; t=1,…,T  (4) 
Equation 4 implies that the intercept ( hi? ), which represents the region-specific effect, cancels 
out. The new intercept ?i represents the coefficient of the crop-specific trend in equation 3. 
The transformed explanatory variables are composed of the first-differenced expected output 
prices ? ?itp? , first-differenced input prices ? ?tw , first-differenced yields per hectare (qmt), first-
differenced average farm size (zhkt), first-differenced dummy trend representing the presence 
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of direct income payments (gt), and the first-differenced ratios of the coefficients of variation 
? ?1?? irtirt vv 2. Note that the dummy time trend for government subsidies transforms into a 
dummy representing the presence of direct payments. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 list the dependent 
and explanatory variables and their descriptive statistics. 
Because all land-use shares together must sum to 0 in the first-differenced model, estimating 
all the land-use equations together results in a singular covariance matrix of error terms. 
While there are various ways to handle this singularity problem (Takada et al., 1995), we 
decided to drop the residual equation ‘other’ from the system (Fezzi and Bateman, 2011). The 
residual equation can then be recalculated because, by definition, the land-use shares must 
sum to 1. 
 
2.5 Results 
We tested the contemporaneous correlation using the Breusch-Pagan test. The null hypothesis 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2(21) = 274.101 and P < 
0.001). This suggests that there is significant correlation because common elements exist in the 
seven equations that relate the equations through their residuals. The strongest correlations 
occurred between the residuals for wheat and meadows (33%) and potatoes and onions (22%). 
We tested for groupwise heteroskedasticity using the Lagrange Multiplier test. The null 
hypothesis (i.e., no groupwise heteroskedasticity) was rejected at the 1% level of significance 
for each of the seven equations. This means that the variances are constant over time within 
the equations, but differ between them. We tested for groupwise autocorrelation using the 
Durbin-Watson test. For all land uses the null hypothesis (i.e., no-autocorrelation) was 
rejected at the AR(1) level. This result means that there is either positive or negative 
2 Note that with first-differencing the panel is reduced by one year; i.e. observations start as of the 
second year of observations in the original panel. Moreover, first-differencing only occurs between 
time periods and not between regions or land uses. 
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autocorrelation and that the different error terms are correlated. Hence, statistical efficiency 
increases by estimating the seven equations as a system, and SUR is therefore the appropriate 
estimation method. Without SUR, the observed heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation would 
lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the estimated regression coefficients for the seven land-use share 
equations. The table consists of two parts. The upper part of the table reports the regression 
coefficients of all variables except those relating to risk. The lower part of the table reports the 
regression coefficients for perceived risk due to price volatility. ???????????????2 value for all 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2 value 
was significant at the 5% level. This means that at least one of the regression coefficients in the 
model does not equal zero. Hence, we can be confident that the dependent variable is 
correlated with the individual variables. The coefficients of the land-use equations were 
generally small, indicating that land-use change is a slow process. We will discuss the 
estimation results for all variables except those relating to risk in the next section. 
 
2.5.1 Non-risk estimation results 
An increase in the expected output price of a particular land use is expected to lead to an 
increase in the share of that particular land use. Only grassland showed a negative and 
significant coefficient (Table 2.4), which supports this hypothesis. In the Netherlands, 
grassland is mainly associated with dairy farming. Dairy farming has been subject to quota 
restrictions for the whole observation period; making it more difficult to increase milk 
production following an increase in the output price of milk. Using the expected prices and 
land use shares of 2013 we calculated the elasticities with respect to output price of the land 
use shares. Table 2.5 shows the resulting percentage change in land shares, taking into account 
the effect of a 1% increase in a particular output price on its own and on alternative land use 
shares. All percentage changes in land share are inelastic with respect to its output price. This 
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is as expected; land use change is a slow process and is dependent on many other factors such 
as farm technology. Sugar beet and potatoes show the highest percentage change in land share 
(respectively 0.514 and 0.692 percent), grassland the lowest (-0.231 percent).  
 Yield per ha is assumed to have a positive effect on the land use share because yield increase 
makes producing the crop more profitable. For cereals and potatoes an increase in the 
expected yield leads to a significant increase in land-use share. For sugar beet, grassland and 
onions, an expected yield increase has a significant negative effect. Again, for both sugar beet 
and grassland, this may have to do with the quotas, restricting the ability to increase yields. 
For onions, this result might be counter-intuitive, but may be caused by the large fluctuations 
in yield for this crop. 
When subsidies are completely decoupled from production, they should not alter the 
production plan (Hennessy, 1998). However, production decisions may be affected indirectly 
because of the so-called wealth effect, increasing a farmer’s wealth and thereby reducing his 
level of risk aversion (Finger and Lehmann, 2012; Hennessy, 1998). Previous studies found 
that this may have some impact on crop allocation (Sckokai and Moro, 2009; Koundouri et al., 
2009). This would mean that due to the single farm payments (SFP), farmers are more willing 
to cultivate crops with a large price volatility. We find a positive and significant effect for 
cereals, sugar beet and grassland and a negative and significant effect for potatoes. Due to the 
decrease in the share of potatoes, a crop with large volatility, we do not find indication of a 
wealth effect. For grassland and sugar beet, the increase in share may have to do with the fact 
that the introduction of SFP was accompanied by a reduction in production restrictions. The 
trend for subsidies may therefore not only represent the introduction of SFP, but also the 
wider on-going liberalization of the CAP.  
An increase in the price of pesticides is expected to lead to a decrease in the share of any land 
use that uses pesticides at a high intensity, but to an increase in the land-use share for a land 
use that uses pesticides at a low intensity. For grassland, the price of pesticides had a 
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significant negative coefficient (Table 2.4). In contrast, potatoes and onions have a significant 
positive coefficient for pesticides. If the price of pesticides increases, this means that it 
becomes more favourable to cultivate these crops. Because fertilizer and pesticide use are 
positively correlated in intensive agriculture, this reasoning is in line with that of Fezzi and 
Bateman (2011), who reported that the price effect of fertilizer depended on whether the crop 
was nutrient-intensive or not.  
Since fixed inputs are not crop-specific we neither expect positive nor negative coefficients for 
average farm size. The coefficients representing average size showed little effect on the land-
use shares (i.e., all values >-0.023 and <0.016; Table 2.4). For cereals, sugar beet, onions and 
vegetables small significant effects were found. 
The constant represents the overall trend in the land-use shares of the different crops. There 
was a positive and significant trend for sugar beet, potatoes and fodder maize and a negative 
and significant effect for grassland (Table 2.4).  
 
2.5.2 Risk estimation results 
The lower part of Table 2.4 reports the ratios of the coefficients of variation of the prices of 
two land uses as a measure of perceived risk due to the expected price volatility of the two 
land uses. The advantage of using the ratios of coefficients of variation rather than variances 
and covariances results from the fact that it accounts for the risk-averse producer who 
compares the alternative crop with the current crop. In the lower half of Table 2.4, the values 
equal the coefficient of variation of the alternative crop (listed in the rows of the table) divided 
by the coefficient of variation of the current crop (listed in the columns of the table). We tested 
each of the land use share equations for model differences with and without the ratios of the 
coefficients of variation using the likelihood ratio test. For all land use shares, except for 
vegetables, the null hypothesis was rejected at the 1% level. For vegetables the null hypothesis 
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was rejected at the 5% level. Hence, test results showed that adding the ratios of the 
coefficients of variations to the model significantly improved the model fit. The results show 
many significant positive and negative coefficients, indicating that the ratios of the coefficients 
of variation successfully captured differences in the perceived risk. This is consistent with 
previous work by Sckokai and Moro (2006) that highlighted the impact of cross-crop effects 
on both the relative price and the variability of income.  
Suppose we have the ratio of coefficients of variation (CV) of the output prices of two crops: 
CV crop Y / CV crop X. A positive sign implies that an increase in the ratio leads to an increase 
in the share of land allocated to crop X. So, for a risk-averse producer this means that when 
the price volatility of crop Y increases compared to that of crop X the land share of crop X 
increases. This may imply that crops X and Y are substitutes. With complements or risk-loving 
producers, an increase in the relative price volatility of crop Y leads to a reduction in the land 
share of crop X. So, in case of complements the coefficient has a negative sign. Hence, the 
likelihood for land use change depends on whether the crops are complements or substitutes 
and on the degree of risk aversion perceived by the producer. 
For cereals (column 1 of Table 2.4), the ratio of the coefficients of variation with respect to 
sugar beet, fodder maize and vegetables showed a negative and significant coefficient. With 
respect to sugar beet, the negative sign implies that cereals and sugar beets are considered 
complements. This means that a smaller area of cereals would be grown if the price variation 
of beets increases compared to the price variation of cereals. This result is as expected because 
the most common crop rotation scheme in the Netherlands involves cereals, sugar beet and 
potatoes. The ratios of the coefficients of variation with respect to potatoes, grassland, onions 
and other show positive effects at the 1% significance level. This means these crops are 
substitutes for cereals. More relative price variation for these crops leads to an increase in the 
land share of cereals. For potatoes this result is unexpected. A possible reason may be that 
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especially seed potatoes are also grown outside the common crop rotation of cereals, sugar 
beets and potatoes.  
For sugar beets (column 2 of Table 2.4), the ratios of the coefficients of variation with respect 
to cereals, potatoes and vegetables were significant and negative, indicating that these are 
complementary products because of crop rotation requirements. Grassland, fodder maize, 
onions and other had a significant and positive effect, indicating that they are substitute 
products.  
For potatoes (column 3 of Table 2.4), sugar beets, fodder maize and vegetables were 
complements. Sugar beet is a complement because of crop rotation requirements, whereas 
onions were substitutes. Cereals does not show the expected negative sign, whereas fodder 
maize does not show the expected positive sign. A possible explanation may be that rotation 
schemes only allow limited cultivation of potatoes, which leads farmers to rent land from 
dairy producers to cultivate potatoes. 
Grassland and fodder maize are production activities that are related to dairy production. For 
grassland (column 4 of Table 2.4), the ratios of the coefficients of variation for fodder maize 
had a large negative and significant effect. This is expected, because both are grown for dairy 
production and can therefore be seen as complements. Also, potatoes can be seen as a 
complement as discussed previously. The ratio of coefficients of variation of vegetables 
showed a positive and significant effect, meaning that they can be seen as substitutes. For the 
other crops, onions and cereals, the estimated coefficients were negative and significant.  
For fodder maize (column 5 of Table 2.4) the estimated coefficients were low and often not 
significant. A possible explanation for this could be milk quotas, which have been enforced 
throughout Europe as part of the CAP and are still binding in the Netherlands. If producers 
produce at the quota level, a change in profit will not directly lead to a change in land use. 
Previous studies showed that quota hamper changes in land use  
(Huettel and Jongeneel, 2011; Piet et al., 2012). Another explanation may be that land used for 
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dairy production is more difficult to change compared with land used for crop production. 
This is due to the relatively large amount of fixed capital required for dairy production and 
the fact that a large part of the soils in the Netherlands are not suitable for crop production. 
Significant coefficients are however observed for sugar beets and potatoes, acting as a 
substitute, and for onions, acting as a complement. 
For onions (column 6 of Table 2.4), the volatility in prices is so high (figure 2.1) that we argue 
that the degree of risk the crop carries is more important than being part of a crop rotation 
system. Onions are the smallest land use; therefore producers may not be fully specialized in 
producing onions. This may lead producers to set aside some of their land for risk-loving 
behaviour. The ratios of the coefficients of variation of onions with sugar beets, potatoes, and 
vegetables had significant negative effects, indicating risk-loving behaviour.  
For vegetables (column 7 of table 2.4), almost none of the ratios of the coefficients of variation 
were significant. This is consistent with our idea that vegetables do not function in a common 
rotation scheme with the other crops considered and that changes in vegetable production 
largely take place within its own category. Nonetheless, we found low, but significant and 
positive values for cereals, sugar beet and fodder maize. 
 
Table 2.4: Estimation results (regression coefficients) using the system of land usea), b), c)  
  Cereals 
Sugar 
Beet 
Potatoes  Grassland 
Fodder 
Maize 
Onions Vegetables 
Output price 
0.022 0.039 0.025 -0.230 0.010 0.001 0.002 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.056) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
* *** *** *** * ns ns 
Yield per ha 
0.026 -0.132 0.065 -0.956 -0.085 -0.059 0.000 
(0.013) (0.021) (0.031) (0.181) (0.067) (0.011) (0.000) 
** *** ** *** ns *** ns 
Subsidies 
0.001 0.004 -0.014 0.015 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
ns *** *** *** ns *** ns 
-0.003 -0.001 0.081 -0.144 -0.014 0.005 0.002 
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Pesticide 
price 
(0.008) (0.002) (0.012) (0.021) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
ns ns *** *** ns *** ns 
Farm size 
-0.023 -0.009 0.003 0.016 0.002 0.004 0.003 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.014) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
*** *** ns ns ns ** * 
Constant 
0.002 0.002 0.010 -0.027 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
ns *** *** *** *** ns ns 
Ratio of coefficients of variation (rows represent nominator, columns denominator) 
Cereals 
  
  
  
-0.010 0.299 -0.047 0.018 0.019 0.007 
(0.003) (0.053) (0.017) (0.015) (0.009) (0.003) 
*** *** *** ns ** *** 
Sugar Beet 
-0.309   -0.132 -0.019 0.059 -0.061 0.006 
(0.096)   (0.023) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.003) 
***   *** ns *** *** * 
Potatoes 
0.034 -0.017   -0.034 0.023 -0.046 -0.002 
(0.012) (0.003)   (0.011) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) 
*** ***   *** *** *** ns 
Grassland 
0.442 0.061 0.043   0.004 0.051 -0.018 
(0.130) (0.008) (0.031)   (0.006) (0.037) (0.016) 
*** *** ns   ns ns ns 
Fodder 
Maize 
-0.576 0.012 -0.465 -0.357   0.068 0.012 
(0.166) (0.004) (0.072) (0.025)   (0.016) (0.005) 
*** *** *** ***   *** ** 
Onions 
0.056 0.008 0.112 -0.022 -0.017   -0.000 
(0.018) (0.001) (0.021) (0.004) (0.002)   (0.001) 
*** *** *** *** ***   ns 
Vegetables 
-0.088 -0.051 -0.399 0.135 -0.001 -0.131   
(0.026) (0.006) (0.073) (0.027) (0.007) (0.018)   
*** *** *** *** ns ***   
Other 
0.097 0.076 0.510 -0.387 0.015 0.047 0.010 
(0.036) (0.014) (0.080) (0.062) (0.016) (0.021) (0.009) 
*** *** *** *** ns ** ns 
a) In the lower half of the table, the values equal the variance of the alternative crop (listed in the rows 
of the table) divided by the variance of the current crop (listed in the columns of the table). 
b)Standard error in parentheses. 
c) Where (*), (**)and (***) represent significance 10, 5 and 1% level respectively, and ns means not 
significant. 
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Table 2.5: Elasticities of land use with respect to price.  
  elasticity 
Cereal 0.174 
Grassland -0.231 
Sugar beet 0.514 
Potatoes 0.692 
Fodder maize 0.079 
Onions 0.119 
Vegetables 0.357 
 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
The European Union’s CAP is shifting away from market and price support towards market 
liberalization and decoupled payments. The resulting increasingly volatile output prices and 
farm incomes pose challenges to agricultural producers that affect the competitive positions 
of various agricultural land uses. The objective of the present study was to assess the effect of 
volatile agricultural output prices on changes in agricultural land use since 2000 in the 
Netherlands. 
Our analysis used data on 66 Dutch agricultural regions from 2000 through 2013 to analyse 
land-use decisions. We defined eight land use activities: production of cereals, grassland, 
sugar beets, potatoes, fodder maize, onions, vegetables, and other crops. For each land use, 
we established restricted profit functions that depended on expected output prices, variable 
input prices, the presence of direct payments, crop yields, the quantity of fixed inputs, and 
the ratios of coefficient of variation of expected output prices with those of alternative crops. 
Coefficients of variation were used in order to obtain a unitized measure of risk. Using ratios 
enabled us to distinguish between complements and substitutes in farmer’s activities. Land-
share equations were estimated using a multiple-equation panel-data model to determine the 
contribution of increased price volatility to land-use change. 
43
2 
Our estimation of the non-risk variables showed that for all land-use shares except for 
grassland, an increase in the expected output price of a particular land use led to an increase 
in the share of that particular land use. This is consistent with previous research, which 
showed significant positive effects of output price on land-use responses and suggests that 
price expectations are important in land-use decision-making (Sckokai and Moro, 2006; Fezzi 
and Bateman, 2011). Regression coefficients for expected yield showed negative results for 
land uses where the level is dependent on quota restrictions, namely sugar beet and grassland. 
For these two land uses, the introduction of single farm payments leads to an increase in their 
share of land. However, this result may be related to easing the production restrictions for 
these products that accompanied the introduction of the single farm payments. Therefore, the 
variable may be more likely to represent the on-going liberalization of the CAP. An increase 
in the price of pesticides showed variations in their effects, suggesting that an increase in the 
price of pesticides favours land uses that use these chemicals less intensively. The average 
farm size in a region had little to no effect on the land-use shares.  
The ratios of the coefficients of variation of the prices of two alternative land uses can be used 
as a measure of expected relative price volatility. Two main conclusions can be drawn based 
on the present results. First, the results show many significant positive and negative 
coefficients, indicating that relative price variation matters and serves as a proxy for the 
degree of perceived risk. Risk-loving behaviour was observed for onions and potatoes. 
Producers only devoted a small proportion of their land to these activities. These results differ 
from those of Sckokai and Moro (2006), who confirmed their hypothesis of risk-averse 
behaviour for all types of farms. A possible explanation may be the unit of analysis; producers 
may be risk-averse overall, but may not show risk-averse behaviour for all activities. 
Second, changes between land uses depend on whether production activities are 
complements or substitutes. For dairy farming, fodder maize and grassland appear to be 
complements. For arable farming, cereals, sugar beets, and potatoes appear to be 
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complements, whereas onions and grassland appears to be a substitute. This is consistent with 
Philippidis and Hubbard (2003) who find a change from oilseeds to cereals and a change from 
cattle to milk under the Agenda 2000 reform. Vegetables is not cultivated in rotation systems 
with other crops, which is reflected by the low response in relation to other land uses. 
The complements within dairy farming and the complements and substitutes within arable 
farming may indicate competition within both categories of land use, and separation between 
them. A producer may view alternative production decisions only within the context of either 
arable farming or dairy farming depending on their current production activities. Switches 
between arable and dairy farming would involve higher transaction costs. This difference may 
also result from the perceived difficulty of converting grassland into other land uses due to 
soil conditions. Further research, splitting the land between arable and dairy sectors is 
necessary to test to what extent this hypothesis holds.  
There are several caveats related to our approach. Data limitations did not allow us to 
disaggregate yields to the regional level. Because the regions had largely homogeneous soil 
types within a region but heterogeneous soil types between regions, disaggregating yields to 
the regional level could lead to more accurate estimates. Moreover, although we divided the 
Netherlands into regions based on homogeneity of soil type, we did not account for the effect 
of soil type on cultivation decisions. Since some soils may be unsuitable for some crops, a 
more precise version of our model would account for this. The increase in risk due to output 
price volatility may be partly offset by risk-reducing direct payments from the government 
(Ridier and Jacquet, 2002; Sckokai and Moro, 2006) and insurance measures such as forward 
contracts (Santos, 2002), which we did not account for in our analysis. By including a dummy 
trend for the introduction of single farm payments, we tried to account for changes in CAP 
policies. However, other policies, such as production restrictions (quotas) or environmental 
regulations, may lead to distortions in analysing the effects of risk.  
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Appendix Derivation from profit function to land use shares 
Profit-maximizing producer 
Assume a producer who takes the prices of inputs and outputs as exogenous. We define a 
profit function with multiple outputs (land uses or crops) that treats the total land area as a 
fixed allocable input:  
? ? ??
i
hithttithit
n
hthtttht npN
hit
),,,(?max,,,? zwzwp ,  h=1,…,H; i=1,…,I; t=1,…,T  (1) 
Subject to: 
? ?
i
hthit Nn            (2) 
where ? ?hthtttht N,,,? zwp  represents the total profit for producer h in year t; pt represents the 
vector of exogenous output prices in year t; wt represents the vector of exogenous variable 
input prices in year t; zht represents the vector of quantities of fixed inputs for producer h in 
year t; Nht represents the total number of hectares to be allocated to different land uses by 
producer h in year t; ),,,(? hithttithit np zw  represents the profit for a producer of land use i in 
year t; pit represents the output price of land use i in year t; nhit represents the number of 
hectares for producer h allocated to land use i in year t. 
Exogenous output prices (pit) differ among land uses and years, whereas exogenous input 
prices (wt) are the same for all land uses. The use of variable inputs differs among land uses. 
However, although the amount of fixed inputs differs among producers and years we make 
the restrictive assumption that land use depends on the total amount of fixed inputs on a farm. 
So, fixed inputs are not allocated to individual land uses. In this chapter, we will assume that 
there is no variation in soil type within regions. However, there is variation between regions 
as regions are divided on the basis of soil type. The total land area available to all producers 
is ???
h i
hitt nN , which equals the total amount of agricultural land available in a specific year. 
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Assuming that output in terms of quantity of a crop (land use) is the product of a fixed 
exogenous yield per hectare (qhit) and the number of hectares, equation 1 can be written as: 
? ? ? ?? ?? ???
i
hthithitthithitit
n
hththtttht qnnqpN
hit
zwzqwp ,,,C.max,,,,?     (3) 
? ?
i
hthit Nn            (4) 
Where qht is the vector of different crop yields for producer h in year t. 
Because producers do not know the price for a given product at the time they make their 
production decisions, we must deal with expected output prices instead of observed output 
prices. Input prices are typically known at the time of purchase, and therefore producers do 
not let their land-use decisions be determined by their expectations on the variability of input 
prices (Chavas and Holt, 1990). Thus, equation 3 can be rewritten as:  
? ? ? ?? ?? ???
i
hthithitthithitit
n
hththtttht qnnqpN
hit
zwzqwp ,,,C.ˆmax,,,,ˆE?     (5) 
where ? ?hththtttht N,,,,ˆE? zqwp  represents the expected profit for producer h in year t, and tpˆ  
represents the vector for the expected output prices. 
 
Utility-maximizing producers 
Expected utility is determined by the expected profit defined in equation 5, the variance of 
profit, and the coefficients of absolute risk aversion per crop. The utility function (Uht) can be 
denoted by the following equation (see e.g. Coyle, 1992):  
? ? htht V?5.0),,,,ˆ(E?V?,,,,,ˆU hhththttththththtttht NN ?zqwpzqwp ??    (6) 
Where ? ?htV?,,,,,ˆU hththtttht Nzqwp  represents the indirect utility for producer h in year t; 
htV?  represents the vector of variance of profit for producer h and year t; and ?h represents a 
vector of coefficients of absolute risk aversion for the different outputs for producer h.  
Following the method of Coyle (1992), we assume that the variance of profit is given by:  
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???? htht nVpnhtV?           (7) 
where Vp represents the symmetric, positive, definite covariance matrix of output prices. nht 
represents the vector of the number of hectares allocated to the different land uses for 
producer h in year t, ?htn  represents the transpose of nht. 
If we substitute the expected value of the profits (Eq. 5) and the expected variance of the profits 
(Eq. 7) into the expected utility function (Eq. 6), we obtain the following indirect utility 
function:  
? ? ? ??
?5.0
,,,C.ˆUmax,,,,,ˆU
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hththtththttht
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???
???
 , T?in   (8) 
The indirect utility function represents the relationship between the maximum attainable 
utility (max U) and the exogenous variables tpˆ , wt, qht, zht, Vp, and Nht (Oude Lansink, 1999). 
This utility function has the following properties: increasing in expected output prices and 
yields, decreasing in variable input prices, decreasing in the variance of output prices, linear 
homogenous and convex in output prices, input prices and the variance of output prices 
(Coyle, 1990). 
The variable of absolute risk aversion ?hi is measured per producer and per crop. For any 
value of ?hi > 0, the producer is risk-averse (Chavas and Pope, 1982). In the case of a risk-
neutral producer (?hi=0), the term that captures the risky environment, which equals the risk 
coefficient multiplied by the variance of profit (0.5?hi 2?? ) disappears from the equation.  
The Lagrangian for the indirect utility function (Eq. 8), denoted UL ht , equals:  
? ? ? ?? ?hthththththhththtththtt Nht nnVpn?znqwnqp ???????? ??U 5.0,,,C.ˆL    (9) 
?????? ?ht represents the shadow price of the land constraint. The necessary first-order 
conditions for an interior solution are: 
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Equation 10 allocates the available land among land uses based on the marginal utility from 
each land use. The input constraint in Eq. 11 is binding if we require an interior solution. 
Solving equations 10 and 11 gives the optimal allocation of land use i for producer h in year 
t3:  
? ?hththtttUht N,,,,,ˆ Vpzqwpn ?         (12) 
 
Land-use Share Equations  
Now, let us assume that the optimal allocation of land ( Uhtn ) is homogeneous of degree 1 in 
Nht4. For the utility-maximizing producer, we then get: 
? ? ? ? hththtttUhthththtttUht NN, 1,,,,,ˆ,,,,ˆ VpzqwpnVpzqwpn ?      (13) 
This means that if the total amount of land decreases with the factor b, the amount of land 
allocated to land use i also decreases with the factor b. Equation 13 can be rewritten towards 
a land-use share function (see equation 1 in the main text).  
  
3 Note that upon solving equation 12 the variable of absolute risk aversion ?hi drops from the 
equation. 
4 Homogeneity of degree 1 in land is a necessary assumption to specify the model in land use shares 
because this implies that any added land will be split up exactly among crops. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE DYNAMICS OF DAIRY LAND USE CHANGE WITH 
RESPECT TO THE MILK QUOTA REGIME1 
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses the sequence of changes in land used for milk 
production on dairy farms before, during, and towards the abolition of milk 
quotas. Using a unique dataset comprising farm level data of the Netherlands 
between 1971 and 2011 we estimate two duration models, analysing the time 
period between increases and decreases in dairy land use. The impact of milk 
quota, socio-economic, farm income and economic-political variables on the 
likelihood of a farm changing its land use are assessed. Results show that 
changes are highly farm specific, but that quota abolition will lead to a more 
dynamic dairy sector. 
 
  
1 Paper by Esther Boere, Jack Peerlings, Stijn Reinhard and Wim Heijman, European Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. Doi: 10.1093/erae/jbv002 
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3.1 Introduction 
Milk quota abolition, taking place in 2015 as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reform, is expected to change the dynamics of (dairy) land use. Before milk quota 
implementation, European Union (EU) dairy policy consisted of price and income support 
provided through import levies, export subsidies, intervention buying and subsidies on 
domestic demand (e.g. school milk). Partly due to this price and income support 
overproduction in milk occurred, which led to the introduction of milk quotas in 1984. The 
total quota amount in the EU was secured at the 1981 level (+1%), while the distribution was 
country-specific. In the Netherlands, milk quotas were tied to land, potentially hampering 
quota trade and farmer’s ability to change milk production. However, this rule was bypassed 
by transferring quota rights via the temporary lease of land, implying that land with quotas 
was leased for a very short period while immediately after this land was returned to the owner 
(Boots et al., 1997). Leasing quota without land was officially introduced in 1990 and 
permanently transferring quota without land in 2006 (Productschap Zuivel, 2007). However, 
because quota trade was already well established both policy changes were basically 
formalities. During the 2003 Fischler reform it was decided that milk quotas were to be 
increased as of 2006-2007 in three yearly steps of 1.5% in total. An extra quota increase of 2% 
was introduced in the Health Check of 2008. Between 2009 and 2014, quotas have been 
subjected to a 1% yearly increase. Complete abolition in 2015 was affirmed by the EU’s 
agreement of December 2013 (European Commission, 2013).  
During the quota regime, milk quota can be seen as a farmer’s most scarce production factor; 
in order to increase production, a farmer has to buy quota rights. Besides milk quotas, land is 
generally seen as the most scarce production factor in dairy farming in the Netherlands. Land 
strongly influences the level of milk production because it is needed for roughage production 
and grazing. Moreover, dairy farming is bound to environmental regulations limiting the 
manure application per hectare of land (RVO, 2014). In the Netherlands, manure policy 
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started in the early 1980s and follows nowadays the EU’s Nitrates Directive, enforced in 1991. 
(European Commission, 1991; 2014b). In the absence of quota, land could therefore be seen as 
the most scarce production factor, making changes in land use relevant for both farms and 
policy makers. The presence and abolition of milk quotas is therefore expected to have an 
effect on the pace of changes, both positive and negative, of land use that takes place at a dairy 
farm.  
The impact of milk quotas on the farm level is complex (Huettel and Jongeneel, 2011), but 
milk quotas are likely to hamper changes on dairy farms (Piet et al., 2012). Existing research 
on the influence of milk quotas includes the impact on changes in farm size (Breustedt and 
Glauben, 2007; Huettel and Jongeneel, 2011; Zimmermann and Heckelei, 2012), production 
(Ooms and Peerlings, 2005; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; Huettel and Jongeneel, 2011), farm 
characteristics (Gale, 2003; Ooms and Peerlings, 2005; Huettel and Jongeneel, 2011), market 
conditions, land mobility (Harrington and Reinsel, 1995) or a combination of them 
(Zimmermann and Heckelei, 2012). However, all these studies focus on the impact of milk 
quotas, but not on the time at which they occur.  
The abolition of the milk quota system will make changes in dairy land use more relevant for 
expansions or reductions in milk production. In the context of policy changes that induce 
transitions it is therefore important to take both time and the length of time periods between 
changes in dairy land into account. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the time period 
between two changes in land used for milk production on dairy farms and the direction of 
change, either positive or negative, before, during and towards the abolition of milk quota. 
This is relevant in order to assess the farm-specific impacts of milk quota abolition on the 
dynamics of land use change. We hypothesize that quota abolition will lead to more dynamics 
in the dairy sector, implying shorter time periods between land use changes, both positive 
and negative.  
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We define change in dairy land use as an increase or decrease of at least 10% in land used for 
milk production on a dairy farm. This may be achieved by buying or selling land, or by 
changing the use of land already present at the farm. Hence, this study focuses on analysing 
the dynamics of changes in land used for milk production and does not analyse the magnitude 
of land use changes. The 10% limit restricts changes to more substantial ones excluding small 
adjustments due to, for example, crop rotation. We define change relative to the size of the 
farm because we assume larger farms find it easier to change the use of a fixed amount of land 
than smaller farms.  
We analyse the impact of determinants of land use changes on dairy farms using a duration 
model. The use of duration models within agricultural economics is relatively rare. Examples 
include Towe et al. (2008) who analyse whether the option to preserve farmland delays 
development decisions; Goncharova et al. (2008) who analyse the duration between 
investment spells in Dutch greenhouse farms; Burton et al. (2003), Kallas et al. (2010) and 
Läpple (2010), all analysing duration models in the light of organic farming adoption; Hynes 
and Garvey (2009) and Wynn et al. (2001) modelling the duration of farmer’s entry into agri-
environmental schemes and Väre (2006) who analyses the spousal effect on the timing of 
farmer’s retirement. However, none of these allow for events to occur multiple times (e.g. 
different occasions of growth), and with different outcomes (e.g. both growth and decline). A 
notable exception is Francksen et al. (2012) who analyse the time towards expansion of milk 
quotas, allowing for different growth rates. However, they do not allow for negative growth 
and are not able to analyse the period prior to the abolition of milk quota. We take a different 
approach compared to the aforementioned studies by applying duration analysis to the pace 
of on-farm land use changes. 
We further contribute to the existing literature by using a unique dataset comprising farm 
structure survey data of the Netherlands covering the period between 1971 and 2011.This 
allows us to analyse dairy farming before, during and towards the abolition of the milk quota 
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regime. We analyse the sequence of increases and decreases in land used for milk production 
with and without the milk quota regime which has to our knowledge not been done before.  
In the next section, we establish a theoretical model of land use change with the aim to show 
why a farmer is not continuously adjusting his land used for dairy farming. Section 3.3 
describes the data and explains how our sample is split into increases and decreases in dairy 
land use. Section 3.4 presents the empirical model and estimation method for the duration 
model. Results are presented in section 3.5. Our conclusions and a general discussion follow 
in section 3.6. 
 
3.2 Theoretical model 
Farmers base their decision to change the amount of land used for dairy farming on their 
relative profitability compared to alternative land uses as represented by the shadow prices 
of land and based on the adaptation costs related to changing land use. To explain why 
farmers are not continuously adjusting their land used for milk production we present a 
simple static model applied to two production activities; milk and other production. 
Formulating a full dynamic model, for example using value functions such as in Goncharova 
et al. (2008), goes beyond the scope of this chapter for two reasons. Firstly, our model does not 
entail a single optimal strategy; a farmer might either increase or decrease its land used for 
dairy production which may change his revenues obtained from both dairy farming and other 
activities. Secondly, our model does not work towards one optimal point in time under the 
assumption that the farmer has complete foresight (see e.g. Bellman, 1957). Rather, we assume 
that the farmer is continuously faced with changes in the factors determining his land use. As 
a result, he re-evaluates his land used for dairy farming on a yearly basis.  
Suppose we have a farmer who can choose to allocate his land between milk production and 
other production, depending on factors that determine profit of milk or other production and 
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adaptation costs. When these factors change the farmer may decide to change his land use. 
Profit in both cases is given by:  
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where (.)nV represents net profit with new land use; n?  is the return from land with new 
land use; i
nL  and enL  are land used for respectively dairy farming and other production after 
the change in land use; C are the adaptation cost; iL? represents the change in land used for 
dairy farming; eL? represents the change in land used for other production; (.)oV represents 
net profit with old land use; o?  is the return from land in case of old land use. ioL  and eoL  are 
land used for respectively dairy farming and other production in the case of old land use; nq
is a vector with new (expected) values of variables affecting return to land and adaptation 
costs. 
Depending on whether (.)nV or (.)oV is larger the farmer decides whether or not to change 
land use:  
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onR        (2) 
where R is the farmer’s decision whether to change land use.  
Taking the first order derivatives of (.)nV and (.)oV  with respect to the amount of land used 
for dairy production gives the shadow prices of land used for dairy production with and 
without land use change. If we compare both shadow prices and using (2) it is clear that:  
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?neninnneoiooneineninn qLLpqLLpqLLCqLLp ,,,,,,,, ' ?????  ,   (3) 
where ? ?neninn qLLp ,,  is the shadow price of land with the new land use, ? ?nei qLLC ,,' ??  are the 
marginal adaptation cost, and ? ?neoioo qLLp ,,  is the shadow price of land for milk production 
with the old land use. This implies that the shadow price of land can vary within a certain 
range before an actual land use change takes place. The size of the range is equal to the 
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adaptation costs; only a change in shadow prices large enough to cover adaptation costs will 
lead to land use change. Notice that land use change can be a reallocation of land on the farm 
but may also involve buying (leasing) or selling (renting out) land. For example, in case of 
buying land ? ?neninn qLLp ,,  would be the buying price. 
A well-known class of models analysing decision making of farms that are faced with changes 
in the factors determining land use are household production models. Household production 
models include a production unit that maximizes profit and a household unit that maximizes 
utility. In these models the household supplies factor inputs to the production unit and 
receives income in return. Recent applications of these models include Glauben et al. (2012) 
using a production model in a non-separable household decision framework, Carter and Yao 
(2002) in a land allocation setting and Glauben et al. (2009) using a dynamic model for farm 
succession. Such farm household models take the shadow price of land to depend on output 
prices, variable inputs prices, and the amount of land, labour and capital. Moreover, via the 
household that maximizes utility and via the adaptation costs, household characteristics play 
a role. Not only variables endogenous to the household, but also exogenous variables are of 
influence. These include the economic-political environment including changes in policy and 
market conditions. 
The farmer’s decision whether or not to change his amount of land use thus depends on 
policy-variables K, farm-specific characteristics Zh, farm-income variables Qh and economic-
political variables M, where the index h refers to farm household. Together these variables 
constitute qn. Each year, this yields the farmer the binary choice explained in equation (2), 
depending on qn. In case R=0 (eq 2), the period towards land use change is enlarged by one 
year before the farmer re-evaluates his land allocation decision. 
 
57
  3 
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
The data was obtained from the Farm Structure Survey, covering all farms in the Netherlands 
with at least ten dairy cows between 1971 and 2011 (Statistics Netherlands, 2013). In this 
section we explain how this sample is composed and describe the factors that determine profit 
of milk production and adaptation costs, as introduced in the theoretical model. 
 
3.3.1 Study sample 
The complete database contains about 2 million observations from around 140,000 farms with 
at least 10 cows. The definition of a farm with milk production as a farm that owns at least 10 
cows is chosen because this excludes farms for which dairy farming is not an economic 
activity. It does include mixed farms that may expand and specialize in dairy farming during 
the sample period. The data set includes both farms that enter after 1971 and farms that exit 
before 2011. We therefore deal with an unbalanced panel. There is a large amount of right 
truncation; 67% of all farms are first observed in 1971, while only 6.2% of all farms are 
observed during the entire sample period. This implies a large exit of farms during the sample 
period, which might either be due to farms specializing in other activities besides dairy 
farming (farms who went from 10 cows or more to anything below 10 cows), or to farms who 
stop farming altogether. Succession by a family member is treated as farm continuation.  
In this chapter we limit our scope to those farms that increase or decrease their land used for 
milk production. We therefore split our sample into positive and negative land use changes. 
The event of land use change is defined as the time at which a farm changes its land used for 
milk production with at least 10%. This may be a change in the use of land already existing 
on the farm as well as a change in the use of land through the purchase or sale of additional 
land. Land used for milk production is composed of grassland and fodder land, mainly 
composed of fodder maize in the Netherlands. Grassland and fodder land is not only used by 
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dairy cows, but also by other livestock such as beef cattle, sheep, goats and equidae. We 
correct for these using the livestock unit classification (LSU), which is based on livestock feed 
requirements expressed per hectare of land compared with feed requirements of a dairy cow 
(Eurostat, 2013). Hence, the amount of land used for milk production is measured as the share 
of dairy herd in the total number of LSU multiplied by the total amount of grassland and 
fodder land on farm. 
For every farm, the years between two changes of at least 10% in land used for milk 
production are measured. For the first observation of land use change the time period is not 
observed because we do not know when the previous change took place. In order to overcome 
this partial censoring to the left, the first period of change in the analysis is measured at the 
second year for which land use change is observed. In order to ensure a continuous dataset 
we analyse the time period from a change in land use to either an increase or a decrease in 
dairy land. It therefore does not matter whether the first observation is an increase or a 
decrease in dairy land. Hence, our subsample includes only farms with at least two years in 
which a change of at least 10 per cent in dairy land is observed. With every subsequent year 
in the sample it is possible for the time period to increase by one year. This causes the data to 
be truncated to the left, the upper two lines in figure 3.1 that display the time period towards 
an increase and decrease in land show that this is indeed the case. The subsample of increases 
in land use consists of 225,342 observations, the subsample of decreases in land use consists 
of 150,585 observations. In total, 68,412 farms observe at least one increase or decrease (or 
both) in land used for dairy farming.  
The bottom two lines in figure 3.1 display the share of increases and decreases; the number of 
farms facing a change of at least 10% in dairy land divided by the total number of farms per 
year. Land use increases and decreases largely develop parallel to each other. This is obvious 
because land is a scarce production factor and for farms to increase others must decrease. 
However, we do not take the magnitude of changes into account. With respect to the time 
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period towards increases in land use, an increase in time period until 1985 (just after the quota 
introduction) is observed, followed by a drop until the early 1990s. After that, fluctuations 
between 3 and 3.5 years take place. For the time period towards decreases in land use, the 
same increase is observed until 1985, after which the time period stabilizes until 1993, then 
drops and stabilizes around 3 years. In the years after the quota introduction, average land 
use changes have taken slightly longer. This might be explained by the necessary reduction 
in milk production, reducing the need to increase dairy land use, or by the adaptation period 
for transferring quota without land. With respect to the share of increases and decreases in 
dairy land use, the course is opposite in the period just after the introduction of the milk quota 
regime. Here, the share of decreases is increasing and the share of increases is slightly 
decreasing. Overall, the share of farms experiencing changes in land use is declining over the 
past decennium. This may have to do with the trend towards fewer but larger farms, requiring 
more hectares of land for a change of at least 10%.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Share of farms facing an increase or decrease of at least 10% in land use in total number of 
farms and the yearly average length of the time period before the change takes place (logarithmic scale).  
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3.3.2 Explanatory variables 
The dependent variable in our model is the time period between two changes of at least 10% 
in land use. The time period is measured as the number of years between a change, either a 
decrease or an increase, in dairy land use.  
The variables explaining the time period between two land use changes and adaptation costs 
are divided into quota variables (K), socio-economic variables (Zh), variables related to the 
income of the farm (Qh) and economic-political variables (M) (see section 3.2). The quota 
variables are a dummy representing whether there is a quota regime, a trend starting in 2003 
when quota abolition was decided and a dummy variable for the years 1984-1986 explaining 
the adjustment to the quota regime. 
Socio-economic characteristics of the farm are grouped to characteristics with respect to the 
farm operator and a variable regarding the continuation of the farm. In analysis on farm 
structural changes, commonly used characteristics with respect to the farm operator are age 
and age squared (Weiss, 1999; Goetz and Debertin, 2001; Glauben et al., 2006; Breustedt and 
Glauben, 2007), part-time or full-time operation of the farm (Weiss, 1999; Glauben et al., 2006; 
Breustedt and Glauben, 2007), whether the farm operator followed an agricultural education 
and the level of education, gender and marital status (Weiss, 1999). In this chapter we use age 
and age squared, whether the farm operator works full-time or part-time on the farm, whether 
the farm operator followed an agricultural education and his level of education, described by 
a dummy variable indicating whether he completed at least post-secondary occupational 
education. We included both age and age squared because previous studies observed life cycle 
patterns of farms (Weiss, 1999; Gale, 2003).  
Variables related to the continuity of the farm are usually grouped to ownership of the land 
(Goetz and Debertin, 2001; Glauben et al., 2006; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; Francksen et al., 
2012), the number of family members (Weiss, 1999; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007) and whether 
there is a successor. We used the presence of a successor as a characteristic measuring 
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continuation of the farm. Furthermore, we included an interaction term between the variables 
age and successor because we assume that having a successor becomes increasingly important 
with age. For variables related to the farmer’s education and successor we did not have 
information on all years of the observation period. For these variables, we filled in the missing 
years where the farm operator did not change. However, some missing values remained, for 
which the observations are dropped during estimation. 
Commonly used variables related to the income of the farm are output price (Rahelizatovo 
and Gillespie, 1999; Foltz, 2004; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007), government payments (Goetz 
and Derbetin, 2001; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007), input price (Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, 
1999), capital (Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, 1999; Goetz and Debertin, 2001; Foltz, 2004; 
Breustedt and Glauben, 2007) and production per cow (Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, 1999; 
Foltz, 2004). Data limitations restricted us to use the change in total labour (hired and 
household labour), the total ha available on farm, the share of fodder land on farm, the 
number of cows on farm, the change in average milk production per cow and the change in 
yearly milk price as variables explaining income generated on farm. Including the change in 
the number of cows on farm may potentially lead to endogenous results. A change in dairy 
herd demands a corresponding change in land for dairy production. Conversely, as land use 
change takes place, this may have an effect on the change in the number of cows. Hence, the 
duration may help predict the change in the number of cows. We therefore used the amount 
of cows right after the last land use as a proxy for the change in cows. 
Economic-political variables usually include population density, population growth and the 
unemployment rate (Goetz and Derbetin, 2001; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007). These variables 
do not seem to be relevant for individual Dutch dairy farmers. We restricted us to the yearly 
interest rate as a measure for investment costs. However, not considering the economic-
political environment may lead to an overestimation of the milk quota effects. Following 
Burton et al. (2003) we therefore included a split time-trend with one variable running from 
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1971 to 1983, with the initial value -11, increasing by one and taking the value zero from 1984 
on; and the other variable running from 1984 to 2011, taking the value zero for all years prior 
to 1984. Herewith, we aim to capture systematic changes in dairy land use change. A 
description of all variables used in the analysis can be found in Table 3.1. 
The socio-economic characteristics of the farm and quota variables are estimated one year 
lagged, whereas changes in production variables (except for the number of cows) and the 
direction of land use change occur at the year of change. All changes are calculated with 
respect to the previous year instead of the previous change in land use to overcome 
endogeneity problems. 
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables for the subsample of 
farms without a change, and for growing and shrinking farms before and after the quota 
introduction. Except for the change in total labour, descriptive statistics between increases 
and decreases in land use do not differ much. Compared to the period before quota 
introduction, farm operators are older, more agriculturally educated and use more production 
factors in the period after quota introduction. Correlations between the dependent and 
independent variables showed that there are no correlations high enough to suggest 
multicollinearity can be expected.  
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Table 3.1: Description of variables 
Variable Explanation 
Quota variables (Kht) 
Quota Dummy (1 between 1984-2011, 0 between 1971-1983) 
Adjustment 
Dummy variable for the years 1984-1986 explaining the adjustment to the 
quota regime 
Transition Time trend as of 2003, when the EU started to yearly increase milk quota 
Socio-economic characteristics (Zht) 
Age Age of the farm operator 
Age squared Age squared of the farm operator 
Fulltime operator Dummy whether the farm operator works full-time 
Agricultural 
education 
Dummy whether the farm operator followed an agricultural education 
Occupational 
education 
Dummy whether the farm operator completed at least post-secondary 
occupational education 
Continuity of the farm 
Successor 
Binary variable that takes the value 1 if the farm operator is over 50 years 
old and has a successor. 
Age x successor Interaction term between variables age and successor 
Farm income variables (Qht ) 
Share fodder land Share of grassland and fodder land in total agricultural land 
Production growth 
Change in national average milk production w.r.t. the previous year in 100 
kg per cow 
Change in labour 
Change in total labour (household + hired) w.r.t. the previous year in Full 
Time Equivalent (FTE) 
Total ha land Total land on farm in ha 
Herd at previous 
change 
Change in the number of cows w.r.t. the previous change 
Change milk price Change in milk price in €/kg w.r.t. the previous year 
Economic-political variables (Mht) 
Interest yearly national average interest rate 
Trend before quota 
split time trend from 1971 to 1983, starting with -11, taking value 0 after 
1983 
Trend during quota split time trend from 1984 to 2011, taking value 0 prior to 1984 
Dependent variable (Yht) 
Time period 
Time period equation: Years between a decrease or increase of at least 10% 
in land used for milk production 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables separated by increases and 
decreases in land use 
  no change before quota after quota 
Variable 
(n= 
1,620,028) 
increases 
(n=77,063) 
decreases 
(n=45,660) 
increases 
(n=148,279) 
decreases 
(n=104,925) 
   mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std 
Quota variables (Kht) 
Quota 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.20 0.96 0.19 
Adjustment 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 
Transition 0.51 1.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.76 0.64 1.75 
Socio-economic characteristics (Zht) 
Age 50.70 11.61 47.71 11.19 49.81 11.34 50.77 11.24 51.92 11.34 
Age squared 3271 7194 2401 1105 2609 1144 2704 1164 2824 1182 
Fulltime operator 0.93 0.26 0.97 0.16 0.97 0.18 0.97 0.18 0.96 0.19 
Agricultural 
education 0.61 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.78 0.41 0.75 0.43 
Occupational 
education 0.24 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.40 0.49 0.35 0.48 
Continuity of the farm 
Successor 0.94 0.24 1.00 0.04 0.99 0.07 0.94 0.24 0.92 0.26 
Age x Successor 46.94 16.21 47.53 11.34 49.34 11.87 47.14 16.22 47.34 17.45 
Farm income variables (Qht ) 
Share fodder land 0.94 0.16 0.87 0.20 0.88 0.21 0.94 0.15 0.94 0.14 
Production growth 0.81 1.04 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.66 1.06 1.30 1.06 1.28 
Change in labour -0.01 0.71 0.02 0.59 -0.03 0.61 0.01 0.78 -0.02 0.81 
Total ha land 21.51 17.65 19.73 11.81 19.84 12.93 30.85 20.64 30.57 22.08 
Herd at previous 
change 
  
28.30 19.07 26.06 18.62 52.30 31.85 47.24 31.59 
Change milk price 0.78 1.99 1.31 0.73 1.33 0.74 0.02 2.27 0.15 2.26 
Economic-political variables (Mht) 
Interest 6.38 1.67 7.60 0.81 7.63 0.80 5.36 1.65 5.49 1.61 
Trend before quota -3.35 4.25 -6.05 3.20 -6.22 3.09 -0.04 0.22 -0.04 0.25 
Trend during quota 5.28 7.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.7 7.29 9.69 7.33 
Dependent variable (Yht) 
Time period   2.24 1.75 2.09 1.61 3.35 3.43 3.27 3.44 
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3.4 Empirical model 
In this section we present an empirical model explaining the time period between two changes 
in land used for milk production and the direction of land use change. The sequence of 
changes in land used for milk production is illustrated for a hypothetical farm in figure 3.2. 
Entry of the farm in the dataset can take place in the first year of the dataset or during the 
observation period. The hypothetical farm in figure 3.2 enters at the first year of the dataset in 
1971. The time period until the first change in land use is not observed because we do not 
know the time period between this and its previous change. With the next change in land used 
for milk production in 1976 we observe inch76Y . At the year of change (1976) dairy land has 
increased. The second change in land used for milk production takes place in 1982 where a 
decrease in land is observed ( dech82Y ). The sequence of land use changes continues until the farm 
decides to quit farming or at the end of the observation period (2011). The hypothetical farm 
in figure 3.2 remains in the dataset until 2011, but is last observed at the year of its most recent 
land use change, 2009.  
?
? ?
? ? ?
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Figure 3.2: Sequence of changes in land used for milk production for a hypothetical farm. 
 
3.4.1 Growth in dairy land and time period 
For a farm with multiple changes in land used for milk production we observe the time 
periods between two changes of at least 10% of land used for milk production. The time period 
is represented by inchtY  and 
dec
htY  and is defined as the number of years between two changes 
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for farm h in year t, which can either be an increase ( inchtY ) or a decrease (
dec
htY ) in dairy land. 
Hence, for each year t all farms that experience either an increase or decrease in land use are 
considered and for each farm the number of years from the last change until t is measured as 
the dependent variable. We model these periods using the following equations:  
inc
htht
inc
ht
inc
ht
inc
ht
incinc
h
inc
ht uMQZK ?????? ?????Y ,     (4a) 
for an increase in land use, and  
dec
htht
dec
ht
dec
ht
dec
ht
decdec
h
dec
ht uMQZK ?????? ?????Y ,     (4b) 
for a decrease in land use.  
Here inch?  and dech?  capture unobserved time invariant characteristics of farm h influencing 
the time period in case of an increase and decrease respectively. Kht represents the variables 
related to the presence of the milk quota system for farm h at year t, inc?  and dec? represent 
the vectors of coefficients of these milk-quota related variables. Zht contains the strictly 
exogenous explanatory variables on the socio-economic characteristics for farm h at year t. inc?  
and dec?  represent the vectors of coefficients for the strictly exogenous socio-economic 
variables for farm h at year t. Qht represents the vector of variables related to farm income and 
inc? and dec?  represent the vectors of coefficients for the these variables. Mht represents the 
vector of economic-political variables and inc?  and dec? represent the vector of coefficients for 
these variables. inchtu and 
dec
htu  represent the error terms. 
 
3.4.2 Estimation method 
The two equations representing the time periods are estimated using a duration model. 
Duration models analyse the impact of factors that have a significant effect on the length of 
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time between two events (see e.g. Verbeek (2008)). A duration starts at the beginning of a 
previous change and ends at the beginning of a new change.  
A number of decisions have to be made in the specification of a duration model. We estimate 
a multistate-multi-episode process where each farm has the possibility to either increase or 
decrease the land used for milk production (multistate) as often as the number of years during 
which it is under observation (multi-episode) (Blossfeld et al., 2007). We estimate the duration 
model twice; once for increases and once for decreases in dairy land use.  
The statistic reason for duration analysis is that it provides a solution to the otherwise violated 
normality assumption of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), meaning that time, conditional on the 
explanatory variables, is assumed to follow a normal distribution (Cleves et al., 2008). This 
assumption is unrealistic because the distribution of the equation for the time period is non-
symmetric. The time period is always positive and not constant over time. Moreover, OLS 
does not correct for right censored data. This means that farms may still be in the process of 
land use change at the end of the observation period (Cleves et al., 2008). 
Parametric duration analysis allows us to handle the specific features of our data; time-
varying explanatory variables, delayed entry, gaps, and right censoring. Where 
nonparametric and semi-parametric models compare different farms at times of land use 
changes, parametric models use probabilities that define the land use changes over the whole 
time period, given the information of the farm in the explanatory variables. Hence, a 
parametric model exploits all information on the explanatory variables.  
Central to duration models is the hazard rate; the probability that either inchtY or dechtY at time t is 
observed. With parametric models, the shape of the hazard rate is allowed to vary over time, 
meaning that the pace of change in dairy land use may increase or decrease over time. 
Different types of parametric models inhabit different shapes for the hazard rate, the so-called 
time dependency. Specifying the correct one is therefore of importance with regard to 
potential misspecification of the influence of explanatory variables. Within parametric 
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models, there are 5 common distributions, namely the exponential, weibull, gompertz, log-
normal and log-logistic. According to our theoretical framework the profit increasing 
potential achieved by growth of size will decrease the time period. However, the existence of 
a quota regime undermines this process. Following the introduction of the quota regime, the 
hazard rate will therefore increase as time passes. In this study, we assume that the model 
follows a non-monotonic hazard, where the time period decreases before the introduction of 
the quota, and increases after the introduction of the quota. Only the log-normal and log-
logistic model use this distribution for the hazard; we choose the log-logistic model.  
With parametric models the hazard rate is allowed to change with time and with the farm and 
time specific covariates (Towe et al., 2008): 
? ? ? ?
t
tTttTt
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t ?
??????
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x
x
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0
        (5) 
where h(t,x) is the probability that land use change occurs between t and ???? and T is the 
moment at which an increase or decrease in land used for milk production occurs. For the log-
logistic model, the hazard rate is specified as (Blossfeld et al., 2007): 
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?????????????? ??????????????? ???? ???????????? ???????????????????????????????? ??? ???? ??????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
decreases. 
The log-logistic model is estimated using the AFT (Accelerated Failure Time) metric, which 
assumes a linear relationship between the log of th and the characteristics of the farms x: 
? ? ??? x?tln            (7) 
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?????? ?j ???????????????????????????????????? ???? ????????????????????????? ???????? et al., 
2008). This means that we estimate the time period, depending on its explanatory variables, 
using maximum likelihood (Blossfeld et al., 2007).  
The duration analysis has been executed using standard features in STATA 12/SE2. Because 
we allow for time-varying covariates and multiple changes in land use per farm, we need to 
assume that the observations within each farm are not independent. We therefore specify 
clusters within each using STATA’s vce(robust) option to avoid misspecification of the 
standard errors. To check for the robustness of the distribution, we compared results of the 
log-logistic distribution with those of other distributions for which the AFT metric was 
allowed (exponential, weibull, lognormal and gamma model). These showed little variation 
in the signs and significance of covariates between distributions. Only for the exponential 
distribution and increases in land use changes in sign and significance were observed. 
However, this distribution is the least suited for our analysis. 
 
3.5 Results 
In this chapter, the time period and the direction between two changes in land used for milk 
production on dairy farms before, during and towards the abolition of milk quota are 
analysed. We define change as a decrease or increase of at least 10% in land used for milk 
production on a dairy farm.  
 
2 The duration analysis has been executed in three main steps (STATA, 2013). First, we convert the 
time series data into time-period data using STATA’s command snapspan: snapspan [instantaneous 
variables], gen(year_org) replace. Second, we declare our dataset to be duration data using stset: stset 
year_fin, origin(time year_beg) id(farm) failure(i_land_10==1) exit(time .) time0(year_beg). Third, we 
estimate the duration analysis using STATA’s streg command: streg [varlist], distribution(loglogistic) 
vce(robust). 
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3.5.1 Model results 
Table 3.4 shows the regression results and the marginal effects at the means for the effect of 
the covariates on the time periods for increases and decreases in land use separately. The 
logged time period increases with a positive coefficient and decreases with a negative 
coefficient. When exponentiated, the coefficients report the ratio by which the dependent 
variable changes for a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Our log-logistic models 
found log pseudo-likelihood values of  
-68746.78 for increases and -96462.923 for decreases in land use. Using the likelihood ratio test, 
the null hypothesis of no significant contribution of at least one of the explanatory variables 
to the model fit can be rejected at the 1% level. The log-logistic models for increases and 
????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????-logistic hazard first increases and 
then decreases, as we hypothesised in the previous section. 
 
3.5.2 Regression results 
Variables used to analyse the time period equations consist of variables related to the presence 
of milk quota (Kht), socio-economic characteristics (Zht), farm income (Qht) and the economic-
political situation (Mht).  
Variables related to the presence of milk quota (Kht) consist of a dummy indicating whether 
there is a quota regime, a dummy explaining the adjustment to the quota regime, and a trend 
as of 2003 representing the transition towards quota abolition. There is a positive effect of the 
presence of a quota regime and a negative effect of the transition towards quota abolition on 
the time period towards an increase in land use. For the time period towards a decrease in 
land use both the presence of the quota regime and the transition period have a negative effect. 
For the adjustment to the quota regime a significant and negative effect is found only for 
increases in land use. Table 3.3 shows that towards quota abolition, more dynamics in land 
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use change are observed, with marginal effects of -0.44 years for increases and -1.39 years for 
decreases respectively. Together with the longer time periods during the quota regime for 
increases in land use, this indicates that quota hamper the pace of change in land used for 
milk production for farms who want to increase milk production. This is in line with previous 
research that indicated that the existence of a quota regime delays the pace of farm structural 
change (Breustedt and Glauben, 2007; Piet et al., 2012). However, this is not the case for 
farmers decreasing their land, since they also experience shorter time periods during the 
quota regime. A possible explanation may be that the ability to sell quota makes their (partial) 
exit from dairy farming easier. 
Socio-economic characteristics (Zht) consist of age and age squared of the farm operator, 
whether the farm operator works full-time or part-time on the farm and whether he followed 
an agricultural education and his level of education, whether he has a successor and an 
interaction term between age and successor.  
With respect to the time period between two changes in land use, we would expect a longer 
time period for older farm operators towards both increases and decreases in land use. The 
older the farm operator, the lower his opportunity costs and the less likely he is to alter his 
land use. However, when the farm operator is close to retirement the time period may 
decrease due to life cycle patterns (Weiss, 1999; Gale, 2003). There is a positive and significant 
sign for age and a negative and significant sign for age squared of the farm operator for both 
the increasing and the decreasing time period equation. This is in line with the results of 
Francksen et al. (2012) who suggest that younger farmers are more willing to take risks in 
order to improve their competitive position. 
We find a significant and positive effect of 0.59 and 1.06 years for full-time labour involvement 
of the farm operator for respectively increases and decreases in land use. This means that the 
more involved the farm operator is, the less likely he is to change his land use. A possible 
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explanation may be that farm operators who work full-time on their farm have less time 
available to make on-farm changes. 
Whether the farm operator followed an agricultural education shows a significant and 
positive effect for both increases and decreases in land use. However, the marginal effect is 
larger for decreases (0.97 years) than for increases in land use (0.60 years). This may imply a 
certain locked-in effect; being agriculturally educated may limit the possibilities to work 
outside, and therefore to adjust land use. The level of education of the farm operator shortens 
the time period in case of increases in land use by 0.07 years but increases the time period in 
case of decreases in land use by 0.12 years. The level of education is likely to be correlated 
with management skills, and therefore improves the position of these farmers. 
Having a successor shortens the time period for increases in dairy land use by 1.62 years, but 
increases the time period by 0.75 years for decreases in land use. This implies a higher pace of 
expansion and less reduction for farms with a successor. This is as expected, because these are 
the farms that want to improve their position by specializing and increasing their dairy land. 
Variables related to the income of the farm (Qht) include the change in the national average 
milk production per cow, the change in total labour and the change in the national average 
milk price with respect to the previous year, the total hectares of land to represent farm size, 
the share of land used for milk production to represent specialization and the number of cows 
right after the previous change. 
The yearly change in the average production per cow was used as a measure of productivity 
growth. An increase of 100 kilograms in milk production per cow leads to a longer time period 
for both increases (0.21 years) and decreases (0.12 years). Francksen et al. (2012) found a similar 
effect for farms with a high quota growth. Milk quota may serve as a restricting factor because 
the productivity growth may induce small growth that can be made without purchasing 
quota; needing fewer cows and less land to maximize a farmer’s quota amount. However, 
more productive cows have higher feed, and therefore land, requirements for roughage and 
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grazing. Therefore, a change in land caused by an increase in average production per cow 
depends on the ratio of the decrease in cows versus the increase in land required per cow.  
The yearly change in average milk price causes the period of both increases and decreases in 
land use to shorten. For increases in land, a higher milk price improves liquidity and therefore 
accelerates land use change. Although at a slower pace, we find the same sign for decreases 
in land. It may be that a milk price increase leads to an increase in the shadow price of land; 
however, with different proportions for different farms. This leads farmers with a relatively 
small increase to decrease their land used for milk production. The share of fodder land 
increases the time period for increases in land use. This may be because a larger share of 
fodder land implies less on-farm land that can be easily converted, leading to larger 
adaptation costs. 
For increases in dairy land use the change in labour shows a negative and significant effect, 
while for decreases in dairy land use the change in labour shows a positive effect. This is as 
expected; increasing land for dairy production requires more on-farm labour. For the change 
in the number of cows, we find that the size of the dairy herd after the previous change leads 
to a shorter time period of 0.04 years for increases in land and a longer time period of 0.02 
years for decreases in land use. Due to the nitrogen regulations in the Netherlands, a change 
in dairy herd demands a corresponding change in land for dairy production.  
The total amount of land measured in hectares on the farm shows a very small positive effect 
for increases in land use and a small negative effect for decreases in land use. This may have 
to do with our definition of growth as relative to the total land used for dairy farming. With 
the same percentage, the absolute number of hectares of change is lower for smaller farms 
than for larger farms.  
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Table 3.3: Regression results and marginal effects at means for increases and decreases 
 Increases Decreases 
Variable coeff sign ME sign coeff sign ME Sign 
Quota variables (Kht) 
Quota 0.192 *** 1.140 *** -0.267 *** -2.171 *** 
Adjustment -0.125 *** -0.722 *** -0.006  -0.047  
Transition -0.073 *** -0.443 *** -0.177 *** -1.386 *** 
Socio-economic characteristics (Zht) 
Age 0.037 *** 0.047 *** 0.029 *** 0.012 *** 
Age squared -0.000 ***   -0.000 ***   
Fulltime operator 0.101 *** 0.585 *** 0.145 *** 1.060 *** 
Agricultural 
education 0.100 
 
*** 0.595 
 
*** 0.128 
 
*** 0.969 
 
*** 
Occupational 
education -0.012 
 
** -0.071 
 
** 0.015 
 
** 0.121 
 
** 
Continuity of the farm 
Successor 0.101  -1.616 *** 0.476 ** 0.753 *** 
Age x successor -0.007 *   -0.007 **   
Farm income variables (Qht ) 
Share of fodder land 
0.519 
 
*** 3.153 
 
*** 0.006 
 
0.050 
 
Production growth 0.034 *** 0.207 *** 0.016 *** 0.124 *** 
Change in labour -0.019 *** -0.114 *** 0.031 *** 0.241 *** 
Total ha land 0.007 *** 0.043 *** -0.007 *** -0.057 *** 
Herd at previous 
change -0.007 
 
*** -0.041 
 
*** 0.003 
 
*** 0.022 
 
*** 
Change in milk 
price -0.026 
 
*** -0.159 
 
*** -0.016 
 
*** -0.123 
 
*** 
Economic-political variables (Mht) 
Interest 0.035 *** 0.215 *** 0.014 *** 0.110 *** 
Trend before quota 0.157 *** 0.951 *** 0.154 *** 1.207 *** 
Trend during quota 
-0.026 
 
*** -0.159 
 
*** 0.020 
 
*** 0.159 
 
*** 
Constant 0.398 *     1.195 ***     
Gamma 0.305       0.351       
Note: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
 
75
  3 
Economic-political variables (Mht) are represented by the interest rate and a split time trend 
capturing structural developments around the introduction of the milk quota. The interest 
rate lengthens the time period for both increases and decreases in dairy land use with 0.22 
and 0.11 years respectively. As suggested in the theoretical model, a higher interest rate 
implies less liquidity, larger adjustment costs, and therefore decelerates land use change. For 
farms increasing in land use a clear break is observed around quota introduction, making the 
time period longer before, and shorter after quota introduction. For decreases in land use both 
trends make the time period longer, although with very different magnitudes; 1.21 years 
before and 0.16 years after quota introduction. 
 
3.5.3 Sensitivity analysis 
To explore the consequences of our definition of land use change we performed six sensitivity 
analyses. We simulated changes of 5%, 30% and 50% and changes of at least 4, 10 and 20 
hectares of land. Four hectares is on average equal to a 10% change in land used for milk 
production. The calculated marginal effects of the sensitivity analyses are found in Table 3.4. 
The results of the sensitivity analyses show that for most variables, no changes in both sign 
and significance are observed when the definition of change is altered. In general, we can see 
that the marginal effects of the covariates rise when the definition of land use change is set at 
a higher percentage. For some variables, a change in sign and significance is however 
observed. For increases in land use, the variables occupational education and trend during 
the milk quota regime change from shorter to longer time periods. For decreases in land use, 
the variables age and interest rate change from longer to shorter time periods. Larger 
percentages of decrease may depend on whether the farmer is close to retirement, accelerating 
large decreases around this age. An increase in interest rate may decrease the liquidity 
position of a farm, which may especially be of concern when larger percentages of land are 
involved. 
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Table 3.4: Sensitivity analysis of 5%, 30%, 50% and 4, 10 and 20 ha land use change 
 Time interval increases Time interval decreases 
  5% 30% 50% 4ha 10ha 20ha 5% 30% 50% 4ha 10ha 20ha 
Quota variables (Kht) 
Quota 1.2* 1.5* 1.5* 2.0* 2.7* 3.9* -0.6* -5.3* -7.3* -2.9* -4.7* -1.5 
Adjustment -0.8* -0.6* -0.4* -0.7* -1.1* -0.2 -0.5* 1.1* 1.7* 0.3* 1.6* 3.4 
Transition 0.5* -0.4* -0.4* -0.7* -0.3* 0.1 -0.1 -0.8* -0.6* -1.4* -1.3* -0.0 
Socio-economic characteristics (Zht) 
Age 0.0* 0.1* 0.1* 0.1* 0.1* 0.0 0.0* -0.0* -0.0* 0.0* 0.1* 0.1* 
Fulltime  0.5* 1.5* 1.8* 0.6* 1.3* 0.8 0.7* 2.2* 2.7* 1.1* 2.2* 1.0 
Agr educ 0.5* 0.6* 0.7* 0.6* 0.5* 0.5 0.7* 1.6* 2.4* 1.2* 1.9* 2.4* 
Occ educ -0.2* 0.2* 0.1 0.1 0.6* 0.9* -0.1* 0.9* 1.5* 0.4* 2.0 * 3.6* 
Continuity of the farm 
Successor -0.6* -1.2* -0.1 -1.9* -1.1* -0.7 0.7* 3.0 * 4.3* 0.7* 3.9* 5.2* 
Farm income variables (Qht ) 
Share 
fodder 
1.8* 4.2* 5.3* 4.3* 5.5* 7.4* -0.3* 4.5* 
10.4
* 
-0.8* 1.1 1.2 
Production 
growth 
0.3* 0.1* 0.0 0.1* 0.0 0.0 0.2* 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.2* -0.2 
Change in 
labour 
-0.1* -0.3* -0.3* -0.1* -0.1 -0.0 0.2* 0.8* 1.3* 0.3* 0.6* 0.2 
Total ha 
land 
0.0* 0.1* 0.1* 0.0* -0.0 0.0 -0.0* 0.0 0.1* -0.1* -0.2* -0.1* 
Herd at 
previous 
change 
-0.0* -0.1* -0.1* -0.1* -0.0* -0.0* 0.0* 0.0 -0.1* 0.0* -0.01 0.0 
Change in 
milk price 
-0.3* -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.3* -0.1* -0.1 -0.1* -0.3* -0.4 
Economic-political variables (Mht) 
Interest 0.6* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.5* -0.1 -0.2* -0.0 -0.2* -0.2 
Trend 
before  
0.8* 1.2* 1.3* 0.9* 1.1* 1.1* 1.0 * 2.0* 2.9* 1.3* 1.9* 1.5* 
Trend 
during  
-0.4* 0.1* 0.3* -0.1* 0.0* -0.1* -0.2* 0.7* 1.0 * 0.3* 0.7* 0.8* 
Note: * denotes significance at the 5 per cent level at least. 
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Milk quota could be seen as a farmer’s most scarce production factor; in order to increase 
production, a farmer first has to buy quota rights. In the absence of quota, land is the most 
scarce production factor; a farmer needs enough land for roughage production and grazing 
but also to comply with the nitrate regulations, expressed per hectare of land, if he wants to 
increase his production. This makes analysing time and the length of time periods between 
changes in the use of land relevant for both farms and policy makers. The purpose of this 
chapter is therefore to analyse the time period between two changes in land used for milk 
production on dairy farms and the direction of land use change over a period before, during 
and towards the abolition of milk quota. We use longitudinal data from the farm structure 
survey of the Netherlands covering the period between 1971 and 2011. We hypothesize that 
land use changes involve adaptation costs hampering land dynamics. These adaptation costs 
may be related to policy (in our case milk quota), socio-economic, farm income and economic-
political variables. 
Quota variables representing the presence of the quota regime and the transition towards 
abolition of the quotas show that quotas hamper the pace of change for expansion in land 
used for milk production. The time period for increases in land use is enlarged during the 
quota regime and shortened towards the abolition of quota. The time period for decreases in 
land use is shortened during the quota regime and towards the abolition of quota. The longer 
time period for increases in land use shows that milk quota hamper farm dynamics. The 
shorter time period for decreasing land use may indicate that reducing milk production is 
easier. This is probably due to the fact that milk quotas can be leased-out or sold. The shorter 
time period towards quota abolition shows that more farm dynamics can be expected as a 
result of the possibility to produce more milk.  
When milk quotas are abolished, nitrate regulations, expressed per hectare of land, may 
become the limiting factor for milk production This directly connects changes in dairy land 
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use to changes to milk and roughage production. However, a farmer who decreases his milk 
production may not directly opt to convert or sell his land. This chapter therefore looks at 
land use changes in light of changes in milk production. A farmer who wants to increase his 
milk production may also have the option to buy compound feed and to make use of manure 
processing. Further research is necessary to investigate to what extent the increased dynamics 
from quota abolition will be offset by the nitrate regulations.  
The farm’s decision to increase or decrease land used for milk production is largely 
determined by characteristics of the farm operator such as age, full-time employment, 
education and whether he has a successor. We find that younger farm operators with a higher 
education level, who do not work full-time on the farm, have a successor and do not yet spend 
a large portion of their total land to milk production exhibit highest dynamics in land use 
change in favour of milk production. On the contrary, farmers with a low education level and 
without a successor exhibit highest dynamics in land use change away from milk production. 
It may be that these types of farms face higher adaptation costs for land use change. The effects 
of age and occupational education become more proficient when land use change is defined 
with a larger amount of increases or decreases. 
Our study complements the existing literature by looking at the interrelations and non-linear 
nature between land use change and milk quotas using a duration model. Although previous 
studies mainly focused on farm growth and entry/exit decisions of farms, we find results that 
are closely related. Weiss (1999), Gale (2003) and Breustedt and Glauben (2007) all found that 
farm exit is accelerated when the farm operator is older. Glauben et al. (2006) add that the exit 
rate further increases when the farm operator does not have a successor and Weiss (1999) adds 
that the exit rate decreases if the farm operator is agriculturally educated. The results of the 
existing literature are more controversial on the influence of full-time farming. Full-time 
farming increases the probability of farm exit according to Glauben et al. (2006) and Breustedt 
and Glauben (2007) but reduces farm structural change according to Weiss (1999). 
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A number of possible caveats can however be mentioned. First, our approach only looks at 
the time period between land use changes on farms, and is thereby not able to explain farm 
structural change. Second, following the 2003 Mid-Term Review, single farm payments were 
introduced to compensate for the decrease in intervention prices. Our model does not account 
for these, and other, policy measures; potentially leading to an overestimation of the milk 
quota effects. In order to overcome at least part of the overestimation, we included a split 
time-trend to capture systematic changes in the economic conditions of farmers. Following 
the course of the CAP, the first part of the split time trend may represent the on-going price 
and income support, whereas the second part may represent the on-going liberalization. 
Despite these caveats, employing a duration analysis to the pace of on-farm land use changes 
leads to more insights in the dynamics of the dairy sector. 
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CHAPTER 4. EXPLAINING FARMLAND PRICES: THERE IS MORE TO IT THAN 
AGRICULTURE1 
 
Abstract 
Farmland prices can be explained by the maximum bid price of the buyer, determined by 
the expected revenue generated from the acquired land as well as the local and general 
economic effects. General effects consist of the economic situation and land regulations, 
whereas local effects consist of rival (agricultural) bidders and potential future more 
valuable use of the land (option value). The objective of this paper is to explain farmland 
prices in the Netherlands, and more specifically to analyse the effect of the financial crisis 
on the land market price. We distinguish four categories influencing the price of land: 
(i) the direct influence via the returns from land, (ii) institutional regulations, (iii) the 
spatial environment and (iv) local market conditions. Two periods are compared to 
distinguish the effect of the crisis on the agricultural land market. Using a unique 
dataset comprising individual transactions in the Netherlands between 2004 and 2011 
we find that all categories significantly influence land prices. Moreover, financial crisis 
leads to a decline in the effects of local market conditions, but the announcement of milk 
quota abolition in 2008 has led to an increase in the effects of the spatial environment 
between the first and the second period. 
 
1 Paper by Esther Boere, Jack Peerlings, Stijn Reinhard, and Tom Kuhlman, submitted to a peer-reviewed 
journal. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In the Netherlands, farmland prices are affected by the general economic situation despite its 
strict zoning policies. If more land is needed for infrastructure, housing and industrial areas, 
pressure for farmland conversion rises. Farmers who subsequently have to sell their land but 
decide to continue farming (based upon tax exemptions) need to buy farmland somewhere 
else. This makes the remaining farmland scarcer, and therefore leads to higher farmland 
prices. Moreover, the general economic situation affects several factors like the interest rate, 
demography, demand for food, exchange rate etc. that may influence farmland prices. In 2008 
an economic crisis hit the Netherlands, like the rest of the world. This gives a unique 
opportunity to analyse the effect on farmland prices.  
Many studies have tried to characterize the factors that together compose the price of 
farmland by characterizing two different channels. The first channel is usually composed of 
the net returns to land, the Net Present Value (NPV). The value of farmland for the buyer is 
usually derived by taking the NPV of the future stream of income generated from the land. 
Income generated depends on factors such as input and output prices and usually includes 
government subsidies that have a direct effect on the price of land, of which direct payments 
are the most well-known (Weersink et al., 1999; Ciaian and Kancs, 2012; Latruffe and Le 
Mouel, 2009). Agricultural policies, especially direct payments, will enhance farm incomes 
and will lead to a capitalization in the price of land (Clark et al., 2003; Goodwin and Ortalo-
Magne, 1992; Latruffe and Le Mouel, 2009). Under the assumption of complete information, 
the maximum bid price however does not have to be paid if the farmer’s potential rivals have 
a lower maximum bid price for a certain parcel. The second channel involves other factors 
that influence the price of farmland, but do not directly affect the (current) returns to land. 
They provide an additional component that may be added or subtracted from the NPV of land 
to get close to explaining the price of farmland. These include other policies such as zoning 
laws (Henneberry and Barrows, 1990) and nearby characteristics such as residential and 
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nature influences (Borchers and Duke, 2012; Plantinga et al., 2002; Livanis et al., 2006; Shi et al., 
1997; Cavailhes and Wavresky, 2003). Zoning laws restrict the location and type of land use 
in a certain area by posing rules and regulations on the use of a parcel of land. Although the 
Netherlands has a zoning system, an option value can exist in anticipation of change to the 
agricultural zoning policy, to allow residential buildings or industry. As houses and firms 
have a higher maximum bid price, buyers can speculate that the value of the agricultural land 
will increase in the future. This phenomenon makes a price above the maximum agricultural 
bid price possible (Plantinga et al., 2002). With a larger demand from houses and firms during 
high economic conjecture, the general economic situation strongly influences the option value 
of farmland.  
All of these studies indicate that both farm income and non-farm income factors are 
important; however, they have not been able to complete the “farmland valuation puzzle” 
(Power and Turvey, 2010). This study does not aim to do so either, but does provide a more 
complete picture by including both the general and the local economic situation. The objective 
of this paper is to explain farmland prices in the Netherlands and to analyse the effect of the 
financial crisis on the land market price, controlling for other factors explaining farm land 
prices. To our understanding, this paper provides a first comprehensive analysis general and 
local economic factors influencing the price of farmland, accounting for both space and time, 
at the farm level.  
In this study we divide the factors determining farmland prices in four categories. In line with 
the existing literature, the first category consists of factors directly determining the expected 
net revenue obtained from farming. The second category consists of institutional regulations 
(e.g. inheritance regulations) that restrict the kind of ownership of the land and transactions. 
These institutional regulations impose costs for buyers and sellers of the land (Ay and 
Latruffe, 2013; Just and Miranowski, 1993). The third category consists of factors relating to 
the spatial environment in which the farmer interacts on the market. Spatial policies play a 
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role by allocating claims on land of different sectors (i.e. zoning) (Ay and Latruffe, 2013; Ciaian 
et al., 2012; Jaeger et al., 2012). The fourth and final category consists of local market conditions 
that determine the option value of land. The option value is likely to be influenced by location 
characteristics such as urban sprawl (Shi et al., 1997) and demographic variables such as 
population density (Devadoss and Manchu, 2007; Livanis et al., 2006). 
We restrict ourselves to transactions where the buyer of land practices land-based agriculture 
(i.e. other than greenhouse horticulture and non-grazing livestock) and include only 
transactions that are bought by farmers and therefore do not include land that is leased. Actual 
land prices originate from a unique dataset comprising individual land transactions in the 
Netherlands covering the period between 2004 and 2011. By linking land transactions to the 
expected net revenue of the average farm of the same type as the buying farm we are able to 
analyse a large set of land transactions without the need for data on all factors determining 
income such as input and output prices and the endowment of capital for all buying farms. 
Moreover, we account for the demand and supply in the agricultural neighbourhood using a 
spatial lag model.  
In the next section, we develop a framework to analyse land prices using the four 
aforementioned categories. Section 4.3 presents the data and descriptive statistics. The 
estimation procedure of the four categories, using spatial econometric techniques, is explained 
in section 4.4. Results are presented in section 4.5 while section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
In this study, we propose a framework that consists of four categories: (i) The revenue 
obtained from farming the land. (ii) Institutional and transaction regulations (e.g. inheritance 
regulations) that may pose additional costs on the land, e.g. in case it is not fully owned. (iii) 
The spatial environment in which the farmer interacts on the land market. If more buyers than 
sellers are in the market, the maximum bid price of the actual buyer will be higher than in the 
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reversed situation. This is determined by the competition on the land market. (iv) The option 
value of the land. If buyers expect in the future a substitution of a more profitable land use for 
the current agricultural use, they will offer a higher price for the land. In this section, we 
develop a model in order to explain these four different categories. 
 
4.2.1 First category: Revenue obtained from farmland  
Following standard microeconomic theory, future stream of income generated from the land, 
including other benefits derived from the land and while accounting for additional costs 
related to investments, should equal the price of land (Lence and Mishra, 2003). Most papers 
analysing land values use an income approach, where the value of land is the discounted sum 
of expected future cash flows, i.e. the NPV of farmland (see amongst others Weersink et al., 
1999; Goodwin et al., 2003, Lence and Mishra, 2003 and Duvivier and de Frahan, 2005). This 
entails all revenues obtained from agricultural activities on the land. Besides the revenues 
obtained from productive use of land, the producer may obtain revenues from e.g. 
government payments. Many studies showed the influence of government payments on the 
capitalization of land prices, and direct payments are generally listed as the main one (see 
Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2009) for an overview). 
In our analysis we do not have farm-specific data to calculate the NPV of the buying farm. We 
do however know the buyer’s farm type, and have data on the average net revenue of each 
distinguished farm type (e.g. milk production, arable production, etc.). Discounting the 
expected future returns of agricultural land use will then not increase the explanatory power 
of the model. We will therefore use the expected net real market-based return and the net 
government-based return per farm type per hectare of land (see the next section for its exact 
calculation). Both the net revenue of the newly acquired land and the average net revenue of 
the buying farm may deviate from the average of their farm type. For instance, if the successor 
joins the farm this may result in excess labour per hectare, thereby increasing the returns of 
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additional hectares. This farm specific revenue of the acquired land can be captured by the 
operator’s age. In order to expand operations, a farmer needs to have a long-term perspective 
on using the newly acquired land. Age may therefore capture opportunity costs as well as 
farmer’s life-time working cycle (Breustedt and Habermann, 2011). Based on the amount of 
land and labour currently available, a farmer might be in a better position to acquire collateral 
for a new loan, needed for the acquisition of new land. The share of land in total production 
factors differs between farm types. A higher degree of substitutability may lead to a reduction 
of the price the farmer is willing to pay for additional land, which in turn may lead to larger 
effects of subsidies on land for land based than for non-land based sectors (Latruffe and Le 
Moel, 2009).  
Differences in the maximum bid-price between the buying and the average farmer can be 
caused by farm-specific factors making the farm-specific revenue deviate from the farm type 
average revenue, as well as other non-income generating factors. We focus on three of these 
non-income generating factors in the other categories. 
 
4.2.2 Second category: Institutional regulations 
As reflected upon in the introduction, land institutional and transaction regulations affect the 
agricultural land market. Governments often impose ownership regulations on farmland, 
such as ownership with or without leasehold. These regulations result from lobbying activities 
by interest groups, causing ownership regulations to be endogenous to the price of land 
(Ferguson et al., 2006). Land may be family owned, or privately owned with or without lease. 
These different regulations further undermine the competitive market for land transactions. 
The supply of land is limited and even when available, institutional relations, such as farming 
families living in the same village, may cause land not to end up with the highest bidder 
(Breustedt and Habermann, 2011).  
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4.2.3 Third category: The spatial environment in which the farmer interacts 
The degree of competition among farmers to buy the land is of importance in explaining the 
difference between the actual price paid for farmland and its expected revenue. Because 
farmers are only looking for farmland that is in close proximity to their current location, land 
markets get fragmented, resulting in locally disaggregated markets. A very competitive land 
market will force farmers to offer their maximum bid price to acquire the land. In a less 
competitive market the farmer may buy the land with a discount on the maximum bid price. 
Here we discuss the main factor that influences the segregation between local land markets 
and help explain the degree of competition within them: the geographical region. 
Within the agricultural sector, activities in the Netherlands still largely follow the 
conventional model of Von Thünen with high-value agriculture using large transportation 
costs, such as greenhouse farming, located in urban areas and low-value agriculture, such as 
arable farming, located in the relatively rural areas. Strong zoning policies usually distinguish 
agriculture in the urbanized West into two types: greenhouse farming and land-based 
farming, mainly dairy farming (Alterman, 1997). With dairy farmers increasingly buying land 
of arable farmers, this geographical differentiation has however declined in importance. 
This segregation of farm types by geographical region is inherent to its differentiation in soil 
type. The soil type determines the productive capacity for different land uses. Land is 
heterogeneous, making some types of land are more productive than others. This matters to 
some types of farms more than to others. Some soil types (e.g. peat) are only suitable for 
extensive dairy farming, while sandy soils can be used efficiently by various farm types. 
Hence, the physical location determines not only yield (part of category 1), but also the farm 
type that enters the market for the land (category 2). Especially bulb growers and certain 
arable farm types such as seed potato farms may select their buying location based on the soil 
type. In the Netherlands, this can be further observed by the geographical differentiation in 
land-based agriculture between arable farming and grazing livestock (mainly dairy farming), 
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with arable farming mostly located in the South-West and North-East (provinces of Zeeland, 
Flevoland and Groningen) and dairy farming mostly located in the North-West and Mid-East 
(provinces of Friesland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, and Friesland). 
 
4.2.4 Fourth category: The option value of the land 
Agricultural land markets are influenced by other competing claims on land such as housing 
and nature. Many countries apply spatial policies that allocate the claims on land of different 
sectors by zoning. Spatial policies help to concentrate urban areas and to maintain open spaces 
around them. Hence, they create sub-markets that are differentiated based on their 
geographical location. Jaeger et al. (2012) distinguished three factors that may lead spatial 
policies to result in either a positive or a negative effect on land price. First, in case zoning 
policies prevent land from yielding the highest possible shadow price, this may result in a 
neutral or negative effect. Second, without zoning policies, scarcity will result in a positive 
effect on the price of land. Third, positive externalities result in a positive effect on land price. 
In the neighbourhood of a city there is a higher anticipation on future relaxation of the zoning 
regulation, leading to a larger bid-price of the land. Moreover, in these areas the demand for 
agricultural products and positive externalities created by agricultural areas may be larger 
(Devadoss and Manchu, 2007).  
Price bubbles that exist in the real estate market (see e.g. Case et al., 2003), may also persist in 
the market for farmland. These may affect the option value of farmland by posing 
expectations on future income. Such expectations often go together with economic 
fluctuations, which can be represented by inflation and anticipation of land development (Just 
and Miranowski, 1993; Hardie et al., 2001). Evidence of the existence of speculative bubbles in 
farmland prices has been mixed (Tegene and Kuchler, 1993; Turvey, 2002). This may be 
because speculative effects are largely dependent on both time and space. Over the past 
decade, especially time may have had an influence on changing option values of land. The 
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clear differences before and after the economic crisis observed in the urban land market may 
also reflect in the rural land market. 
 
4.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
As explained in the theoretical framework, different spatial factors, e.g. the distance to cities, 
the number of buyers and sellers and the concentration of farmers by type, may cause locally 
fragmented markets for land prices. Moreover, the degree of market fragmentation may 
depend on time. We therefore divide the Netherlands in two time periods; one before the 
onset of the financial crisis, from 2004 until 2007; and one after the onset of the financial crisis, 
from 2008 until 2011. The two periods coincide also with differences in policies caused by the 
Health Check of 2008. The split in time periods also follows from the fact that it is 
computationally not possible to estimate a weight matrix consisting of 20,000 observations. 
Data used in this study consists of three different databases, all considering the time period 
between 2004 and 2011 for the Netherlands. The price of land and institutional and transaction 
regulations are obtained from the land transactions database of LEI, the Dutch Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute. These transactions include also transfers between generations. 
We selected only transactions comprising at least 1 hectare with a price per hectare between 
€15,000 and €150,000. Extreme values above or below this range are likely to represent 
unobservable site characteristics and therefore do not reflect the price per hectare of land 
accurately. We converted the price of land from nominal to real prices using an index for 
agricultural prices with 2010 as the base year (LEI, 2014c). 
Revenue directly obtained from the land, characteristics related to the farm type and 
characteristics related to the buying farm all help to determine revenue generated on-farm 
(category 1). The expected net revenue of the buying farm type per hectare is obtained from 
the FADN, and serves as a proxy for the marginal profit of an additional unit of land. We take 
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the net revenues of the buying instead of selling farm to calculate the value of farm land 
because this may serve as a proxy for the farmer’s willingness to pay for the land. We account 
only for average net revenues per farm type and do not account for legislation such as nitrate 
regulations. Further, we assume that a farmer who buys an additional hectare of land has 
already accounted for fixed costs. Net revenues are therefore calculated as the per-hectare 
average of the total revenues obtained from farming minus variable costs, where revenues 
exclude earnings from direct payments and variable costs include animal and crop assets and 
energy but exclude tangible assets, labour and depreciation (LEI, 2014e). Like the land price, 
we converted the net revenue of land from nominal to real prices using the index of 
agricultural prices (LEI, 2014c). In order to represent the expected net revenue instead of the 
actual net revenue, we calculated the moving average of the net revenues, composed of the 
average of the three years previous to the year in which the transaction took place. The 
expected average net revenues are calculated for the main land-based farm types in the 
Netherlands: dairy, arable, starch potato, horticulture, flower bulbs, fruit trees, tree nursery 
and mixed farms. Starch potato farms are separated from arable farms because they received 
coupled support over the period of observation. Mixed farms are treated as the rest-category 
of land-based agriculture, but commonly include a combination of crops and non-dairy 
pasture. For dairy and arable, the net revenue of land is further distinguished by small, 
medium and large farms.  
Data on direct payments are obtained from the FADN database also (LEI, 2014e). They 
comprise the average per hectare payment for the type of buying farm in the year the 
transaction took place. Because the amount of these payments is generally known in advance, 
we do not take the expected value, but the actual value in the year the parcel of land is bought. 
The amount of payments is not converted to real terms because government payments are not 
corrected for inflation.  
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Variables related to the farm type, farm characteristics and geographical region are obtained 
from the Farm Structure Survey (FSS) and the transactions database. Farm type includes the 
share of hectares of land for arable and grassland use, the number of cows and pigs and the 
number of livestock measured in Livestock Units (LSU) per hectare. LSU is based on livestock 
feed requirements expressed per hectare of land compared with feed requirements of a dairy 
cow, and thereby serves as a proxy for the level of manure surplus of the buying farm 
(Eurostat, 2015). The main livestock groups cows, pigs, sheep, goats and horses are converted 
to LSU. Farm characteristics represent the size of the buyer in hectares of land, the age and 
age squared of the buyer, the number of labour units in Full Time Equivalent (FTE) and the 
number of labour units per hectare as a proxy for on-farm productivity.  
Institutional and transaction regulations are taken into account in the second category. They 
can be further specified into the number of hectares of land transacted and dummies 
representing whether the seller is a private person, and whether the land is fully or family 
owned. Alternatively, land transacted may be under leasehold. Regarding the type of buyer 
and seller, government institutions, municipality, province and national government are 
characterized as public buyers or sellers, and families and tenants as private buyers or sellers. 
Other buyers or sellers include nature organizations and banks or insurance companies. The 
type of ownership can be distinguished into full ownership, ownership with leasehold, family 
ownership and leasehold. 
Geographical region is taken into account in the third category and includes dummies for the 
provinces, with Limburg as the base province. These capture the geographical location and 
help capture spatial policies that are often decided upon at the provincial level. 
Time and population density compose the fourth category. Population density is measured in 
terms of inhabitants per 100m2 by zip-code and captures the proximity to residential areas. 
This serves as a proxy for the option value of agricultural land and helps to capture the spill-
over effects that are generated by residential demand for agricultural land. The time period is 
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specified two types of dummies, one for each quarter of the year and one for each year in 
which the transaction took place. Quarterly dummies are aimed to capture seasonal 
fluctuations, whereas years are aimed to capture changes to the economic and political 
situation.  
Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Table 4.1 below. Upon analysing 
differences between the two periods, it can be observed that while the price of farmland has 
increased between the first and the second period, the expected revenue had decreased. This 
provides indication that the difference between farmland price and expected revenue has 
increased between the two periods. Furthermore, the share of arable land of the buying farm 
has increased, at the cost of the share of grassland. The shares of transacted land have 
remained almost equal between provinces. Surprisingly however, less hectare of land are 
involved in a transaction in the second period compared with the first period. For period 1, 
the largest share of transacted hectares of land takes place in 2007. For period 2, this is 2008, 
after which a decrease in land transactions takes place. The relationship between the price of 
land and the number of transactions can be more clearly observed from figure 4.1: the number 
of transactions increases until 2007, after which a sharp decrease takes place. The price per 
hectare of land continues to increase until around 2009, after which it stagnates. 
 
Figure 4.1: Average real price of farmland (/€1000) and number of transactions (/100). 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics by time period 
 Period 1 (obs = 9859) Period 2 (obs = 9777) 
Variable mean std mean std 
Farmland price 3.50 1.97 4.44 1.96 
Category 1: Revenue obtained from farming  
Expected net revenue (1000 €/ha) 5.34 6.89 5.02 5.57 
Direct payments (10 €/ha) 6.37 5.00 7.87 5.35 
Share arable land 0.29 0.38 0.47 0.39 
Share grassland 0.60 0.40 0.46 0.40 
Cattle (/10) 8.95 10.11 10.06 11.49 
Pigs (/10) 1.24 15.11 3.52 27.33 
LSU/ha 2.26 3.19 2.22 2.63 
Farm size 52.43 45.19 58.34 51.06 
Age 49.86 10.74 50.33 10.29 
Age squared 2601.33 1128.17 2639.15 1081.07 
Labour in FTE 2.15 2.32 2.31 3.20 
Productivity (FTE/ha) 0.09 0.26 0.08 0.20 
Category 2: Institutional regulations 
Private sellera) 0.88  0.90  
Full ownershipa) 0.85  0.88  
Ha transacted 5.91 7.85 5.36 6.76 
Category 3: Spatial environmenta) 
Groningen 0.06  0.05  
Friesland 0.12  0.12  
Drenthe 0.08  0.09  
Overijssel 0.13  0.13  
Flevoland 0.04  0.02  
Gelderland 0.14  0.15  
Utrecht 0.03  0.03  
Limburg (base) 0.08  0.08  
Noord-Holland 0.05  0.05  
Zuid-Holland 0.06  0.07  
Zeeland 0.06  0.05  
Noord-Brabant 0.15   0.15   
Category 4: Local market conditionsa)  
Q1 (base) 0.29  0.31  
Q2 0.27  0.27  
Q3 0.13  0.13  
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Q4 0.32  0.29  
2004 0.19    
2005 0.23    
2006 (base period 1) 0.25    
2007 0.33    
2008 (base period 2)   0.30  
2009   0.23  
2010   0.22  
2011    0.25  
Population density (100 m2) 2.14 3.00 2.16 2.83 
a)Dummy variables represent the share of the respective variable in the total sample. 
 
4.4 Empirical Model 
In this study we explain the price of farmland with the help of the four categories mentioned 
in the theoretical framework:  
?? ?????? ????????P ,        (1) 
where P is the real price of land per hectare, ? is the vector of coefficients related to the 
revenue directly obtained from farming, and R is the vector of variables related to the revenue 
obtained from farming (category 1). These include the expected net revenue and direct 
payments per hectare of land, the share in hectares of land per type of farming, the number of 
cows and pigs, the quantity of labour, the quantity of labour per hectare of land, the size of 
the buying farm, and the age and age squared of the farm operator. ? is the vector of 
coefficients related to institutional regulations and I are the variables related to institutional 
regulations. These include the type of ownership and variables related to the transaction 
(category 2). ?  is the vector of coefficients related to the spatial environment in which the 
farmer interacts on the land market and G are characteristics related to the environment 
(category 3). These include all provinces of the Netherlands. ? is the vector of coefficients 
related to the option value of the land and T are characteristics related to the option value of 
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the land ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
transaction-specific error term. 
Previous studies have noted that the farmland or farm rental price may entail spatial effects 
that need to be further explained (Patton and McErlean, 2002; Breustedt and Habermann, 
2011; Guastella et al., 2013). Spatial effects are observed via spatial dependence. Spatial 
dependence refers to the interrelationship between two points across space. It can be divided 
into spatial lag dependence and spatial error dependence, where spatial error dependence 
refers to the error term and spatial lag dependence refers to the dependent variable (Anselin, 
1988). Both spatial error and spatial lag dependence may persist in our data.  
Spatial lag dependence may be present by the fact that the price of a parcel affects the price of 
the parcels in the vicinity directly. Spatial lag dependence would therefore be part of our third 
category. Patton and McErlean (2003) argue that property owners, prospective buyers, real 
estate agencies, tax assessors and others base their estimates of values of agricultural land on 
observed sales in the vicinity. Both Patton and McErlean (2003) and Breustedt and Habermann 
(2011) found presence of spatial lag dependence; respectively for Irish land prices and German 
rental rates. The following re-specification corrects for spatial lag dependence:  
??? ??????? ????????WPP ,       (2) 
where the spatial lag is composed of an n x n matrix of spatial weights W with parameter ? 
representing the spatial structure among all transactions. The element ?? is then multiplied 
by the dependent variable P (Patton and McErlean, 2003).  
Spatial error dependence may be present when spatial effects on land prices are due to 
unobserved variables that are spatially correlated. For example, information on the depth of 
the groundwater level is not available. The groundwater level is spatially correlated and 
affects the yield. Depending on the sign of the correlation, the estimated variances may be 
either too small or too large (Hardie et al., 2001). In case of spatial error dependence, omitted 
variables that are spatially correlated with independent variables result in inefficient 
95
  
 4 
5 
estimators compared with OLS (Anselin, 1988). The following re-specification corrects for 
spatial error dependence:  
?? ?????? ????????P ,  with ???? ?? W     (3) 
where ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the spatial autoregressive error term and ? is a normally distributed error term (IID) (Patton 
and McErlean, 2003). 
Part of the spatial dependence that persists in our data is captured by the explanatory 
variables. Provinces may serve as a proxy for spatial policies, and population density serves 
as a proxy for the proximity to residential errors. The size and location of locally fragmented 
land markets with the related number of buyers and sellers of agricultural land in a certain 
area can however not be captured by one of the explanatory variables. In order to reflect this, 
we define the spatial weight matrix for both models and time periods in such a way that each 
transaction has at least one other transaction connected to it. The spatial weight matrix is then 
defined based on this radius. 
 
4.5 Results 
In this section, we explain the price of agricultural land via the four defined categories: (1) the 
revenue obtained directly from farming, (2) institutional and transaction regulations, (3) the 
spatial environment in which the farmer interacts on the land market, and (4) the local market 
conditions that determine the option value of the land. We split our model into two time 
periods, one from 2004-2007 and one from 2008-2011. We test whether these two periods are 
significantly different from each other in two ways; first by testing for the importance of years 
using an F-test on the full model with and without year-dummies. Second, using a Chow test 
to compare the two time periods. Both tests are significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. This implies that time matters in explaining farmland prices and that the two time 
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periods are significantly different from each other. We will first explain our choice for the 
spatial model specification before turning to the model results. 
 
4.5.1 Selection of spatial model 
In order to estimate the influence of spatial lag and spatial error dependence, we first specify 
the spatial weight matrix W. The weight matrix is based on a critical distance band, specified 
in kilometres. There are three common options to ensure continuity between the different 
locations: (1) farmers are potentially willing to buy land if they are not separated by a common 
border, (2) farmers are potentially willing to buy land if they are part of the k nearest 
neighbours; e.g. only the 10 closest transactions are considered if k is set at 10 and (3) farmers 
are potentially willing to buy land if they are not further apart from each other than a certain 
distance. We assume that it is only reasonable for a farmer to buy additional land for farming 
purposes if the land is located sufficiently close to his current farming operations. We 
therefore specify a spatial weight matrix based on the third option. For each of the two time 
periods, we estimate the distance to the nearest transaction and based on that distance 
construct W. At a distance of 5778, and 6913 meters between the X and Y coordinates of the 
different transactions for respectively the first and second period, all farms are connected to 
at least one other farm. We therefore specify the W matrix based on 6000 for period 1 and 7000 
for period 2.  
In order to test whether spatial dependency is present, we first use a Moran’s I test. For both 
periods, the Moran’s I is highly significant at the 1 percent level. As explained in the empirical 
model, both spatial lag dependence and spatial error dependence may be present. To 
distinguish between the two we carry out a Lagrange Multiplier test. For both periods, both 
spatial lag and spatial error dependence are significant, necessitating the need of a robust form 
specification. Upon considering the robust form for period 1, the error model is only 
marginally significant, leading us to choose the lag model for period 1 (LMlag(157.68)<0.0001, 
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LMerr(4.76)<0.05). For period 2, both the Lagrange Multiplier for spatial lag and spatial error 
dependence remain significant when considering the robust form specification 
(RLMerr(53.06)<0.0001) (RLMlag(188.94)<0.0001). However, the consistently larger value of 
the lag model led us to choose the spatial lag model for period 2. The spatial lag model tests 
whether the price of farmland in one geographical region is directly influenced by the values 
of farmland found in by other transactions in the same region, above and beyond the 
explanatory variables already captured in the regression. We consider the spatial lag to be 
part of the third category, and will therefore discuss this at section 4.5.3. The results of the 
spatial lag specification compared with OLS results can be found in Table 4.2. 
 
4.5.2 First category: Revenue obtained directly from farming 
The expected revenue of agricultural land has a positive and significant effect for both time 
periods. This is as expected because a larger expected net revenue is likely to affect land prices 
positively. Various studies have showed a capitalization effect of direct payments in the price 
of land (Weersink et al., 1999; Ciaian and Kancs, 2012; Latruffe and Le Mouel, 2009). The 
negative and significant sign that we find for the amount of direct payments in the first period 
and the insignificant sign in the second period may therefore seem contrary to the expectation. 
However, Ciaian et al. (2012) found that only 19 cents of every Euro are captured in land rents 
and Devadoss and Manchu (2007) also find an insignificant effect of government payments. 
The effect of government payments is likely to be larger under rental prices than under 
farmland prices. A further possible reason for the negative effect is that there is less need to 
buy land if a farm receives a large amount of payments. Moreover, the direct payments are 
the average direct payments of the buying farm and may therefore relate to the present level 
of payments of the farmer and not to the additional payments he would receive upon 
acquiring the additional land. 
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Farm types characterised by the share of land for arable and grassland use both show 
significant and negative effects on farmland price. Farm types not considered are e.g. 
horticultural farms. These other type of farms use relatively less land and are therefore likely 
to be able to pay more for their land. Although these farms have a higher degree of 
substitutability it does not lead to a reduction of the price the farmer is willing to pay for 
additional land, as suggested by Latruffe and Le Moel (2009).  
Animal density is measured by the number of cattle, pigs and the LSU per hectare of farmland. 
Previous studies have highlighted the importance of livestock density to the local competition 
for land. Breustedt and Habermann (2011) find a significant and positive effect of animal 
density at the regional level, but not at the farm level. Vulkina and Wossink (2000) further 
showed that quota policies led to an increase in the price of land for regions where quotas are 
binding compared with regions where quotas are not binding. This is in line with the results 
that we find for LSU per hectare of land. The LSU per hectare shows a negative and significant 
effect for the first period and a positive and significant effect for the second period. Our second 
time period starts with the announced extension of milk quotas, which are eventually 
abolished in 2015. The LSU per hectare of land therefore starts influencing the price of land 
positively when farmers can increase production without buying quota rights. This because 
in order to expand farm operations, they still need to buy land in order to meet nitrate 
requirements (Boere et al., 2015). 
The size of the farm shows an insignificant effect for the first period and a significant and 
positive effect for the second period. The effect for the second period implies that the larger 
the farm is in terms of hectares, the higher the price it is willing to pay for the land. This could 
represent economies of scale; larger farms are able to obtain a larger net revenue per hectare 
of agricultural land. Farm size may capture productivity differences; larger farms are able to 
offer a higher price for land compared with the average NPV. The previous literature is not 
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conclusive on the relationship between farm size and productivity, Ciaian and Kancs (2012) 
for example find very small negative effects. 
The age of the farmer is only significant for the first period, showing a negative effect for age 
and a positive effect for age squared, and implying life cycle patterns in farmland transactions. 
Life cycle patterns imply that the advantage of increasing farming operations is increasing up 
to a certain age, after which it is decreasing (Gale, 2003). They may reflect different things, 
such as bargaining power, opportunity costs and the farmer’s lifetime working cycle 
(Breustedt and Habermann, 2011). Breustedt and Habermann (2011) find an insignificant 
effect for age, but this may be because they did not include age squared.  
For none of the periods the quantity of labour shows a significant effect on the price of land. 
However, the productivity (quantity of labour per hectare) is highly significant for both 
periods. This, together with the positive effect for farm size observed in the second period 
captures the efficiency of farms; showing that more productive farms are able to offer a higher 
price for land.  
 
4.5.3 Second category: Institutional and transaction regulations 
Transaction regulations, and especially institutional regulations, are of large importance in 
explaining farmland prices (Ferguson, 2005). Ownership may be permitted to only certain 
types of buyers, or regulations regarding the size and price of the transaction may be imposed 
by governments (Ay and Latruffe, 2013). If the land is fully or family owned, this has a large 
positive impact on the price of land. With full or family ownership the investment is more 
secured compared with for example ownership with leasehold. Further institutional and 
transaction regulations are represented by whether the seller is a private person. In that case, 
positive and significant effects are found for both time periods; implying that private persons 
can pay a higher price for the land than e.g. governmental bodies. It may also be the case that 
transaction costs, such as search and monitoring costs, are higher if two private persons have 
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to meet than when the seller of land is e.g. a government body or a bank, who typically have 
more information available. Government bodies or banks often have more information on 
land prices and supply and demand in the market and may buy land with the idea of future 
development into for example residential areas. They also have to bear less costs, such as 
registration costs, and notary fees (Ay and Latruffe, 2013). The number of hectares involved 
in the transaction does not seem to have an influence on the price of farmland. This is counter-
intuitive because transaction costs per hectare of land are likely to decrease with the size of 
the transaction. It may be that this effect is already captured by the aforementioned variables. 
 
4.5.4 Third category: Spatial environment in which the farmer interacts in the market 
The large significance of the coefficients for the individual provinces show that the 
geographical region matters in explaining the price of land. We find both positive and 
negative coefficients, which is in line with the existing literature that suggests that land-use 
regulations may have different effects (Jaeger et al., 2012). The large significance of the 
coefficients is mostly due to land-use regulations that are set on a provincial level. They 
include for example zoning policies that limit urban sprawl (Ay and Latruffe, 2013). In the 
first period, the price of land has a positive and significant effect (compared with the province 
Limburg in the South of the Netherlands) in the more urbanized provinces Utrecht, Noord-
Holland and Zuid-Holland and a negative and significant effects for the rural provinces 
Groningen, Friesland and Drenthe. Near cities agricultural land faces pressure from other uses 
such as housing and infrastructure which commonly entail larger land prices. In more urban 
regions this may therefore lead to spill-over effects in the price of land. This is largely similar 
for the second period, except that the province of Noord-Holland is not significant anymore. 
This may have to do with the fact that after the financial crisis, the urban influences of this 
province have become less important.  
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Land-use regulations often have an environmental goal also, for example by preserving 
environmental benefits and storage for ground water (Ay and Latruffe, 2013). In the 
Netherlands, the nitrate regulation is a good example of such regulation. This especially 
applies for areas with a high density of livestock, which occurs mostly in the provinces 
Drenthe, Overijssel, Utrecht, Noord-Brabant and Limburg. Indeed, the province Overijssel 
was insignificant in the first period, but significant in the second period, capturing the start of 
the quota enlargement. 
The Lagrange Multiplier test showed that spatial lag dependence is present in our data. 
Hence, the price of farmland in the local spatial environment is directly influenced by the 
values of farmland found in the same environment, above and beyond the explanatory 
variables already captured in the regression. This implies that the price of a parcel affects the 
price of the parcels in the vicinity directly. Property owners, prospective buyers, real estate 
agencies, tax assessors and others base their estimates of values of agricultural land on 
observed sales in the vicinity (Patton and McErlean, 2003). If there is a larger number of actors 
interacting in the vicinity of the transaction, this is likely to result in a larger price offered for 
the land. 
 
4.5.5 Fourth category: Local market conditions that determine the option value of land 
The dummies for each quarter of the year show that there are seasonal fluctuations present in 
the data. Over both periods, the second half of the year results in higher land prices compared 
with the first half of the year. This may be for agronomic reasons; in order to profit from the 
newly acquired land, a producer needs to buy land before the new planting season starts. 
Especially in the second period, the year-dummies show significant results, indicating that 
land prices rise faster in certain years than in others. This may be caused by speculative effects 
on future returns and future use of the land. This is in line with Power and Turvey (2010) who 
suggest that the volatility of rural land values exists mostly in the short term and thereby find 
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evidence for a short-run bubble in farmland prices in the US. This may also explain the 
difference compared with Tegene and Kuchler (1993) who did not find evidence for a rural 
land market bubble, but instead focused on the long term. In the first period, we only find a 
significant and positive effect for the year 2004. In the second period, significant and positive 
effects are found for all years. This implies a negative effect for 2008, the year of the onset of 
the financial crisis. In line with Power and Turvey (2010) we do however also use a short time 
horizon. 
In both periods, population density shows a significant and positive result, implying an 
option value of land in anticipation of the transformation of agricultural land into for instance 
residential land. Moreover, a higher nearby population density may increase the demand for 
agricultural products and may lead to larger positive externalities of farmland near residential 
areas (e.g. the valuation of farmland), also leading to larger farmland prices (Devadoss and 
Manchu, 2007) 
 
Table 4.2: Regression results 
  Period 1 OLS Period 1 Lag Period 2 OLS Period 2 Lag 
Variable  coeff sign  coeff sign  coeff  sign  coeff sign  
Revenue obtained from farming 
Expected net revenue 0.00 *** 0.01 ** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 
Direct payments -0.01 ** -0.01 *** 0.00  0.00  
Share of arable land -0.89 *** -0.53 *** -1.15 *** -0.84 *** 
Share of grassland -1.04 *** -0.64 *** -1.56 ** -1.07 *** 
Cattle 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Pigs 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
LSU/ha -0.02 *** -0.02 *** 0.02 * 0.01 * 
Size 0.00 *** 0.00  0.00 ** 0.00 *** 
Age -0.02 * -0.02 ** -0.02  -0.01  
Age squared 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.00  0.00  
Labour 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  
Productivity 0.36 *** 0.30 *** 0.30 ** 0.30 *** 
Institutional and transaction regulations 
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Private seller 0.64 *** 0.60 *** 0.63 *** 0.60 *** 
Full ownership 0.64 *** 0.66 *** 1.25 *** 1.20 *** 
Ha transacted 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   
Spatial environmenta) 
Groningen -0.39 *** -0.16   -0.59 *** -0.20 ** 
Friesland -0.59 *** -0.28 *** -0.44 *** -0.05  
Drenthe -0.89 *** -0.45 *** -0.92 *** -0.33 *** 
Overijssel -0.06  0.00  0.53 *** 0.30 *** 
Flevoland 0.44 *** 0.52 *** 1.68 *** 0.88 *** 
Gelderland 0.18 ** 0.09  0.42 *** 0.26 *** 
Utrecht 0.91 *** 0.52 *** 0.70 *** 0.41 *** 
Limburg         
Noord-Holland 0.51 *** 0.23 ** 0.12  0.06  
Zuid-Holland 0.78 *** 0.45 *** 0.67 *** 0.39 *** 
Zeeland -0.08  -0.05  0.05  0.18 ** 
Noord-Brabant 0.66 *** 0.33 *** 1.07 *** 0.48 *** 
Local market conditionsa) 
Q2 0.04  0.03 * 0.06  0.07  
Q3 0.35 *** 0.32 *** 0.31 *** 0.25 *** 
Q4 0.17 *** 0.15 *** 0.31 *** 0.28 *** 
2004 0.22 *** 0.20 ***     
2005 0.09 * 0.08      
2007 0.05  0.05      
2009     0.84 *** 0.81 *** 
2010     0.35 **   
2011     0.27 ***   
Population density 0.05 *** 0.03 *** 0.06 *** 0.04 *** 
Constant 2.63 *** 0.53 ***  3.44 *** 0.61 * 
Rho     0.46 ***     0.58 *** 
a)Province Limburg, Q1 and 2006 and 2008 for respectively period 1 and 2 treated as base category. 
 
4.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
In 2008 an economic crisis hit the Netherlands, like the rest of the world. This gives a unique 
opportunity to analyse the effect of the economic crisis on farmland prices. The objective of 
this paper is to explain farmland prices in the Netherlands and to analyse the effect of the 
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financial crisis on the land market price, controlling for other factors explaining farm land 
prices. In order to do so, we defined four categories explaining farmland prices: (i) The 
revenue obtained from farming the land. (ii) Institutional and transaction regulations. (iii) The 
spatial environment in which the farmer interacts on the land market. (iv) Local market 
conditions that determine the option value of land. In order to account for the influence of the 
financial crisis, we divide the Netherlands in two time periods; one from 2004 until 2007; and 
one from 2008 until 2011. Moreover, we have corrected for spatial influences by testing for 
spatial lag and spatial error dependence. We found evidence of spatial lag dependence, 
implying that the price of farmland in the local spatial environment is directly influenced by 
the values of farmland found in the same environment, above and beyond the explanatory 
variables already captured in the regression. 
All of our four categories show significant coefficients and are thereby important in explaining 
farmland prices. With respect to the first category, larger expected net revenue, more intensive 
farm types compared with grassland or arable land and more efficient farms will induce a 
higher price of farmland. With respect to the second category, full or family ownership and a 
private seller induce a higher price of farmland. With respect to the third category, zoning 
policies likely lead to higher land prices nearby cities and agricultural policies lead to higher 
land prices in provinces with a manure surplus. Moreover, the announcement of milk quota 
abolition in 2008 has led to higher land prices. With respect to the fourth category, seasonal 
fluctuations relating to planting times and volatility in years exist and population density has 
a positive effect on farmland price. 
The difference in results between the two periods are generally small; except for LSU per 
hectare, no differences in both sign and significance are observed between the two periods. 
However, certain variables have become (more) significant or have resulted in a larger impact. 
With regard to the first category, the negative impact of the share of grassland and arable land 
of the farm on the land price has become more pronounced. Moreover, the size of the farm 
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has become positive and significant and the number of LSU per hectare of land has changed 
from negative and significant to positive and significant. The larger effect of share of grassland 
and arable land and size of the farm may imply that farm-specific factors making the farm-
specific revenue deviate from the average revenue have become more important. The positive 
and significant effect of LSU per hectare together with the positive and significant effect of 
Overijssel may indicate that land use regulations, and more specifically the nitrate regulation 
have become more important in the second period.  
Changes are observed to the spatial environment in which the farmer interacts on the market 
as well. Noord-Holland, the most urban province of the Netherlands, does not show a 
significant effect (compared to Limburg) on the price of land anymore. Furthermore, the 
significant and positive effects found for all years in the second period imply a smaller effect 
for 2008. Together, this provides limited indication that the onset of the financial crisis had a 
negative effect on farm land prices. The announcement of the milk quotas however had a 
positive effect on farm land prices. So, the spatial environment in which the farmer interacts, 
as well as the local market conditions that determine the option value of land have changed 
in importance.  
To our understanding, this paper provides a first comprehensive analysis general and local 
economic factors influencing the price of farmland, accounting for both space and time, at the 
farm level. However, there are also caveats to this study, the most important being that we 
were not able to determine the farm-specific NPV. We have tried to overcome this by 
including the farm-type specific expected net revenue and by capturing differences between 
the farm-specific net revenue and the average net revenue using farm-specific variables such 
as age and labour productivity.
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CHAPTER 5. TOWARDS THE GREENING OF AGRICULTURAL PAYMENTS: THE 
EFFECT OF RECENT CAP REFORM ON CROPPING DECISIONS1 
Abstract 
 
This chapter analyses the potential impact on producers’ land-use decisions 
in moving from support payments based on entitlements to a single farm 
payment (SFP) and then to a single farm payment with a greening component 
as part of the 2013 CAP reform. Using data for representative Dutch arable 
farms of different sizes, we develop a farm-level crop allocation model that is 
calibrated using positive mathematical programming. We use a two-step 
calibration method to determine a nonlinear cost function and farm-specific 
risk aversion coefficients. We find that the 2013 CAP reforms will cause 
farmers to shift away from crops previously eligible for payments, with the 
initial shift under the SFP enhanced by the move towards SFP combined with 
green payment. 
  
1 Paper by Esther Boere and G. Cornelis van Kooten. Submitted to a peer-reviewed journal. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has increasingly focused on liberalizing markets 
by decoupling payments from production, and linking them to the provision of 
environmental services. The 1992 MacSharry reform laid the foundation for the transition 
from market protection and price support policies to a direct income payment system. 
Products receiving price support, such as cereals, oilseeds, tobacco, milk, beef and lamb, saw 
a reduction in levels of protection, with producers receiving direct payments in return. This 
transition was reinforced by the reforms that followed: Agenda 2000, the 2003 Mid-Term 
Review (Fischler reform), the 2008 Health Check, and, more recently, the 2013 CAP reform. 
Direct payments can therefore be seen as the embodiment of the move away from support 
measures for specific products towards less market-distorting agricultural support where 
subsidies are paid directly to farmers, conditional upon certain practices but decoupled from 
production. An important step in this direction was the 2003 Mid-Term Review that gradually 
introduced the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) between January 2005 and January 2007. Direct 
payments were decoupled from production but linked to eligible farmland, although coupling 
elements were retained in some programs, notably dairy, cereals, sugar beets and starch 
potatoes.  
Under the 2003 reforms, countries could choose (1) an approach where entitlements depended 
on farm-specific historical reference amounts, (2) an approach where entitlements depended 
on the region’s outcomes for establishing a reference margin, or (3) a hybrid of the historic 
and regional approaches (European Commission, 2014a). While the European Commission 
expressed a preference for the regional model, the majority of countries opted for the historical 
one (Matthews et al., 2013). Under the historic approach, only lands growing specific crops 
were considered eligible for fixed payments (€/ha) that varied by crop based on historic 2000-
2002 yields; additionally, payments depended on cross-compliance measures linked to 
environmental standards (Helming et al., 2010). Because payments were based on farm-
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specific entitlements, their size differed significantly by type of farm and across farms 
(Helming and Peerlings, 2014).  
When subsidies are completely decoupled from production, one would expect the levels of 
output with and without subsidies to be equal (Hennessy, 1998). However, production 
decisions may be affected indirectly because flat-rate payments based on historic reference 
amounts result in an insurance effect, because it provides an effective lower bound on a 
producer’s income, and a wealth effect, because it increases a farmer’s wealth and thereby 
reduces his level of risk aversion (Finger and Lehmann, 2012; Hennessy, 1998). Decoupled 
payments do not affect price variability and thus are not expected to have an insurance effect. 
Wealth effects, on the other hand, are likely to be small and producer specific, although some 
evidence suggests the wealth effect could still have a slight impact on crop choices (Sckokai 
and Moro, 2009; Koundouri et al., 2009). Wealth effects only occur under the assumption of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, where the farmer becomes less risk-averse with an 
increasing expected payoff. Since the payoff would need to be quite large to have a significant 
impact on wealth in any one year, we assume that a farmer’s risk-aversion is unaffected by 
the expected change in wealth as a result of his crop allocation choices.  
Besides potential insurance and wealth effects, there is an extensive literature evaluating the 
other effects that the decoupled payments of the 2003 Mid-Term Review had on farmers’ 
decisions (for a review see Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009). These include impacts on investment 
decisions caused by increased access to credit (Sckokai and Moro, 2009), changes in on- and 
off-farm labour allocations (Key and Roberts, 2009; Hennessy and Thorne, 2005), changes to 
inputs or other activities that would increase output (Hauser et al., 2004), increased land and 
rental prices (Brady et al., 2009), and, related to prices, competition for land between 
agricultural markets (Gohin, 2006). On a broader scale, direct payments impacted land 
abandonment and biodiversity (Brady et al., 2009; Mosnier et al., 2009; Bhaskar and Beghin, 
2009; Key and Roberts, 2009), affected prices/markets (Balkhausen et al., 2008; Gohin, 2006), 
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and led to the distortion of subsidies on production (Dewbre et al., 2001; Burfisher and 
Hopkins, 2003). Except for the effect of decoupled payments on land prices, the impacts of all 
these effects tend to be rather small (Hennessy and Thorne, 2005; Sckokai and Moro, 2009; 
Koundouri et al., 2009; Key and Roberts, 2009), certainly in comparison to other support 
mechanisms (Dewbre et al., 2001; Burfisher and Hopkins, 2003). However, most changes were 
analysed at the national or large-region scale and not at the farm level, leading to general 
instead of farm-specific statements about land-use change. 
The CAP reform of 2013 introduced a single farm payment (SFP) that would eventually 
provide the same level of support to every hectare of agricultural land within a region, 
independent of the type of farm or crop grown – it is a flat rate payment. In addition, 
producers can be compensated for providing public goods in the form of environmentally-
friendly farming practices – a so-called greening component that is added to the new SFP 
(SFP&GP) if farmers are in compliance (European Commission, 2014a). The most important 
restriction imposed by the greening component is a set-aside requirement referred to as the 
Ecological Focus Area (EFA). Estimates for the Netherlands indicate that some 12,500 farms 
with a total area of 670,000 hectares have to apply EFA measures to meet the greening criteria, 
implying 33,500 hectares of EFA (Bron et al., 2014).  
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the farm-specific effect that the different payment 
mechanisms, including the single farm payment and green payment (GP), have on land use 
(crop allocation) decisions. In essence, we compare the direct payment reforms on cropping 
decisions using the Netherlands as a case study. For the Netherlands, it is expected that the 
SFP will lead to a lower level of income support and an increase in income uncertainty 
(Helming and Peerlings, 2014). Thus, we investigate if, and under what circumstances, this 
implies enhanced greening practices for farms of different sizes.  
We begin our analysis in the next section with a description of our crop allocation model, 
which employs representative farms of various sizes, followed in section 5.3 by a summary of 
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the Dutch data employed in this application and how the data are used to calibrate our model 
using PMP. Our simulation results comparing historic, SFP and SFP&GP follow in section 5.4. 
Our conclusions ensue. 
 
5.2 Farm-level crop allocation models 
In deciding how to allocate his land among different uses, the agricultural producer takes into 
account government support payments. Three stages in the reform of direct payments for the 
Netherlands are indicated in Table 5.1. Before 2006, payments were linked to crops, leading 
to payments up to €9,560 for an average arable farm. Then the Mid-Term Review led to a 
significant but not total shift to decoupled direct payments starting in 2006. Finally, beginning 
2015 direct payments were fully decoupled and are now linked to greening criteria. Our 
purpose is to determine the potential effect that these three stages have on the way the farmer 
allocates his land to various crop activities. We do this using a farm-level crop allocation 
model for representative Dutch arable farms of different sizes. 
We assume that the producer selects the crops to plant in a way that addresses two conflicting 
objectives: the farmer seeks to maximize expected net returns from his land-use decision while 
minimizing the variance of returns. For example, the objective might be to maximize expected 
utility using a mean-variance approach where the expected net return is adjusted for risk. In 
that case, risk is defined as the variance in net returns associated with the crop portfolio 
multiplied by the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient (discussed below). Further, 
we calibrate the model using positive mathematical programming (PMP) (Howitt, 1995).  
We begin by constructing a base farm-level crop allocation model that includes a direct 
payment (€/ha) based on historic entitlements that are assumed to be in place until 2012 (first 
stage). Then we discuss how we calibrate our crop allocation model using PMP. Finally, we 
describe how the model needs to be modified to take into account flat-rate direct payments 
(second stage) and, subsequently, direct payments that include an option for higher payments 
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by meeting certain greening requirements (third stage). In Table 5.1, these are referred to as 
CP, SPS and SFP, respectively.  
 
Table 5.1: Amount and type of payments for an average arable farm in the Netherlands  
Type of support Year 
Coupled 
payments (€) 
Direct payments 
(€) 
Size of average 
arable farm (ha) 
CP 2001 5,340  50.7 
CP 2002 7,180  51.1 
CP 2003 7,900  52.7 
CP 2004 9,560  53.2 
CP 2005 9,310  55.1 
SPS 2006 2,390 17,390 55.2 
SPS 2007 2,750 18,270 57.6 
SPS 2008 3,130 20,150 58.7 
SPS 2009 2,840 21,880 59.4 
SPS 2010 2,940 23,090 59.1 
SPS 2011 3,170 24,750 59.4 
SPS 2012  29,210 59.5 
SFP 2013    
Source: LEI (2014e) 
5.2.1 Base Model and Flat-Rate Payments 
For the average arable farm in the Netherlands, the crops previously eligible to receive 
payments were wheat, barley and sugar beets. A farmer received the subsidy as long as his 
eligible land is planted to one of the eligible crops, independent of the precise distribution of 
crops within the eligible set (RVO, 2015). In our model and based on payments as of 2006, we 
employ the fixed crop-specific direct payments provided in Table 5.2. Sugar beets are still 
coupled and subject to a quota regime. Therefore, only wheat and barley can be freely 
allocated within the eligible hectares to receive payments. For reasons of simplicity, we model 
the payments in Table 5.2 as if they were crop-specific. 
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Table 5.2: Fixed crop-specific payment based on historic 2000-2002 yields 
Crop Payment (€/ha) 
Wheat 377.5 
Barley 377.5 
potato 0 
sugar beet 687.0 
Onions 0 
Source: Hermans et al. (2006) 
Expected income and its variance are affected by the subsidies agricultural producers receive. 
We assume that farmers maximize their gross margins (defined as the difference between crop 
revenue and identifiable variable costs), while accounting for risk in their production 
decisions; thus, in the current context, an arable farmer with a fixed amount of land and facing 
exogenous input and output prices seeks to maximize his expected utility by allocating land 
to various uses. Expected utility is determined by the expected overall gross margin, the 
variance-covariance matrix of gross margins, and the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk 
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where U ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ??Rk] is the expected total gross margin 
from crop production; ? = –U???w)/U??w), where U(w) is specified as an exponential utility 
function of wealth w;2 ?2 is the risk associated with the total crop portfolio; pk,t and yk,t 
represent, respectively, the output price and yield for crop k in period t; SPSk is the historic 
reference payment (€/ha) for crop k; and ck(w) is the per unit-area variable cost of producing 
crop k as a function of exogenously-determined input prices w. CV(Rk,Ri) refers to the 
covariance matrix, where Ri and Rk refer to the respective realized gross margins to crops i 
and k, and E[Rk] is the farmer’s expected overall gross margin (€/ha) from planting crop k; 
there are K crops that can be planted in any period; xk denotes the number of hectares allocated 
to produce crop k; and X  represents the total area (ha) the farmer allocates to crop 
production. Finally, T refers to the number of past years used to generate the expected gross 
margins and the variance-covariance matrix. 
Equations (2) through (5) are accounting identities. Equation (2) calculates the gross margin 
accruing to each crop in each period given the allocation of land to crops, which is 
endogenously chosen in the model. SPSk is included in (2) because we model payments based 
on entitlements as payments varying by crop. Equation (3) specifies the risk associated with 
the total crop portfolio, while equation (4) provides the variance-covariance matrix. Based on 
historic data, equation (5) calculates the expected (mean) revenue that accrues to each crop 
and is used in each of our model simulations. An additional constraint (6) restricts the farmer’s 
2 This implies constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) as discussed below. Notice that some authors 
specify utility as a function of consumption or income rather than wealth, but this can be confusing in 
the current context as explained in the next section (compare Freund, 1956; McCarl and Bessler, 1989; 
Petsakos and Rozakis, 2011).  
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cultivated area to that which is available. In each period, the producer must decide how to 
allocate his X  hectares among the K different crops so as to maximize utility. 
 
5.2.2 Model Calibration 
The PMP procedure for calibrating a model in which the objective is simply to maximize the 
gross margin from allocating a fixed amount of cropland to a variety of crops is now well 
known (Howitt 1995, 2005). The calibration procedure is first to maximize E[R], as given in 
equation (5), where Rk is a linear function, subject to (2), (3), (4) and (6) plus added calibration 
constraints (discussed below). Notice that, at this stage, linearity implies that ck(w)=ck, where 
ck is the (fixed) average cost of producing crop k (€/ha); it is this average cost that is the only 
cost component commonly available to the researcher.  
Using the 1st-stage PMP results, the linear objective function is then adjusted to include 
nonlinear terms (Heckelei et al., 2012). Nonlinearities might arise, for example, as a result of 
unobserved differences in soil quality, topography or to account for other physical attributes 
of the land such as crop rotation, as well as anticipated government programs, labour 
availability, et cetera. These unobserved attributes result in increasing marginal costs as more 
of a particular crop is planted on a farm (Howitt, 1995). Upon taking these factors into account, 
a smooth supply response can be detected, and continuous changes in land use responses can 
be identified by changing the (exogenous) policy variables, avoiding over-specialisation and 
unrealistic responses in land uses (Röhm and Dabbert, 2003).  
The PMP method is somewhat more complicated when the objective is to maximize expected 
utility rather than the total expected gross margin. In that case, one should also calibrate the 
absolute risk aversion parameter. Petsakos and Rozakis (2011, 2015) provide a more complete 
model in which observed plantings and a covariance matrix of gross margins are needed to 
calibrate the crop-allocation model. Rather than assuming an exponential utility function 
which leads to a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) parameter, Petsakos and Rozakis 
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(2015) assume a logarithmic function and thus a decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) 
coefficient that is a concave function of wealth. Specification of an initial level of wealth is 
required so that DARA changes in response to the farmer’s cropping choices. In their 
application, the authors choose an initial level of wealth given by the single farm payment. 
However, this is more suited to the situation where the level of initial wealth is larger than 
that given by SFP, primarily because a producer’s total wealth is not likely to change 
dramatically from one crop year to the next, making a normal wealth distribution more likely; 
if wealth is set equal to SFP, small changes in annual returns will have too great an impact on 
wealth. Producers face different kinds of uncertainty and increased output price volatility 
caused by the EU’s shift towards SFP does not necessarily imply changes in the level and 
variance of income (Pennings et al., 2010; Moschini and Hennessy, 2001). Perceived risk may 
therefore depend more on the person rather than changes in wealth. As a result, and to allow 
comparison of the degree of risk aversion among farmers, we characterize the farmer’s risk 
aversion by CARA rather than DARA. In this chapter, we assume different farmers with 
varying degrees of risk aversion. In order to do so, an exponential utility function and normal 
distribution of wealth are required. 
A method for specifying the CARA parameter ? is nonetheless still required. In the current 
application, we vary ? for the small, medium and large representative producers in an 
iterative fashion in order to come close to duplicating the observed crop allocation (see Jeder 
et al., 2011).3 We begin with the standard PMP approach identified in Howitt (2005) that starts 
by introducing the following calibration constraints: 
xk ??xko + ?k, ?k,           (7) 
where the superscript denotes observed land use and ?k are small perturbations required to 
avoid degeneracy of the shadow prices. The calibration constraints put an upper limit on 
3 This is discussed in more detail in section 3.3 below. 
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simulated land-use allocations. Since it is not possible to infer the crop specific costs as 
functions of input prices, cost functions ck(w) are replaced by observed average variable costs 
in (2). More specifically, we assume that ck(w)=ck(xk)=cko (€/ha), or a farm-specific value set to 
the observed average cost of producing crop k. Thus, the cost of planting, tending and 
harvesting crop k is now assumed to be a function of how much land is allocated to that crop.  
In the second step, the dual values associated with the calibration constraints are used to 
parameterize a nonlinear cost or production function; in this case a quadratic cost function is 
specified. The revenue function (2) becomes a function of land use as follows:4 
Rk(xk) = pkyk – c(xk) = pkyk – (?kxk + ½ ?kxk2) + SPSk xk,      (8) 
with c(xk) = ?k xk + ½?k xk2 an assumed quadratic cost function. Now, for each crop, the shadow 
price ?k is simply the difference between the marginal (MCk) and average (ACk) costs: 
?k = MCk – ACk ????k + ?kxk) – ??k + ½?kxk) = ½?kxk.      (9) 
Given observed values for yields, crop prices, average per ha production costs and the 
allocation of farmland to various crops, it is possible to derive ?k and ?k from the shadow 
prices ?k determined in the first step: 
?k = 2?k/xko and ?k = cko – ?k – SPSk.        (10) 
In the third step, the calibration constraints are removed; i.e. c(xk)=cko is replaced by c(xk), and 
? is varied until it exactly duplicates observed land allocation. Given the parameterized 
objective function and the farm-specific value for ?, it is now possible to simulate changes to 
the policy variables. The revised revenue equation used in place of equation (2) is:  
4 The subscript t has been dropped as we calibrate the model to land uses observed in our base year. 
117
  
 
 5 
? ?? ???
??
????
K
k
kkkkkkk
K
k
k xSPSxypR
11
5.0 ?? .      (11) 
5.3 Description of the Model Farms 
In this section, we first examine the data and then present the results of the PMP analysis 
using a trade-off function that gradually increases the risk-aversion coefficient for the 
representative crop farms of different sizes under payments based on entitlements.  
 
5.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our study focuses on representative arable farms of different sizes in the Netherlands that 
have a mixed crop portfolio. We use the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) to select 
representative small, medium and large farm sizes. For each of our representative farms, farm 
specific land allocations, prices, yields and costs are reported in Table 5.3. Because the FADN 
employs a representative sample of farms, it was not possible to gather historic data per 
representative farm. Thus, we took a sample of farms within the farm size classes to establish 
historic prices, yields and costs for the three representative farms. 
Farm specific data from the FADN (LEI, 2014e) for the period 2000 through 2012 were used to 
measure annual variations in prices, yields and costs. Variable costs were calculated by crop 
per hectare and include costs of seed, pesticide, fertilizer, energy and other costs for crop 
activities. Given available yield and price data, net revenues were calculated for all cropping 
activities. A summary of net revenues and their variances for 2012 is also found in Table 5.3. 
By employing information from the PMP calibration, we establish farm plans for each of the 
representative farms to use for simulating different scenarios for direct payments as part of 
the CAP reform. 
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Table 5.3: Land allocations, yields, prices, costs and revenues and their variance for the 
small, medium and large farm. 
Crop 
Observed  
ha 
Yield (100 
kg/ha) 
Price (€/100 
kg) 
Variable 
cost (€/ha) 
Gross 
margin 
(€/ha) a 
Variance 
gross 
margin 
(€/ha) 
SMALL  
wheat 10.45 78.4 22.91 911.59 884 390,468 
barley 5.06 63.08 22.54 564.34 858 125,037 
potato 10.55 387.09 17.29 2,174.90 4,519 1,561,499 
sugar 8.15 773.61 6.07 1,160.29 3,539 354,382 
Onion 5.72 748.5 11.51 2,388.67 6,223 7,926,375 
Total 39.93           
MEDIUM         
Wheat 19.31 86.1 24.23 647.25 1,439 131,076 
Barley 10.8 75.45 23.62 489.11 1,293 107,267 
Potato 12.68 424.94 18.87 2,357.02 5,660 2,255,007 
Sugar 8.83 803.63 6.22 1,080.62 3,920 350,510 
Onion 7.79 629.73 11.62 2,184.60 5,131 8,203,962 
Total 59.41           
LARGE  
Wheat 35.02 88.6 23.63 593.23 1,500 126,251 
Barley 14.97 73.52 24.96 387.34 1,448 109,852 
Potato 26.37 455.72 18.94 2,253.42 6,379 1,740,431 
Sugar 17.08 794.51 6.39 993.48 4,083 447,065 
Onion 13.09 579.3 10.98 2,227.38 4,133 6,841,132 
Total 106.53           
Source: Farm Accountancy Data Network (LEI, 2014e) 
a Farmers initially receive payments based on entitlements which have not yet been 
included. 
 
5.3.2 PMP calibration 
To model our various scenarios, we develop a mathematical programming model in GAMS 
(Rosenthal, 2008). We begin by maximizing the overall gross returns subject to technical and 
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observed land-use calibration constraints of the representative farms (Table 5.3). The gross 
margin is calculated for each crop as price × yield minus variable cost using the data in the 
table. In Table 5.4 we provide the estimated slope coefficients, but only for four PMP activities 
as barley continues as a non-marginal (linear) activity for all farm sizes as its calibration 
constraint was not binding (?b=0).  
Table 5.4: Calibrated slope (?) coefficient for the small, medium and large farms 
Crop Small Medium Large 
Wheat 27.07 145.93 52.67 
Barley 0 0 0 
Potatoes 3656.63 3991.08 4552.7 
Sugar beets 2681.14 2934.44 2945.22 
Onions 5365.31 3462.34 2308.11 
 
For barley, outside information is needed to distinguish between average and marginal cost. 
Following Howitt (2005, pp.88-91), we employ the elasticity of land supply with respect to 
output price: ?s ????q??p) (p/q??????xb??MCb) (pb/xbo), where xbo is the observed land in barley and 
pb is the output price for barley. Recall from (9) that MCk ???k+?kxk??????MCb??xb = ?b = pb/(?s × 
xbo). Now define an adjustment at xbo that is added to the LP average cost to obtain a nonlinear 
cost function: Adj = MC – AC = ½ ?b xbo = pb/2?s. If the adjustment applies to the marginal activity 
– the activity whose calibration constraint is not binding – then the PMP values for the non-
marginal activities (whose calibration constraints are binding) must also change as follows: 
k?ˆ = ?k + Adj.           (12) 
The choice of value for the elasticity of land supply for the non-marginal activity differs 
between studies, even for the same crops (Jongeneel, 2000; Salhofer, 2000; Helming, 2005; 
Helming and Peerlings, 2014). Following Salhofer (2000), who indicates that elasticities of land 
supply must be between 0 and 1, and based on a previous study using the same period and 
study area, we choose ?s = 0.174 for barley with respect to land (see Chapter 2). The farm-
120
  
 
5 
specific results for k?ˆ ???k and ?k that are obtained after re-calibration of the PMP model are 
presented in Table 5.5.  
 
Table 5.5: Shadow prices and PMP calibrated marginal cost functions for the small, 
medium and large farma  
  Small Medium Large 
Crop ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Wheat 4113 -3201 787 5267 -4620 545 5326 -4733 304 
Barley 4086 -3521 1616 5121 -4632 949 5273 -4886 705 
Potatoes 7742 -5567 1468 9112 -6755 1437 9826 -7572 745 
Sugar beets 6767 -5607 1660 8056 -6975 1824 8218 -7225 962 
Onions 9451 -7062 3304 8583 -6399 2203 7581 -5354 1158 
a Recall that MCk ???k + ?k xk?? ??????k is the shadow price of the calibration equation for crop 
k determined from GAMS and ?k and ?k are derived using equation (11). In doing so, SPS 
was added to ?k and then used to calculate ?. The shadow price for total land use is the 
shadow price found for the total land use constraint. Values are in €/ha. 
5.3.3 Revenue-variance trade-offs under varying levels of risk-aversion 
Next, we construct a frontier based on the model described above where we vary the level of 
the risk coefficient from very low to very high values, each time finding the related revenue 
and variance of revenue. The resulting frontiers for the representative small, medium and 
large farms are shown in Figure 5.1, but with risk measured as standard deviation. If the 
farmer has a very low risk-aversion coefficient, and focuses primarily on maximizing revenue, 
he is at the upper right of his frontier. If the farmer places much more emphasis on minimizing 
risk, he is at the bottom left of his frontier. The total difference in potential revenue between 
these two points is less than 1%, 9% and 4% for the small, medium and large farms, 
respectively, indicating that a very small reduction in income leads to a relatively large 
increase in the risk coefficient. The corresponding optimal planting strategies change 
gradually as the risk coefficient changes, as indicated in Figure 5.2 below. 
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Figure 5.1: Trade-off between revenue and standard deviation at given levels of risk aversion for 
representative small, medium and large farms. 
 
If we knew a producer’s utility function (or aversion to risk), we would be able to identify the 
optimal allocation of land to various crops. In step 3 of the PMP model, we calibrate the risk 
coefficient by iteratively increasing the value of ? to the point where it begins to impact the 
calibrated (observed) crop allocation. The objective function in equation (1) then includes 
calibrated costs in E[Rk] and the maximum possible value for ? that still retains the observed 
land allocation. For small, medium and large farms, we find respective values of 17.5×10–6, 
0.012×10–6 and 0.001×10–6 for the absolute risk aversion coefficient. The risk aversion coefficient 
of the small farm is much larger than that of the medium and large farms, whereas the risk 
aversion coefficient differs to a much lesser extent between the medium and the large farm. 
The differences in coefficients are as expected. The risk aversion coefficient of a small producer 
is greater than that of a large producer, suggesting that the absolute risk aversion coefficient 
does indeed decline with increasing wealth.5 In their seminal paper, McCarl and Bessler (1989) 
5 Because our ‘calculation’ of the risk coefficient follows the PMP calibration, the actual value of farmers’ 
risk aversion coefficients is likely different from that estimated here because the calibration method 
may account for some risk considerations. Nonetheless, along with the calibrated cost functions, the 
risk coefficients we use enable us to duplicate the observed land uses for each farm size almost exactly. 
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suggested an upper bound on ? might be as follows: ? ?? ???R, where ?R is the standard 
deviation of gross margin. Using data for an average farm of 60 ha and the associated 
allocation of crops (with 1/3 of the land planted to wheat), and based on yield and price data 
for 2000-2012, we find ? = 0.00009 as the upper bound. The values for the small, medium and 
large farms are all well below this threshold. 
Moving away from values of ? that still retain the observed land allocation towards larger 
values of ? will result in a change in land allocation. As an agricultural producer becomes 
increasingly risk averse, the primary change in land use is away from wheat and sugar beets 
towards potatoes and onions, and this is true for each of the three representative farms, as can 
be seen from Figure 5.2. The relative increase in potatoes and onions compared with wheat 
and sugar beets is largest for the medium farm, then for the large farm, and finally for the 
small farm. 
 
Figure 5.2: Changes in land use: Comparison of a producer’s objective of maximizing revenue and 
minimizing variance for a small, medium and large farm (ha) 
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5.4 Single farm and green payment 
As the CAP changes, payments based on historic entitlements are to evolve into a per-hectare, 
flat-rate payment that is invariant to crop choice – the Single Farm Payment (SFP). Previously, 
entitlements were based on the cultivation of specific crops in the reference period (Table 5.2). 
In the scenarios that follow, we first assume a shift from direct payments tied to crop choice 
to direct payments independent of crop choice, and then from direct payments independent 
of crop choice to direct payments with a greening component. In all cases, our objective is to 
determine impacts on income and land use decisions. 
 
5.4.1 Single Farm and Greening Payment Scenario 
As part of the 2013 reforms starting in 2015, all producers in the Netherlands will receive a 
new entitlement based on the size of their operation, which amounts to about €270 per hectare 
(Dutch Government, 2014).6 In addition, 30% of a nation’s agricultural support budget is to be 
reserved for environmentally friendly practices (European Commission, 2014a). For the 
Netherlands, this implies an additional payment of some €120 per hectare if the producer 
meets certain greening requirements (Dutch Government, 2014). An arable producer with 
more than 30 hectares of land must meet three basic practices to qualify for the green payment 
(RVO, 2015).  
1. The producer must maintain permanent grassland, defined as land that has been in 
pasture for at least five years. In practice, arable farms in the Netherlands only keep 
‘permanent’ grassland if the land is not suited to cultivation, which implies that the 
farmer’s opportunity costs associated with this land are lower than for other cropland. 
Although grassland is integral to many crop rotation systems, it is generally not held in 
that state for more than five years. Hence, we do not address this greening option here, 
6 Note that the SFP based on the payments in Table 1 and the observed land allocation for the average 
farm (see Table 3 below) would be €282.60 per ha. 
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focusing instead on the other greening criteria. At a national level, permanent grassland 
is not allowed to drop below 95% of its 2012 reference level; since we focus on the 
individual farmer, this objective is also not addressed here.  
2. The producer must diversify his crop portfolio. For farms with at least 30 hectares of 
cropland, this requires that the producer must (1) cultivate at least three crops, with (2) 
the largest crop planted to no more than 75% of the land and (3) the largest two crops 
accounting for no more than 95% of land in cultivation.  
3. At least 5% of cropped land must be set-aside for purposes such as field margins and 
buffer strips that are eligible as part of the ecological focus area (EFA). From 2017 this 
may increase to 7% (European Commission, 2014a). 
The exact interpretation of the three basic practices is likely to vary by country, especially 
concerning the EFA. We assume that farmers have to set-aside 5% of their agricultural land 
independent of any positive or negative compensation to the area set aside, and that they must 
satisfy the diversification criteria in order to be eligible for a green payment.7 
If the farmer meets the crop diversification and set-aside EFA criteria, the SFP will be €390/ha 
(= €270/ha + €120/ha). In the future, however, farmers might be penalized (witness a reduction 
in basic payments) if the greening criteria are not met; in essence, the producer would only 
receive green payments if he complies with crop diversification requirements and satisfies the 
EFA. To take these conditions and payments into account in our model, the revised revenue 
equation (2) is written as: 
Rk,t = [pk,t yk,t – ck(w) + SFP + ? GP] xk, ? k.       (13) 
where SFP and GP ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
7 Because the green payment applies to all cropland, it would seem that farmers would always seek to 
qualify for it. To determine whether it would actually be beneficial for the farmer to qualify, it will be 
necessary to include these three constraints along with an ‘if condition’ in the programming model that 
we develop below.  
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
the greening requirements: 
? ?efak xX.x ?? 750 ,          (14) 
? ?efaik xXxx ??? 95.0 , ? ik xx ? , and       (15) 
Xxefa 05.0? ,           (16) 
where xefa refers to the area set-aside as part of the ecological focus area. The third crop 
diversification requirement, cultivating at least three crops, is automatically satisfied via 
equations (12) and (14), because the largest two crops cannot account for more than 95% of 
total cultivated area, and the farmer wants to maximize risk-adjusted revenue. Objective (1) 
is now maximized subject to equations (3)-(6), (12) instead of (2) or (11), and (13)-(15), while 
retaining the PMP-calibrated cost function and values of the absolute risk aversion coefficient 
of the base scenario. 
 
5.4.2 Simulating the effect of a Single Farm and Greening Payment 
As explained in section 5.2, we first simulate a move from direct payments tied to crop choice 
and then to direct payments that are independent of crop choice. We then simulate a move 
from direct payments independent of crop choice to direct payments including greening 
payments. We simulate the results for farms of different sizes with land-use allocations as 
displayed in Table 5.3. First, rather than the payments based on entitlements indicated in 
Table 5.1, we now assume that our representative farmers are paid €270/ha, independent of 
whether they comply with the greening criteria. For the simulations, we assume that changes 
can only be made to the crop allocation and not to the cropping intensity (e.g., greater use of 
fertilizer). The land use allocations under different policy scenarios for farms of different sizes 
are provided in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.6: Land use allocation under different policy scenarios for farms of different 
sizesa  
  Small Medium Large 
Crop Base SFP GP Base SFP GP Base SFP GP 
Wheat 10.45 10.45 9.72 19.31 19.21 18.02 35.02 34.81 32.61 
Barley 5.06 5.06 4.70 10.80 10.74 10.05 14.97 14.88 13.92 
Potato 10.55 10.55 10.16 12.68 12.90 12.45 26.37 26.79 25.89 
Sugar 8.15 8.15 7.80 8.83 8.63 8.28 17.08 16.69 16.00 
Onion 5.72 5.72 5.55 7.79 7.94 7.64 13.09 13.36 12.78 
EFA   2.00   2.97   5.33 
Total 39.93 39.93 39.93 59.41 59.41 59.41 106.53 106.53 106.53 
a SFP represents the 2013 EU-CAP reform flat-rate or single farm payment of €270/ha and a 
potential green payment of €120/ha. GP represents the crop allocation if the farmer adopts 
greening practices.  
When moving from payments based on historic reference amounts to the single farm payment 
without greening criteria, only small changes in land allocation are observed and only for 
medium and large farms (Table 5.6). For the medium and large farms this leads to a slight 
decrease in the area allocated to wheat, barley and sugar beet and a slight increase in the area 
allocated to potatoes and onions. This is as expected, because it indicates a move away from 
those crops that were eligible for entitlements, towards crops that were not eligible (see Table 
5.1). The largest increase, albeit still very limited, is observed for onions (about 2%), but area 
planted to potatoes also increases by about 1.6% for both medium and large farms. The largest 
decrease (2.2%) is observed for sugar beets, the crop where a quota regime is still present.  
The move from a SFP to one that includes a GP is more profound. In absolute terms, a decrease 
in land allocation is observed for all crops. Naturally, this is linked to the 5% set-aside which 
is required to be eligible for green payments. However, some crops experience larger relative 
decreases than others. A further move away from wheat and barley towards sugar beet, 
potatoes and onions is observed. The relative shift is about equal between farm sizes, with a 
slightly larger change for small farms. The crop-diversity requirement of the green component 
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does not have any effect on the farmer’s land allocation because crop diversity was already a 
common practice among producers of all sizes, a conclusion reached by Mosnier et al. (2009) 
as well. 
If a farmer is concerned only with revenue, the shift from payments based on historic 
entitlements towards SFP, and from SFP towards SFP with GP, would make him worse off 
(Table 5.7). However, the shift from SFP towards SFP with GP leads to an increase in gross 
revenue between 7.8% and 8.5%. When accounting for risk however, GP may lead to larger 
benefits for the farmer in terms of a larger level of utility. Hence, the additional GP income 
generated is likely to offset the income lost by setting aside 5% of the land; that is, the 
opportunity costs of setting aside farmland are lower than the GP compensation.  
 
 
Table 5.7: Changes in gross revenue under different policy scenarios for farms of different 
sizes. 
  Small Medium Large 
Crop Base SFP GP Base SFP GP Base SFP GP 
Wheat 13,183 12,066 15,181 35,077 33,376 39,314 78,970 62,745 73,609 
Barley 6,252 5,701 7,213 18,041 17,088 20,465 32,979 26,029 30,699 
Potato 47,675 50,506 52,773 71,769 74,472 77,403 168,214 173,908 179,852 
Sugar 32,772 31,027 32,887 39,965 37,726 39,849 87,723 75,791 79,904 
Onion 35,596 37,163 38,292 39,970 41,609 43,460 54,101 56,740 60,101 
EFA 0 0 779 0 0 1,158 0 0 2,077 
Total 135,478 136,463 147,125 204,823 204,271 221,649 421,988 395,213 426,242 
 
The small changes in land allocation we find are in line with the estimated impact of partial 
decoupling under the 2003 Mid-Term Review; most authors found that it had at most only a 
modest impact on crop allocation decisions (Helming and Peerlings, 2014; Mosnier et al., 2009; 
Sckokai and Moro, 2009). Where there was a change, the effects were as predicted – a 
reallocation of land use away from crop activities that did not receive direct payments under 
the historical reference scenario, namely, reduced plantings of potatoes and onions.  
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For the 2013 reforms, we find shifts of a similar magnitude, but then in the opposite direction 
as incentives no longer disadvantage the planting of these crops. In addition, we find that the 
introduction of a single flat-rate payment (SFP) along with GP leads to a further relative 
decline in the area cultivated to cereals. This corresponds with previous research at a regional 
scale (Balkhausen et al., 2008; Koundouri et al., 2009; Solazzo et al., 2014). The fact that changes 
are small may also be explained by crop rotation requirements that are inherently 
incorporated in the PMP calibration. 
With respect to the specific greening component measures, diversification measures do not 
influence a farmer’s crop allocation decisions due to crop rotation schemes, while 
environmental set-aside requirements do substantially alter farm income and the farm plan. 
For farms of all sizes, the hypothesized green payment of €120/ha appears to compensate for 
lower revenues caused by set-aside of land, confirming results by Solazzo et al. (2014). The 
EFA requirements will lead to a relatively larger use of the most profitable crops, hence 
reducing the amount of land devoted to cereals and sugar beets. Furthermore, grassland and 
set-aside land benefit from the CAP reform, reducing the area allocated to crop cultivation. 
Taking into account the possibility for land that is not cultivated is therefore of importance in 
modelling the 2013 CAP-reform (Balkhausen et al., 2008). 
 
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Coupled support has slowly been replaced by support linked to land-entitlements with 
limited coupling, and, finally, to support that is decoupled from the choice of crop activities, 
with more emphasis on environment-friendly practices (Helming et al., 2010). The objective of 
this chapter was to analyse different forms of direct payments, including green payments, in 
terms of their effects on land use (cropping) decisions. More specifically, we analysed if, and 
under what circumstances, this implies a shift towards more ecologically-sensitive land-use 
practices for farms of different sizes. Thus, we compared single (flat-rate) farm payments with 
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and without a greening incentive, as described in the December, 2013 agreement on CAP 
reform, with the payment system based on historic entitlements. To do so, we developed a 
mathematical programming model that was calibrated using positive mathematical 
programming, and maximized utility of different representative producers by selecting 
various crop (land-use) allocations.  
The change from payments based on entitlements to flat rate payments is both crop and farm 
specific, as also determined by Sckokai and Moro (2009) using econometric analysis. The 
policy shift is crop specific because previously ineligible crops are now included in the 
agricultural support scheme. The changes are farm specific because responses to changes in 
EU farm policies depend on a farmer’s utility, with more risk-averse farmers unlikely to 
modify their cropping decisions and less risk-averse ones more willing to reallocate land 
among crops. This has been shown by tracing back farm-specific risk coefficients that differ 
significantly across farm sizes, and thus potentially wealth. Moreover, in the case of a policy 
change, less risk-averse farmers (owning larger farms) make larger changes to land allocation 
than more risk-averse ones (with smaller farms). 
We assumed farm-specific, constant absolute risk aversion coefficients. This implied that we 
did not account for wealth effects, where the producer is more willing to plant crops with 
higher, but riskier returns when his expected gross margin was larger. Instead, we focused on 
risk-aversion that is inherent to the farm itself. Hence, the change from a historic to a flat-rate 
payment affects the shadow price of land for some types of farmers more than others, which 
in turn affects the producer’s crop allocation. However, the shift from cereals to potatoes may 
also be explained as a wealth effect, where the increasing effect of direct payments on income 
makes producers less averse towards production risk, leading to alterations in the crop 
portfolio (Koundouri et al., 2009; Sckokai and Moro, 2006; Burfisher and Hopkins, 2003). 
Because of the complex and uncertain nature of the direct payments, we had to assume that 
entitlements, though not entirely crop specific, were based on the land allocated to cultivated 
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crops eligible for payments in a certain reference period. Hence, our model might 
overestimate the crop-specific effects. In addition, while the rules and regulations of the new 
direct payment system are determined at the EU level, their interpretation is country specific, 
which might make our results less applicable more generally. Finally, research into the 
biodiversity aspects of crop cultivation is necessary to investigate to what extent the increased 
shift towards potatoes and onions and away from cereals might offset the ecological benefits 
obtained from the ecological focus area. Despite these uncertainties, however, the effects on 
crop strategies found here are likely to remain. 
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CHAPTER 6. BUSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT: COMPARING THE 
IMPACTS OF WHOLE FARM AND CROP-SPECIFIC REVENUE 
INSURANCE1 
Abstract 
This chapter aims to investigate the impacts of whole farm and crop-specific 
insurance on optimal management decisions, taking into account income and 
risks in crop production in the Netherlands. To this end, a farm management 
model has been developed that can examine crop-specific and whole farm 
insurance, where premiums and indemnities are endogenously determined 
for various insurance options. We use a farm-level analysis where the 
farmer's objective is to maximize utility, with a farm-specific risk aversion 
coefficient extracted from PMP calibration. Results indicate that small 
changes in land allocation are observed when the possibility of whole farm 
and crop-specific insurance is offered. Land-use changes are larger with crop-
specific than with whole farm insurance, with the latter biased towards 
smaller farms. Furthermore, results are sensitive towards the specification of 
the risk-aversion coefficient. 
1 Paper by Esther Boere and G. Cornelis van Kooten. Submitted to a peer-reviewed journal. 
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6.1 Introduction 
European Union’s policies to reduce intervention in agricultural markets have shifted support 
payments away from programs that incentivized production towards the support of farm 
incomes through direct payments and compensation for the provision of public goods 
(European Commission, 2014a). The EU’s December 2013 agreement on reforms to the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) entailed a further shift away from coupled support, but 
at the cost of increased volatility in output prices. Increased output price variability does not 
necessarily imply changes in the level and variance of producers’ incomes, however, because 
income depends on a variety of different types of risks and the correlations among them 
(Chambers, 2007; Moschini and Hennessy, 2001; Pennings et al., 2010). Nonetheless, if incomes 
associated with various farm activities are positively correlated, instability of agricultural 
incomes might well increase. This then requires greater focus on agricultural business risk 
management (BRM).  
BRM can be used to control the possible adverse consequences of uncertainty that may arise 
from production decisions. Currently a producer in the European Union can adopt several 
measures to reduce income risk; these include diversifying crop plantings, contracting in 
forward and futures markets, and purchasing various other financial products such as hail 
insurance (Finger and Lehmann, 2012). Some of these measures are partly subsidized by 
governments which intervene to mitigate producers’ risks because competitive markets for 
hedging risk are lacking (see Chambers, 2007; Arrow, 1996). Nonetheless, the recent spikes in 
agricultural prices resulted in an increased appeal by various EU member states for financial 
safety nets, including insurance. But if insurance schemes manage the price risk of one output 
without managing input and other output risks, income risk might well increase rather than 
decrease on aggregate. This is not the case with multi-product hedging approaches, such as 
whole farm income insurance. Although eventually not adopted, the proposals of the 2013 
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CAP reform entailed a risk management toolkit that included whole farm income insurance 
(European Commission, 2013), which is eligible under WTO rules as a ‘green box’ item.  
The objective of this paper is to analyse and compare the effects that crop-specific and whole 
farm insurance will have on a farmer’s income and land-use (crop allocation) decisions. 
Payments based on output generally incentivize greater production because the reference 
revenue used to calculate when a pay-out is triggered depends on a moving average of yield. 
Insurance may therefore lead to the allocation of more resources to activities with greater 
volatility of output, and may intensify production resulting in negative environmental effects 
(Vercammen and van Kooten, 1994; Cafiero et al., 2007).  
Insurance strategies depend not only on the degree of price and income uncertainty, but also 
on the degree of risk aversion perceived by the producer. Farmers are generally considered to 
be risk averse, which means they will give up some expected income to reduce the possibility 
of larger losses. The most common way for them to do so is by altering their production plan. 
This is why producers’ preferences for allocating land among crops have often been 
characterized using an expected utility function (Chavas and Pope, 1985; Coyle, 1999; Oude 
Lansink, 1999; Sckokai and Moro, 2006). Thus, we assume that the producer’s objective is to 
maximize utility by selecting a variety of cropping (land-use) activities. 
The methods used in the literature to examine the influence of insurance measures on 
production and land use decisions can be broadly divided into two strands. The first involves 
simultaneous equation models that investigate whether and how acreage responds to 
different types of insurance schemes (Wu 1999; Wu and Adams 2001; Goodwin et al. 2004). 
The second involves mathematical programming models that examine changes in a farmer’s 
crop portfolio between different insurance products (Turvey 2012). The EU’s recent emphasis 
on insurance implies that econometric approaches based on behavioural functions may be less 
suited for analysing their impact than other approaches. New restrictions and agricultural 
135
  
 
 
 6 
policies might better be modelled using a farm-level crop allocation model that is calibrated 
using positive mathematical programming (Howitt 1995; Heckelei et al., 2012). 
In this study, we use representative farms of three sizes to examine the impacts on production 
decisions of crop-specific revenue and whole farm income insurance schemes in the 
Netherlands. We begin in the next section by developing our farm-level model with the 
current levels of support in place. Then, in section 6.3, we describe the Dutch data we employ, 
followed in section 6.4 by taking out the current support and modelling the crop-specific and 
whole-farm revenue scenarios. We report the results in section 6.5, and end with some final 
observations in section 6.6. 
 
6.2 Farm Business Risk Management Model 
Government agricultural programs not only enhance incomes but also reduce exposure to 
risk. Therefore, in deciding how to allocate her land among different uses, the farmer takes 
into account the availability of government support payments and crop insurance programs. 
Our purpose is to determine the potential effect of crop-specific and whole farm income 
insurance on the way the farmer allocates his land to alternative crop activities. We do this 
using a farm-level crop allocation model. 
We focus on the variability in a farmer’s gross margins and model it following an approach 
suggested by Turvey (2012). As opposed to minimizing variance used by Turvey (2012), we 
maximize the producer’s utility function using mean-variance analysis whereby expected 
income is adjusted for risk. We define risk as variance in the gross margin of the crop portfolio 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
based on historic crop yields, prices and identifiable variable costs. Using empirically-
determined parameters, we employ Monte Carlo simulation to obtain 1,000 possible gross 
margin outcomes (iterations). The gross margin is also adjusted by accounting for the per 
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hectare payment based on historic entitlements. Variance is then calculated over the adjusted 
gross margin. 
We begin by constructing a base farm-level crop allocation model that includes a direct 
payment (€/ha) that varies by crop and is assumed to be in place before the 2013 CAP reforms 
go into effect (Helming et al., 2010). We discuss how we calibrate our crop allocation model 
using positive mathematical programming (PMP), and then describe how the model needs to 
be modified to take into account differences between crop-specific and whole farm insurance. 
 
6.2.1 Base Model and Flat-Rate Payments 
We assume that producers maximize income while accounting for risk in their production 
decisions. Representative arable farmers with fixed amounts of land and facing exogenous 
input and output prices aim to maximize expected utility from total revenues by allocating 
land to various crops. Currently, producers receive a direct payment per hectare that varies 
by crop based on historic entitlements. However, a flat-rate payment was introduced with the 
2015 crop year; it provides the same payment regardless of the crops planted by the producer, 
and is referred to as the single farm payment (SFP). Based on prior payments based on historic 
entitlements and crop allocations in our 2012 base year, the average direct payment was €310 
per hectare (Doorn et al., 2011).  
To analyse the crop allocation decision, we develop the following model: 
Maximize U = ?
?
K
k
kRE
1
][  –?????2        (1) 
Subject to: 
Rk,t = [pk,t yk,t – ck(w)+SPSk] xk, ? k        (2) 
? ???
? ?
???
K
k
K
i
iikk xRRCVx
1 1
2 ),(?         (3) 
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U ??????????????????????????????????????Rk] is the expected total revenue minus variable costs 
from crop production; ? is the risk aversion coefficient, that takes the form 
U'(I)
U''(I)? , where I 
refers to the farm household’s income;2 ?2 is the variance associated with the total crop 
portfolio; pk,t and yk,t represent the respective output price and yield for crop k in period t; ck(w) 
is the per unit-area variable cost of producing crop k as a function of exogenously-determined 
input prices w; and SPS is the flat-rate payment based on historic entitlements (€/ha). Further, 
CV(Rk,Ri) refers to the covariance matrix, where Ri and Rk are the respective realized gross 
margin to crops i and k, and E[Rk] is the farmer’s expected gross margin (€/ha) from planting 
crop k; xk denotes the number of hectares allocated to produce crop k; and X  represents the 
total area (ha) the farmer has available to allocate to crops. There are K crops that can be 
planted in any given period and there are T periods. T may refer to historic revenues 
(calibration phase) or to the outcomes from a Monte Carlo simulation (simulation phase).  
Equation (2) calculates the farmer’s gross margin accruing to each crop in each period given 
the allocation of land to crops, which is endogenously chosen in the model. SPS is included in 
(2) but fixed production cost is not because fixed costs are part of the PMP term (as explained 
2 When the utility function takes an exponential form, maximizing utility with normally distributed 
consumption results in a standard mean-variance objective as follows (McCarl and Spreen 2004, p.14-
18): 2
2
?E[R]U ??? . 2
2
?E[R]U ??? . Some authors specify utility as a function of consumption or 
wealth. 
138
  
 
 
6 
next). Equation (3) specifies the risk associated with the total crop portfolio, while equation 
(4) provides the variance-covariance matrix. Equation (5) calculates the expected gross margin 
that accrues to each crop over all periods (simulations). Finally, constraint (6) indicates that 
the farmer’s cultivated area does not exceed the available area. In each period, the producer 
must decide how to allocate her X  hectares among the K different crops so as to maximize 
utility over the total set of crops. 
 
6.2.2 Model Calibration 
The usual PMP model starts with an objective function that maximizes the overall gross 
margin from crop activities subject to constraint (6) and added calibration constraints. 
Subsequently, the linear objective function is adjusted to account for nonlinearities due to such 
things as differences in soil quality and the need to rotate crops to mitigate fungi and disease 
(Heckelei et al., 2012). We specify gross margins as a function of land use as follows: Rk(xk) = 
pkyk – c(xk) = pkyk – (?kxk + ½?kxk2) + SFP x, with c(xk) = (?k + ½?k xk)xk an assumed quadratic cost 
function and SPS the direct payment based on historic entitlements. The shadow price is 
specified as the difference between the marginal and average cost, ?k = ½?kxk. In the third step, 
the objective function is revised to take into account the following quadratic cost function:
? ?? ???
??
????
K
k
kkkkkkk
K
k
k xSPSxypR
11
5.0 ?? , and the calibration constraints are removed.  
To calibrate the model using PMP is somewhat more complicated when the objective is to 
maximize expected utility rather than the overall expected gross margin. One should also 
calibrate the absolute risk aversion parameter, but the methods for doing so (Petsakos and 
Rozakis, 2011, 2015) require the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) as 
opposed to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Further, it requires the specification of an 
initial level of wealth so that DARA can change in response to the farmer’s cropping choices. 
In the current application, we use a farm-specific risk-aversion coefficient based on the 
139
  
 
 
 6 
assumption that a producer’s total wealth is unlikely to change dramatically from one crop 
year to the next, in which case the farmer’s risk aversion is best characterized by constant 
rather than decreasing absolute risk aversion. Moreover, we assume different farmers with 
varying degrees of risk aversion. In order to do so, an exponential utility function and normal 
distribution of wealth are required. Therefore, once the cost parameters from the linear PMP 
program are obtained, the objective function is set to maximize expected utility. The related 
risk-aversion coefficient ??is then varied for each representative producer in step 3 of the PMP 
model by iteratively increasing its value to the point where it begins to impact the calibrated 
(observed) crop allocation (see Chapter 5). The risk coefficient is then set to the value where it 
just does not affect crop allocation. This results in risk aversion coefficients of 1.2×10–6, 1.2×10–
6 and 0.4×10–6 for small, medium and large farms respectively. 
Given the parameterized nonlinear objective function, it is now possible to simulate changes 
to the policy variables. The objective function in equation (1) then includes calibrated costs in 
E[Rk] and the maximum possible value for ? that still produces the observed crop allocation.  
 
6.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our study focuses on representative Dutch arable farms of three different sizes that have a 
mixed crop portfolio. Data for the period 2000 through 2012 were obtained from the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN), but because the FADN employs a sample of farms for 
each year, it was not possible to identify historic data for any representative farm size that we 
might examine. Thus, we took a sample of farms in each size category to establish historic 
yields and costs for the representative farms. The data were then used to measure annual 
variations in producer yields and costs. Costs of seed, pesticides, fertilizer, energy and other 
variable costs for various crop activities were used to construct per ha variable costs.  
Since prices are not farm-specific, these are obtained from outside sources. Future prices are 
often used to establish expected farm revenues. However, neither monthly nor futures 
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contract prices were available for all crops in the Netherlands. Therefore, to reduce price 
coverage to within-season fluctuations, as is common practice (Meuwissen et al. 2003), we 
used quarterly producer prices covering the period 2000 through 2012. For onions, wheat and 
barley, we aggregated monthly producer prices to the quarterly level. For sugar beets and 
potatoes, we calculated quarterly prices based on the yearly producer price of the specific crop 
and quarterly nominal indices obtained from Eurostat (2014). 
Given farm-specific yields, costs and external price data, gross margins were calculated for 
each crop activity for 2012, and reported in Table 6.1 for each representative farm size. Also 
reported in Table 6.1 are the observed average 2012 crop allocations for the representative 
farms. Notice that potatoes and onions provide the greatest gross margins, but also the most 
volatile crops; indeed, 2012 was a very good year for these crops. As a result, simulated 
average margins based on farm-specific historic yields multiplied by national-level quarterly 
prices will thus be lower compared with the gross margins observed in Table 6.1. 
Consequently, based on our simulations, we reduced the gross revenues for all root crops 
(potatoes, sugar beets and onions) by €2,000 per hectare compared to the data reported in 
Table 6.1 for the PMP calibration phase. From the PMP calibration, we find crop-specific costs 
as a quadratic function of land allocated to the activity, and use these cost functions in the 
policy analysis. Although the average cropping plan differs from one producer to another, 
farmers in the Netherlands tend to allocate their land first to potatoes and then to sugar beets, 
although they need to consider the need to maintain crop rotations to mitigate fungi and 
disease. 
It has long been believed that farm size is negatively related to risk aversion – that perceived 
risk decreases when farm size increases. This would lead larger farms to plant a greater 
proportion of their available area to crops with greater income variation but higher expected 
gross margin. This is a major justification for our use of representative small, medium and 
large farms. 
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Table 6.1: Yield, price, costs and gross margin by farm size in 2012. 
Crop 
Observed 
ha 
Yield 
(1000 
kg/ha) 
Price 
(€/1000 
kg)a) 
Variable 
cost  
(€/ha) 
Direct 
payments 
Gross 
revenues 
(€/ha) 
St. Dev. 
Gross 
Revenues 
SMALL 
Wheat 10.45 7.84 242.37 911.59 377.50 1900.20 172.47 
Barley 5.06 6.31 226.87 564.34 377.50 1431.08 80.80 
Potato 10.55 38.71 192.50 2174.90 0 7451.62 1186.78 
Sugar 8.15 77.36 55.97 1160.29 687.00 4330.17 486.12 
Onion 5.72 74.85 117.57 2388.67 0 8799.82 3199.29 
Total 39.93             
MEDIUM 
Wheat 19.31 8.61 242.37 647.25 377.50 2086.83 190.02 
Barley 10.8 7.55 226.87 489.11 377.50 1711.71 110.26 
Potato 12.68 42.49 192.50 2357.02 0 8180.25 1030.02 
Sugar 8.83 80.36 55.97 1080.62 687.00 4498.20 269.68 
Onion 7.79 62.97 117.57 2184.60 0 7403.49 1834.69 
Total 59.41             
LARGE 
Wheat 35.02 8.86 242.37 593.23 377.50 2147.42 190.02 
Barley 14.97 7.35 226.87 387.34 377.50 1667.93 110.26 
Potato 26.37 45.57 192.50 2253.42 0 8772.78 1030.02 
Sugar 17.08 79.45 55.97 993.48 687.00 4447.16 269.68 
Onion 13.09 57.93 117.57 2227.38 0 6810.6 1834.69 
Total 106.53             
a) Prices are average national quarterly prices, yields and costs are farm-specific. 
 
6.4 Insurance Programs 
Government participation in agricultural insurance is considered to fall into the WTO’s ‘green 
box’ if the following conditions apply: (i) insurance is based on an income shortfall relative to 
a reference level; (ii) indemnities do not relate to the volume of production or input use; and 
(iii) income protection is triggered when income falls to 70% or less of the reference level and 
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the indemnity is no more than 70% of the difference (OECD 2011; Coppens, 2014). Given this 
guiding principle, we assume that the producer receives restitution for up to 70% of lost 
income if total income from the entire crop enterprise falls below 30% of the reference level. 
We consider two types of revenue insurance to meet these requirements: (1) whole farm 
insurance and (2) crop-specific insurance. For both types, we assume that the current level of 
support no longer exists. 
 
6.4.1 Whole Farm Insurance 
Now we assume that there is a target or reference gross margin for the whole farm that is 
denoted M, which is the expected gross margin across all random states T. Premiums and 
indemnities are determined endogenously. With whole farm insurance only, constraint (2) is 
now written as (see Turvey 2012):  
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 is the whole-farm reference level of income; only 70% of M 
would potentially be covered and then only if actual revenue falls by more than 30% of the 
reference level. The dummy variable Z is thus defined as:  
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In equation (7), ? ? ?
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again represents the share of the premium that the farmer pays with the government 
subsidizing the remainder. The indemnity is based on the sum of the crop enterprises’ 
differences between realized and expected gross margin. 
To find the optimal allocation of crops under insurance, we solve the constrained optimization 
problem given by equations (1) through (6), but with (2) replaced by (7) or (9) depending on 
whether crop-specific or whole farm income is modelled, respectively. 
 
6.4.2 Crop-Specific Revenue Insurance 
Now we assume that agricultural producers have the option to insure the gross margin for 
any specified crop. Following Turvey (2012), we assume that this option is available for each 
of the individual crops in the model, and that a shortfall of at least 30% in targeted gross 
margin receives a payment up to 70%. We assume that there is a similar target or reference 
margin for each crop, denoted Mk, which is the expected gross margin for each crop across all 
random states T . Prior to setting an insurance premium, the total set of cropping activities 
has to be selected. This results in the endogenous setting of premiums and indemnities. 
With crop-specific insurance, the objective function specified in equation (1) can now be 
written as:  
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where the dummy variable is specified as: 
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where Rk,t xk = (pk,t yk – ck) xk. Mk signifies the reference gross margin associated with crop k, 
while ? ?? ?kktktkk xcypM ?? ,,7.0,0Max  is the pay-out to crop enterprise k when outcome t 
occurs as the realized gross margin is 70% or less of the reference margin. Both the realized 
gross margin and the reference gross margin are calculated from Monte-Carlo iterations. The 
premium the farmer pays for hedging crop k is given by ? ?? ??
?
??
T
t
kktktkk xcypMT 1
,,7.0,0Max
?
, 
where ? represents the share of the premium that the farmer pays with the government 
subsidizing the remainder. It is assumed that the rate of subsidy is the same across all crops. 
 
6.4.3 Gross Margin Scenarios 
Following Turvey (2012), we generate random gross margins for representative farms of 
different sizes using Monte Carlo simulation, thus explicitly accounting for trends and 
variability in prices and yields. We generate 1,000 potential outcomes (states of nature) for 
each crop alternative used in the current application. In determining gross margins, the 
observed average costs of planting, tending and harvesting are employed; these costs are fixed 
at the observed value (ck0) when calculating insurance premiums and indemnities. For 
simulated gross margin scenarios, we employ historic gross revenues as a measure for price 
per hectare of land in our simulations. Although the decision for crop allocation, and therefore 
the related yield, is made before output prices are known, prices and yields influence each 
other. In order to take correlations between prices and yields into account, we simulate the 
generation of revenues (€ ha–1) as follows:  
Rk,t = ((pk,yk)t – cko) xk, t = 1, …, T, ?k,        (11) 
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where Rk,t refers to the crop-specific gross margin from planting crop k under random outcome 
t, with each of gross revenue pkyk randomly determined and xk = 1, ?k.  
The distributional assumptions pertaining to prices (Goodwin et al. 2003) and yields (Claassen 
and Just, 2011; Coble and Dismukes, 2008; Paulson and Babcock, 2008) have been widely 
researched. There is a broad consensus that prices and yields have to be de-trended to exclude 
inflation and technology bias from estimates of the underlying probability distribution 
(Cooper, 2010), although ongoing debate continues regarding the proper way to do this. We 
regress prices and yields on time using OLS as this is common practice (Coble and Dismukes, 
2008; Cooper, 2010; Sherrick et al., 2004).  
We then estimate gross revenues using geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with a mean-
reverting process – rather than a normal random walk, there is the tendency for prices to 
return to their mean level, but at a speed determined by the reversion rate. The Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck or Vasicek process, which is commonly used to model prices, is used to simulate 
this stochastic process that takes the following form: 
dpt = ? (μ – pt) dt + ? dWt,         (12) 
where ?(μ–pt) is the deterministic part with drift (μ–pt), where μ is the long-run equilibrium 
or mean value, and ???t is the stochastic part where ? is the diffusion parameter. Brownian 
motion is given by dWt which follows a normal distribution N(0,t); ?? is the speed of mean 
reversion, or the speed at which the process reverts towards its mean value; and ? is the degree 
of volatility and ½ ?2??? is the long-term variance. The estimated values for ?, μ, and ? are 
provided in Table 6.2 by crop and representative farm size. As can be observed from the table, 
all mean prices are slightly lower than the observed average prices in the base year.  
The 1,000 possible per hectare crop-specific gross margins outcomes for each crop are shown 
in figure 6.1 for the medium sized farm. The simulation results provide the expected returns 
and variances that are then used to analyse the crop-specific and whole farm insurance. As 
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can be observed from the figure, and in line with Tables 6.1 and 6.2, both the revenues and 
the volatility are much larger for potatoes and onions compared with wheat, barley and sugar 
beet. Clearly, gross margins for grains tend to be much lower and less volatile, compared with 
those of root crops, with the exception of sugar beets. Sugar beets are generally sold under 
contracts to sugar producers, thus explaining their lower returns and volatility of returns. 
Based on the gross revenue, farmers are likely to plant onions and potatoes over the other 
crops because, even at their lowest revenue, these crops are more profitable than the other 
crops. However, also costs are higher for these crops. Moreover, it is still necessary for the 
farmer to plant cereals for reasons unrelated to income and income risk, namely, for reasons 
related to agronomic needs, such as crop rotations that mitigate disease and fungus.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Crop-specific Monte-Carlo gross margins for the medium farm (€/ha). 
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Table 6.2: Estimated parameters to calculate farm-specific gross revenue scenarios 
SMALL ?  μ ?  
Wheat 0.36 1645.46 138.64 
Barley 0.34 1353.44 66.27 
Potato 0.78 5360.22 1446.3 
Sugar 0.34 2711.68 303.59 
Onion 0.45 6581.14 3086.52 
MEDIUM     
Wheat 0.34 1958.56 152.17 
Barley 0.34 1645.42 74.03 
Potato 0.79 5361.83 1272.42 
Sugar 0.65 2284.91 309.13 
Onion 0.63 5597.97 2093.89 
LARGE       
Wheat 0.34 1958.18 251.78 
Barley 0.34 1645.42 159.82 
Potato 0.79 5861.83 1602.13 
Sugar 0.65 2284.91 244.09 
Onion 0.63 5491.67 2958.18 
 
6.5 Results 
We now examine the producer’s impact on land allocation and willingness to pay for crop-
specific and whole farm insurance. In all cases, our objective is to determine impacts on land 
use decisions. 
 
6.5.1 Base Model 
The various scenarios are simulated in R with calls to GAMS.3 We begin by maximizing the 
net revenue of the representative farmer described in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 subject to technical 
3 R is a statistical programming language (http://www.r-project.org/) and GAMS refers to the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (Rosenthal, 2008). 
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and observed land-use calibration constraints. Gross margins are given for each crop as price 
× yield minus average cost, using the data in Table 6.1. Then, using the shadow prices from 
step 1 of the PMP process, we discover the quadratic variable cost function for each crop and, 
upon substituting these into the objective function in lieu of observed average variable 
production costs, we obtain the observed land allocation choices.  
Initially, only four PMP activities are calibrated as barley continues as a non-marginal (linear) 
activity for all farm sizes as its calibration constraint was not binding (?b=0). Therefore, it is 
necessary to obtain outside information for barley in order to distinguish between average 
and marginal cost. Following Howitt (2005, pp.88-91), we take the elasticity of land supply 
with respect to the price of the crop: ?s ?? ??q??p) (p/q?? ?? ??xb??MCb) (pb/xbo), where xbo is the 
observed land in barley and pb is the output price for barley. The adjustment at xbo that is 
added to the LP average cost to obtain a nonlinear cost function is defined as: Adj = MC – AC 
= ½ ?b xbo = pb/2?s. Adjusting for barley also changes the values for the other crops as follows: 
k?ˆ = ?k + Adj. Based on a previous study using the same time period and study area, we choose 
a value for the elasticity of barley with respect to land (?s) of 0.174 (see Chapter 2). The farm-
specific results for k?ˆ ???k and ?k, which are obtained after re-calibration of the PMP model, are 
presented in Table 6.3, while the observed land uses are provided in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.3: Shadow Prices and PMP Calibrated Marginal Cost Functions at Final Calibration 
 Small Medium Large 
Crop ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Wheat 4235 -3323 810 5136 -4488 532 5067 -4473 289 
Barley 4114 -3549 1627 4919 -4430 911 4793 -4406 641 
Potatoes 6451 -5276 1223 6869 -5512 1083 6789 -5536 515 
Sugar beets 4655 -3494 1142 5296 -4216 1200 5200 -4206 609 
Onions 5577 -4189 1950 6481 -5296 1664 6254 -5027 956 
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To determine the sole impact of insurance schemes on crop allocation, we first remove the 
support measures currently in place. These are the direct payments that are currently based 
on crop-specific historic entitlements (see Table 6.1). The abolition of payments based on 
historic reference amounts results in only small changes in land allocation (Table 6.4). For the 
medium farm, this leads to a decrease in the area allocated to wheat and barley, and an 
increase in the area allocated to potatoes, sugar beets and onions. This is as expected because 
it indicates a move away from those crops that were eligible for entitlements towards crops 
that were not eligible (see Table 6.1). The only exception is sugar beets, which received support 
in the base scenario, yet also leads to a slight increase in crop allocation for large farms when 
direct payments are abolished. This may be related to the low variability observed in revenues 
for sugar beets and the relatively large revenues for this crop. 
Table 6.4: Crop allocation without historic reference payments compared to the base 
scenario 
 Small Medium Large 
Crop Base 
Without  
direct 
payments Base 
Without  
direct 
payments Base 
Without  
direct 
payments 
Wheat 10.45 9.52 19.31 18.69 35.02 30.11 
Barley 5.06 4.71 10.80 10.51 14.97 14.98 
Potatoes 10.55 10.92 12.68 13.23 26.37 24.76 
Sugar beets 8.15 7.85 8.83 8.34 17.08 21.85 
Onions 5.72 6.92 7.79 8.64 13.09 14.80 
 
6.5.2 Whole Farm Insurance 
Whole farm insurance provides a producer with a certain income if gross margin falls below 
70% of the farm-specific reference income. This may make the farmer less risk-averse and 
thereby lead her to choose a crop allocation that yields higher returns but is likely to be more 
volatile. In this application, these are potatoes and onions. The subsequent policy interest is 
to analyse the extent by which farmers will alter their crop allocation if their income is partly 
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secured. Without any subsidy on WFI, there will be no change in crop allocation, because 
what the farmer has to pay as insurance indemnity is equal to the size of his pay-out. At an 
insurance pay-out of 70% and a subsidy share of 0.7, the resulting crop allocation mix of the 
producer is depicted for the small, medium and large farm in figure 6.2.  
As can be seen from figure 6.2, a small increase in potatoes is observed for the small and 
medium farm. For the large farm, the shift in land allocation mainly takes place from wheat 
to sugar beets. For the small farm, the changes in land allocation are only captured by the 
effect of the removal of historic reference payments. This is due to our definition that income 
must fall below 70% of reference income in order for the farmer to receive insurance. Changes 
in crop allocation for the small farm with changes in the reference trigger for receiving a pay-
out are indicated in figure 6.3. As can be observed from the figure, only when the trigger 
constitutes 80% of the reference margin does the farmer change his land use. It would appear, 
therefore, that the trigger must be set to at least 80% before the small farmer would be willing 
to participate in whole farm insurance. 
 
Figure 6.2: Crop allocation plan for a small, medium and large farm under Whole Farm Insurance, 
compared with the base allocation. 
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The case for the medium-sized farm is illustrated in figure 6.4. Changes in land allocation are 
more drastic and observed at much lower thresholds of the trigger. When the trigger is set at 
60%, the farmer starts changing land use and, importantly, would be willing to participate in 
a whole-farm insurance scheme. As the threshold trigger ratio increases from 0.6 towards 0.8, 
the crop allocation changes more dramatically than for small farms; less wheat is planted in 
favour of more onions, sugar beet and potatoes.  
 
Figure 6.3: Changes in crop allocation for the small farm when the trigger of reference revenue changes 
from 0.4 to 0.9. 
 
Figure 6.4: Changes in crop allocation for the medium farm when the trigger of reference revenue 
changes from 0.4 to 0.9. 
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The large farm will never participate in the insurance scheme. This can be observed from the 
fact that land allocation under WFI is the same as land allocation with direct payments 
removed for the large farm. This may be related to the lower level of risk aversion for the large 
farm, suggesting that the larger agricultural producer is less affected by the variability of gross 
margins, and would only plant wheat and barley for their agronomic benefits, say. The 
changes to crop allocation due to WFI do not only reflect a move towards those crops that 
potentially yield higher revenues, but also relate to the farmer’s risk-aversion and her 
production constraints. Changes to land allocation are therefore highly farm specific. WFI 
may therefore be biased towards smaller farms. This result is in line with Finger and Benni 
(2014) who find that the introduction of an Income Stabilisation Tool (IST) will reduce income 
inequality. 
 
6.5.3 Crop-specific Revenue Insurance 
Crop specific insurance gives the farmer the possibility to insure only one or a few crops 
instead of the whole farm allocation plan. The changes in land allocation induced by crop-
specific insurance are therefore larger than that of whole farm insurance, as can be observed 
from figure 6.5. A small farm will further decrease its allocation of land to wheat and barley. 
The additional hectares of land are mostly converted into onions, the most volatile crop. In 
fact, it will also substitute part of its land from potatoes to onions. However, all crops will still 
be cultivated. 
For the medium farm, crop allocation also moves away from wheat and barley. The allocation 
of land to potatoes will increase with about 0.5 hectares compared with the base scenario, but 
will decrease with about the same size compared with WFI. Here, the area allocated to cereals 
remains at 46.8 percent of total land allocation however. Also for the medium farm, the 
additional hectares of land will move towards the cultivation of onions.  
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With crop specific insurance, also the large farm experiences changes in land allocation. A 
move away from barley towards potatoes is observed. The move towards these crops is logic 
given the crops that are triggered for pay-out, as can be observed in Table 6.5. As expected, 
especially onions and potatoes receive a large share of pay-outs. However, this also implies 
that they have the highest premium.  
 
Figure 6.5: Crop allocation plan for a small, medium and large farm under Crop-specific Revenue 
Insurance, compared with the base and WFI allocation. 
 
Table 6.5: Number of times of trigger and related crop-specific premium. 
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Crop Trigger Premium Trigger Premium Trigger Premium 
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Barley       
Potatoes 280 92.97 294 106.82 325 120.13 
Sugar beets 64 9.14 90 19.37   
Onions 840 519.84 866 87.30 49 106.07 
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calibration, the linear objective function was adjusted to include nonlinear terms (Heckelei et 
al., 2012). One of the main reason for nonlinearities are crop rotation requirements, which are 
physical attributes of the land and therefore cannot be measured. The main crops with large 
revenue and high volatility, onions and potatoes, will take increasing marginal costs for each 
additional hectare of land that is planted with them when they move closer to the specific 
boundary set by crop rotation requirements (Howitt, 1995). The PMP calibration therefore 
causes a smooth supply response leading to a continuous, but slow change towards these 
crops with increases in the trigger for pay-out under various insurance mechanisms. This way, 
over-specialisation and unrealistic responses in land uses, implying mono-culture of onions 
or potatoes, is offset (Röhm and Dabbert, 2003).  
Neither under WFI, nor under crop-specific insurance does a change to the proportion of the 
subsidy paid b???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
has decided to participate in the respective insurance program. This is because the amount is 
small compared to the producer’s gross margins, leading the effect of the premium subsidy 
on changes to land allocation to be negligible. However, in the current model, it is unlikely 
that an insurance program such as WFI will exist without government support because of the 
endogenous setting of pay-outs and premiums. Hence, if farmers know the parameters of the 
whole farm insurance policy, it is possible for them to change their farming practices to 
optimize the insurance decision. Without subsidies, this may lead farmers to only choose for 
crop insurance schemes in case of moral hazard where the environmental conditions 
discourage production, but the insurance schemes have the opposite effect (Rude and Ker, 
2013). A way to include the option of moral hazard is to deviate the reference revenue from 
the actual revenue outcomes of the Monte Carlo iterations. In that case, what the principal 
(government) can observe differs from what the agent (farmer) experiences. However, this 
does not lead to an endogenous setting of pay-outs and premiums anymore. 
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6.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis for the risk aversion coefficient 
In this study, we assume that in order to incorporate risk and uncertainty into the farm model, 
a farmer maximizes expected utility, instead of total gross margin, from crop production. We 
????? ???????????? ??????? ??????? ???? ?? ?????? ??? ???????? ??? ? ????? ???p allocation. Instead of 
Petsakos and Rozakis (2015) who used a decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) parameter 
with a logarithmic function, this study used a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) 
parameter with an exponential utility function. We therefore first calibrated cost functions 
using the standard PMP approach based on an LP model where the objective is to maximize 
overall gross margins, and subsequently adjusted the level of ? until crop-allocation changed 
in order to determine a starting value.  
However, it might still make sense to examine the influence of different levels of ? on farm 
specific crop allocation. In their seminal paper, McCarl and Bessler (1989) suggested an upper 
bound on ? might be as follows: ? ?????R, where ?R is the standard deviation of gross margin. 
This leads to values for ? of 1.35×10–4, 1.45×10–4 and 7.8×10–5 for the small, medium and large 
farm respectively. We therefore check what these values would do to crop allocation. Table 
6.6 shows the changes in crop allocation in ha with the farm-specific upper bounds for ? 
compared with the values for ??obtained from the PMP-procedure.  
 
Table 6.6: Change in crop allocation for varying levels of risk aversion coefficienta) 
 Small Medium Large 
Crop WFI Crop WFI Crop WFI Crop 
Wheat 0.38 0.05 -0.31 0.13 2.18 0.18 
Barley 0.19 -0.01 0.22 0.09 -0.04 0.08 
Potatoes -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.30 2.57 -0.07 
Sugar beets 0.25 0.06 0.43 0.12 -3.39 0.13 
Onions -0.86 -0.05 -0.32 -0.03 -1.31 -0.34 
a)The risk-aversion coefficient changes from 1.2×10–6, 1.2×10–6 and 0.4×10–6 to 1.35×10–4, 
1.45×10–4 and 7.8×10–5 for the small, medium and large farms respectively. 
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When the farmer has a larger risk-aversion coefficient, she chooses less volatile cropping 
activities compared with a lower risk-aversion coefficient. However, the move towards more 
volatile crops compared with the base scenario is still present. 
 
6.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Changes in agricultural policies have influenced both the level and the variance of farm 
incomes as natural volatility in yields is combined with increased instability in output prices, 
which is partly attributable to the European Union’s reforms. Increased volatility leads to 
more price and income uncertainty for producers about the difference between the actual and 
expected output price and to a change in the shadow price (value) of agricultural land. This 
uncertainty may differ by activity, while the degree of perceived uncertainty may differ across 
farms. The objective of this Chapter was to analyse and compare potential crop-specific and 
whole farm insurance programs. This was achieved by employing a mathematical 
programming model that endogenously determined crop allocations under different 
insurance schemes. Using data of Dutch arable producers of different sizes we investigated 
optimal crop portfolios, where insurance premiums and indemnities depend on the crop 
allocation chosen but, at the same time, the crop allocation depends on the type of insurance 
provided.  
For a risk-neutral producer, uncertainty and therefore insurance possibilities will not 
influence her production decisions. For a risk-averse producer, production activities with a 
high expected output price and low profit variability are preferred. WFI takes away part of 
the insurance and therefore leads to more allocation of crops with a higher volatility. All 
producers in our study are, albeit to different extents, risk-averse. When faced with increased 
volatility in output prices, they are more likely to switch to less volatile production activities. 
Depending on the change in shadow price of land, the difference between the actual and 
expected output price and the level of risk aversion, the respective farmers of our study adjust 
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their land allocation decisions. We find that effects of whole farm insurance are larger for 
smaller farms then for larger farms, whereas the effects of crop-specific insurance are not. This 
is inherent to the higher risk-aversion coefficient of these farms. Hence, if from a policy 
perspective the aim is to reduce inequality amongst farmers, WFI is preferred above crop-
specific revenue insurance.  
Results also indicate that the impacts on crop allocations of income risks are of rather lesser 
importance. Three major reasons for this can be indicated: first, direct payments make up a 
large percentage of the agricultural income of crop farms in the Netherlands, which makes 
them less vulnerable to income fluctuations. Second, arable crop farms have to cultivate at 
least three different crops to meet cross-compliance requirements. Third, even without 
insurance, farmers will choose to plant onions and potatoes over the other crops because of 
their larger gross revenues. Therefore, only with higher levels of eligibility, crop insurance 
becomes interesting to farmers. 
WFI is considered to fall into the WTO’s ‘green box’, meaning that the presence of WFI should 
not affect crop allocation decisions. However, we find that the possibility of WFI leads to very 
different effects per crop, with generally more land allocation towards more volatile crops 
potatoes and onions and away from more stable crops such as cereals. The possibility of WFI 
leads also to very different effects per farm type. Relatively larger changes are observed for 
smaller farms under WFI, meaning that the insurance and wealth effects of these farms are 
larger. On the one hand, because all crops are targeted equally, whole farm programs are 
seemingly decoupled. The fact that different types of farms, who are likely to have different 
degrees of risk aversion, react to different degrees, supports this argument. However, the 
general optimization towards more volatile crops might give indication of coupling, which is 
of course against WTO decisions. This provides indication of an insurance effect when farmers 
are offered whole farm income insurance, providing an effective lower bound on a producer’s 
income.  
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The effect is not as large as often expected though. Farmers are constraint not only by their 
own aversion to risk, but also by production constraints such as crop rotation. Moreover, 
under the 2013 CAP reforms, it was decided that farmers had to meet green practices in order 
to be entitled to part of the single farm payments they receive. These requirements include the 
cultivation of multiple crops, likely further reducing the possibility for farmers to enter 
monoculture (European Commission, 2014c). This, together with the fact that only losses 
above 30% will receive compensation under WFI, still leads to quite some diversification in 
farm plans. 
There are some caveats to the research. First, we only looked at the impact that risk 
management programs have on land use, ignoring other inputs into agricultural production. 
While both risk management and environmental policy are specifically regulated as part of 
the European Union’s agricultural policy, it is not yet clear how the two might act together, 
and whether they offset each other. For example, at least one study has shown that subsidizing 
insurance could offset the environmental benefits created by direct payment policies 
(Capitanio et al., 2015). Relatedly, we assumed that the total area of cropland available to a 
farmer was fixed, but Capitanio et al. (2015) argue that risk management programs could 
induce farmers to bring marginal land into production. However, in a country where land is 
as scarce as in the Netherlands, this will unlikely be the case. Second, whether farmers 
respond to changes in the EU’s farm policies also depends on farmers’ utility functions, with 
some farmers unlikely to modify their cropping decisions while others will change the way 
they allocate land among crops. In this study we did not account for possible differences in 
utility functions. 
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CHAPTER 7. SYNTHESIS 
This final chapter draws general inferences from the topics discussed in chapters 2-6. The first 
section addresses a selection of theoretical issues in analysing land use change, and reflects 
on the data and models employed in this thesis. The second section provides the main 
conclusions of this thesis. 
 
7.1 Discussion 
In this section three central issues are discussed. The first are the theoretical choices with 
respect to the elements of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, risk and uncertainty 
and agricultural land use (change) outlined in the introduction of this thesis. The second issue 
deals with the data employed and their subsequent advantages and disadvantages. The third 
issue deals with the mathematical programming and econometric models chosen to answer 
the specific research questions. 
 
7.1.1 Theory  
CAP reform 
This thesis aims to make statements on the introduction, change or abolition of specific policy 
measures in the light of the CAP reforms. The influence of direct payments is discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 5, milk quota abolition is discussed in Chapter 3 and insurance is the subject 
of Chapter 6. The CAP is not the only policy that influences farmers’ decision-making. Spatial 
policies, as explained in the introduction, restrict the location and type of land use in a certain 
area by means of zoning. They are therefore of large importance to the amount and location 
of agricultural land. This thesis aims at analysing land use changes within the agricultural 
sector, and does not focus on changes to the total amount of agricultural land. The CAP reform 
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is therefore seen as the main driver of land use changes within agriculture, while recognizing 
that other policies such as the Nitrate Directive are of importance as well. Quantifying the 
effects of a policy change by analysing farmers’ behaviour is relatively straightforward when 
there is only one policy change. Most studies analysing CAP reform have tried to single out 
specific policy measures. The CAP is however comprised of a range of policy measures that 
are often simultaneously enforced, complicating the analysis. Moreover, the effect of specific 
policy measures differs in importance between farm types and sectors. For example, for dairy 
farmers, milk quotas are replaced by Single-Farm Payments, making it difficult to quantify 
their separate effects on land use change. Some studies have therefore aimed at a more 
comprehensive assessment of CAP reform policies (Piorr et al., 2009; Sckokai and Moro, 2006).  
 
Risk and uncertainty 
Producers are assumed to be rational agents who optimise an objective function. This may for 
instance be maximizing profit or maximizing utility by accounting for risk in farmers’ 
decision-making (Chavas and Pope, 1985; Coyle, 1999). Both under the profit-maximizing and 
utility-maximizing framework, shadow prices of land can be derived. In Chapters 2, 5 and 6 
the shadow price of land depends on the risk perceived by farmers. 
Chapter 2 develops a conceptual framework where risk is incorporated in the utility-
maximising behaviour of farmers. As an indicator of risk the historic variation of expected 
output prices has been used. However, for an individual producer, increased output price 
volatility does not necessarily imply changes in the level and variance of income, since a 
producer’s income is also dependent on input costs and yields, and the correlation between 
prices and yields (Pennings, 2010). Where some existing studies have only focused on price 
uncertainty (Femenia et al., 2010), others have includes price and yield uncertainty (Bakhshi 
and Gray 2001; Lehmann et al., 2013; Moro and Sckokai, 2013) or even accounted for policy 
uncertainty (Bhaskar and Beghin, 2010). The conceptual framework of Chapter 2 is therefore 
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extended in Chapters 5 and 6 by not only considering price volatility but also yield volatility 
and the total variation in revenues. Monte Carlo simulations of historic output prices and 
yields, multiplied by an Arrow-Pratt risk coefficient have been used to measure risk.  
The utility functions formulated in Chapters 2, 5 and 6 are somewhat simplified. Decisions on 
land-use change do not depend on utility as a function of income and risk alone, but may also 
incorporate speculation (Power and Turvey, 2010), farm characteristics (Weiss 1999; Gale, 
2003; Breustedt and Glauben, 2007) as well as farm location (Livanis et al., 2006). This may 
lead to farmers specifying alternative objectives such as production growth or farm survival 
(Weiss, 1999; Foltz, 2004). Besides alternative objectives of farmers, different driving factors 
might interact with each other. Driving factors are often subdivided into socio-economic, 
biophysical and land-management drivers (Lambin et al., 2001).  
 
Agricultural land use change 
Changes to the use of land do not instantaneously take place when shadow prices change; a 
farmer may be concerned with adaptation costs related to land use change. The size of such 
costs is largely dependent on whether the total amount of land available on the farm is 
considered fixed or variable. Chapters 2, 5 and 6 analyse land use changes given that the total 
amount of land is fixed. Here, land use change may be influenced by short-term expectations 
on profitability and perceived risk only. Chapters 3 and 4 account for changes to the total 
amount, and therefore use, of land on a farm. Changes to the total amount of land are 
necessarily influenced by long-term expectations also, and therefore include adaptation costs. 
Chapters 3 and 4 attempt to analyse and quantify factors besides those directly coming from 
changes to shadow prices, such as farm characteristics (Chapter 3), location and institutional 
factors (Chapter 4). 
A consistent theoretical framework to support this differentiation both analytically and 
empirically has not been developed. The lack of such a framework incorporating both 
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economic and non-economic factors stems from the complexity of long-term changes, 
especially when land transactions are involved. Approaches that do consider long-term 
perspectives of farmer’s decision-making include the application of real-option theory (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994). Such approaches focus on the optimal timing of change, but do not 
differentiate between different kind of changes. 
 
7.1.2 Data  
This thesis employs three different datasets that describe factors relating to land use change: 
the Farm Structure Survey (FSS), Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) and the national 
land transaction database (LEI, 2014e; Statistics Netherlands, 2014). Chapters 2 and 3 focus on 
the FSS data, Chapter 4 employs all three datasets, and Chapters 5 and 6 use the FADN. Using 
these different datasets allows analysis at different scales (regions, farms, hectares of land). 
Where the FADN contains a sample of farms with a lot of information, the FSS contains the 
complete population of farms with a limited amount of information. Quantifying the 
influence of different driving forces on both the magnitude and the dynamics of land use 
change depends on the scale at which it is studied. The unit of analysis of this thesis has been 
individual farms mostly, yielding socio-economic factors as important explanatory variables 
for land-use change. However, there is evidence that driving factors play different roles at 
different scales. Where socio-economic factors are important at micro-level, climatic, macro-
economic and demographic factors may be more important at a regional and at macro-level 
(Veldkamp and Lambin, 2001). Extrapolating the behaviour of farmers to a more aggregate 
level therefore has to be done with caution. 
Two other issues related to the data persist. First, where data was missing, proxies coming 
from higher aggregation levels were used; possibly leading to errors. Some variables, such as 
the introduction or abolition of specific policies, are difficult to quantify and dummies or 
trends had to be used. This requires cautious interpretation because such trends may also 
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capture other developments. Second, historical data cannot analyse changing or new policies 
because the data does not entail variations due to changes in such policies. Farm structural 
change can therefore only be analysed after it has been observed in the data. 
 
7.1.3 Models  
Models analysing land-use change that employ a coherent decision-making framework 
improve the analysis of causes and consequences of land-use change. However, driving forces 
are spatially and temporally interrelated, complicating the ability of such models to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of land-use change. Studies on land use therefore require 
knowledge of multiple methods. Depending on the research question, the theoretical 
framework and available data, the most appropriate method was chosen. Where historic data 
was available and the aim was to analyse changes over time, we used (panel data) econometric 
approaches. Where historic data was scarce and the aim was to analyse potential effects of 
reforms not yet implemented, we used mathematical programming. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 use 
various forms of (panel data) econometrics, Chapters 5 and 6 use mathematical programming 
models. This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of both. 
 
Econometric models 
Econometric models have been used in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. With respect to Chapter 2, three 
methodological issues persist. First, the complexity of the optimisation problem and 
availability of input-output data on farm level does not allow for a full estimation of the 
utility-maximizing framework developed. This leads to the adoption of a reduced-form 
approach. Although theoretically not very satisfying, reduced-form approaches allow for the 
inclusion of other variables besides those related to the generation of income, such as policy, 
socio-economic and wider economic-political variables. Second, when using panel data 
econometrics, specific effects of the observation unit are of importance. In Chapter 2, these are 
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region-specific effects. A fixed-effects model that allows for the inclusion of such unit-specific 
effects is therefore used, resulting in an improved explanation of the variance between 
regions. Interpretation of the region-specific effects may however be difficult. Variations 
between farms could for instance be due to differences in soil, management and production 
intensity. Finally, the fixed-effects panel data model estimated in Chapter 2 deals with 
agricultural land use change as a stationary process which may not be true in reality.  
To overcome the stationary element and to focus on the dynamics, Chapter 3 uses a duration 
model to explain land use change. Duration models are a special form of panel data 
econometrics that analyses the impact of factors influencing the length of time between two 
changes in land use (see e.g. Cleves et al., 2008). A parametric duration model is used in order 
to deal with the specific features of our data: time-varying explanatory variables, delayed 
entry, time gaps, and right censoring. However, this approach also has its caveats. First, where 
Chapter 2 is only able to explain the magnitude and not the dynamics of change, Chapter 3 is 
only able to explain the dynamics and not the magnitude of change. Testing for different 
magnitudes of land use changes does however show that results are quite robust. Second, the 
impossibility of including magnitudes of change and multiple equations implies that it is not 
possible to give a complete explanation of farm structural change using a duration model.  
Chapters 2 and 3 ignore the influence of location in analysing changes, even though 
agriculture is land-based and thus spatially explicit. Space may be taken into account by 
location-specific, autoregressive or spatial error variables (Anselin, 1988; LeSage and Pace, 
2009). Chapter 4 includes location-specific variables and tests for a spatial lag and spatial error 
model. Integrating land use changes through both time and space could be a valuable exercise 
and may help to provide more insight in the effects of policy changes, such as the changes to 
the CAP or to spatial policies. Chapter 4 provides a first attempt to do so. 
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Mathematical programming models 
The revised Single-Farm Payments (SFP), as described in the 2013 CAP reforms, are yet to be 
implemented. The possibility of whole-farm income (WFI) and crop-specific insurance is a 
hypothetical policy instrument. For both measures it is therefore not possible to use historic 
data to analyse their effects. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 considered land-use changes through time, 
and therefore used econometric models. Chapters 5 and 6 analyse future and hypothetical 
changes and for that purpose require mathematical programming models.  
When using such models, optimal land allocation plans can be established for farms using a 
minimal amount of data. Moreover, these models are able to deal with shifts in farm 
behaviour when triggered by socio-economic events such as a policy change. The possibility 
of corner solutions, where a farmer is unable to make trade-offs, is however a potential 
drawback of these models, leading to extreme outcomes when a threshold is passed. In 
Chapters 5 and 6 this is circumvented by using positive mathematical programming (PMP) 
(Howitt, 1995). An average-cost approach is employed to calibrate the model such that it 
precisely duplicates the observed allocation of land to crops. Unfortunately, a unique or best 
PMP method does not exist, especially when the objective function differs from maximizing 
gross revenues. Another disadvantage of the mathematical programming models used in this 
thesis is that they have been applied to only a few farms of different sizes due to a lack of data 
and resources. This makes it difficult to draw general conclusions on the imposed policy 
measures for the farming sector. Moreover, mathematical programming models are 
comparative static models. Dynamic programming, taking into account both the magnitude 
and pace of land use changes could therefore be a possible alternative for the models used. 
The foundations for dynamic programming have been laid out by Bellman (1957). More recent 
examples of dynamic agricultural land-use modelling include Thornton and Jones (1998), 
Stephenne and Lambin (2001), Mary (2013) and Briner et al., (2012). However, such models 
require more data and assumptions on (dynamic) behaviour.  
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7.2 Summary of main conclusions 
Five driving factors that potentially influence land use changes are defined in the introduction 
and subsequently analysed in Chapters 2 through 6. In this section the main conclusions are 
summarised and implications for land use changes in the Netherlands are given. An overall 
conclusion on the general objective concludes this section. 
 
Volatile output prices 
The European Union’s CAP is shifting away from market and price support to liberalized 
markets and payments decoupled from production. Chapter 2 assesses the effect of resulting 
volatile agricultural output prices, and hence farm profits, on farmer’s land use decision-
making since 2000 in the Netherlands. More specifically, by estimating a system of land-
response equations, accounting for the effects of price uncertainty on its own and alternative 
land uses, the effect of output price volatility is investigated. Two main conclusions can be 
drawn. First, the results show that relative price variation matters and serves as a proxy for 
the degree of perceived risk. Second, changes between land uses depend on whether 
production activities are complements or substitutes. For dairy farming, fodder maize and 
grassland appear to be complements. For arable farming, cereals, sugar beets, and potatoes 
appear to be complements, whereas onions and grassland appear to be substitutes. This 
indicates that a producer may view alternative production decisions only within the context 
of either arable or dairy farming, depending on his current production activities. This could 
be due to adaptation costs related to shifts between arable and dairy farming. 
 
Milk quota 
Adaptation costs may be related to policy (in our case milk quota), socio-economic, farm 
income and economic-political variables. Depending on the level of adaptation costs the 
shadow price of land can vary within a certain range before an actual land use change takes 
168
  
 
 
 
7 
place, impeding land dynamics. The purpose of Chapter 3 is to analyse the time period 
between two changes in land used for milk production on dairy farms and the direction of 
land use change over a period before, during and towards the abolition of milk quota. 
Employing a duration model and using farm-level data from the Netherlands between 1971 
and 2011, the pace of changes in agricultural land use is analysed. Results show that quotas 
hamper the pace of change for expansion in land used for milk production. Therefore, quota 
abolition will lead to a more dynamic dairy sector. Furthermore, the pace of land use changes 
is highly farm-specific; younger farm operators with a higher education level, who do not 
work full-time on the farm, and farmers who have a successor and do not yet dedicate a large 
portion of their total land to milk production exhibit highest dynamics in land use change in 
favour of milk production. In contrast, farmers with a low education level and without a 
successor exhibit highest dynamics in land use change away from milk production. 
 
Land prices 
Farm-specific effects are further explored in Chapter 4, where the objective is to explain 
farmland prices in the Netherlands, and more specifically the effect of the financial crisis on 
the agricultural land market in the Netherlands between 2004 and 2011. Prices of farmland 
are usually derived by taking the net present value (NPV, i.e. discounting) of the future stream 
of income generated from the land (Ahearn et al., 1997, Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2009, Roberts 
and Key, 2008, Weersink, et al., 1999). However, the price of farmland cannot be explained as 
an income-generating asset alone. In Chapter 4, four categories influencing the price of land 
are distinguished: (i) the direct influence via the returns from land, (ii) institutional 
regulations, (iii) the spatial environment and (iv) local market conditions. Furthermore, two 
periods are compared to distinguish the effect of the crisis on the agricultural land market. 
Results indicate that all categories significantly influence land prices. Moreover, the financial 
crisis leads to a decline in the effects of local market conditions, whereas the announcement 
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of milk quota abolition in 2008 has led to an increase in the effects of the spatial environment 
between the first and the second period. The results of Chapter 4 therefore highlight the need 
to look beyond discounted agricultural shadow prices of land in determining the effects of 
farm-land prices.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 develop mathematical programming models that maximize utility of 
representative farmers of different sizes by selecting various land use allocations. The 
influence of respectively SFP and insurance on farmer’s land allocation decisions is analysed. 
Neither the SFP nor insurance should affect a producer’s land-use decisions because they are 
both listed as ‘green box’ items in WTO regulations.  
 
Direct payments 
The EU’s December 2013 agreement on CAP reforms stated that direct payments adopted in 
the Mid-Term Review would be abolished by 2015 and replaced with a flat-rate payment per 
hectare regardless of what crops are planted. In addition, landowners will be compensated 
for environment-friendly farming practices, the so-called greening component. The objective 
of Chapter 5 is to analyse the potential impact of the move to SFP with a greening component 
on producers’ land-use decisions. Results indicate that the 2013 CAP reforms will cause 
farmers to shift away from crops previously eligible for payments, with the initial shift under 
the SFP enhanced by the move towards SFP combined with green payment. Moreover, the 
change from a historic to a flat-rate payment affects the shadow price of land for some types 
of farmers more than others, which in turn leads to differences in changes to land use between 
farms. This is largely dependent on the degree of risk aversion of the farm, with more risk-
averse farmers unlikely to modify their cropping decisions and less risk-averse ones more 
willing to reallocate land among crops. With respect to the greening component of the reform 
in direct payments, diversification measures do not influence farmer’s crop allocation 
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decisions because of crop rotation schemes, but environmental set-aside requirements 
substantially alter farm income and cropping plans. 
 
Insurance 
Chapter 6 analyses the impact of Whole Farm Income (WFI) and crop-specific insurance on 
producer’s crop allocation decisions. Using data of Dutch arable producers of different sizes, 
optimal crop portfolio was investigated, where insurance depends on farmer’s crop 
allocation, while at the same time that allocation depends on the type of insurance provided. 
Results indicate that, by taking away part of the revenue volatility, insurance schemes alter 
farmer’s land allocation plans towards a larger share of crops with a higher volatility. More 
specifically, this means a decrease in area allocated to wheat and barley, and an increase in 
area allocated to potatoes and onions. Smaller farms observe relatively larger changes in WFI, 
whereas larger farms observe relatively larger changes with crop-specific insurance. Land-use 
changes are larger with crop-specific than with whole farm insurance, with the latter biased 
towards smaller farms. Results are however highly dependent on the level of risk aversion.  
For both SFP and WFI changes to crop allocation are small, and even smaller under direct 
payments compared with insurance. However, the small but notable optimization towards 
more volatile crops under both SFP and WFI may indicate that even decoupled farm payments 
do subsidize production, contrary to WTO regulations.  
 
7.3 General conclusion  
The general objective of this thesis is to investigate farmers’ decision-making on agricultural 
land-use changes in the Netherlands, accounting for the role of the EU’s CAP reform. Different 
effects, potentially affecting production decisions, may result from government support 
measures. These can be grouped into coupling effects, linking support to production; wealth 
effects, increasing producer s ' income; and insurance effects, decreasing a producer’s income 
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variability (Hennessy, 1998). All these effects are likely to influence producer’s aversion to 
risk. However, risk aversion is inherently coupled to the farmer himself; when production 
risk is decreased, this opens the possibility to increase risk in other areas, such as farm 
expansion. The coupling effect of government support is reduced, but not eliminated, by the 
decoupling of the CAP reforms. The resulting increased price volatility leads to negligible 
land use changes. Direct payments only entail a wealth effect, leading to very small, but 
significant changes to crop allocation away from crops that used to receive subsidies. 
Insurance schemes entail both a wealth and an insurance effect, leading to somewhat larger, 
but still small changes to crop allocation towards more volatile crops. The effects of increased 
price volatility, reforms in the direct payment system and hypothetical insurance schemes 
analysed in Chapters 2, 5 and 6 all lead to small but notable changes to agricultural land use 
due to changes in farmers’ perceived risk. The small changes observed in these chapters are 
partly due to the fact that the total size of the farm is treated as fixed. Moreover, changes are 
likely to take place within a certain production system (e.g. arable or dairy farming). Land 
allocation is to a large extent imposed in the current production system due to, for instance, 
crop rotation and nitrate regulations. 
Farmer’s decision-making on agricultural land-use changes may also involve buying (leasing) 
or selling (renting out) land. Chapters 3 and 4 treat the total amount of farmland as variable. 
This causes adaptation costs to be of importance; implying that changes to land cannot be 
explained by changes to the shadow price of land alone. Here, larger effects of driving forces 
on land use change are found. Land use changes given a fixed farm size are mostly influenced 
by short-term decision making based on changes in farm profitability and perceived risk. 
Land use changes in case farm size can alter are also influenced by long-term decision-making 
based on expectations on future costs and revenues, and other factors such as farm 
characteristics, institutional and transaction characteristics and the influence of location. 
Decision-making on agricultural land-use changes therefore depends on the time horizon of 
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the use of the land. This shows that land-use change is complex and caused by different factors 
that interact with each other, leading farmers to base their land use decisions on more than 
changes to the shadow price of land alone. 
Due to this complexity, different research methods and data are needed to capture and 
analyse different elements of farmers’ decision-making on land-use change. This thesis 
addresses several issues, and consequently applies a variety of methods and uses different 
data. Results of this thesis can be used especially to assess the influence of current and future 
CAP reforms, but also to gain a deeper insight into (the dynamics of) land use changes in the 
Netherlands.
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SUMMARY 
Farmer’s decision making on agricultural land use change is often explained by combining 
the effects of relative profitability, risk aversion, price uncertainty, and yield uncertainty on 
production decisions. However, there is only so much room for change due to the 
opportunities and restrictions that two protective policies, zoning and the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), impose. To a certain extent, these two policies lay the foundations 
for agricultural land use and its competition with non-agricultural land. With changes to these 
policies, a reallocation of land can therefore also be expected. At the changing interplay 
between the CAP and spatial policies this dissertation aims to investigate driving forces of 
agricultural land use change in the Netherlands.  
The general objective of this study is to investigate farmers’ decision-making on agricultural 
land use changes in the Netherlands, accounting for the role of the EU’s CAP reform. The 
Netherlands provides a relevant context to address this objective due to the co-existence of 
strict zoning policies and the degree to which farmers are affected by changes to the CAP 
reform. The country is densely populated, making land scarce, and competition for land exists 
both within the agricultural sector and between agriculture and other sectors. Besides, the 
availability of large-scale temporal and spatial datasets allows us to analyse land use changes 
both through time and space. From the general objective, the following five driving factors 
that potentially influence land use changes are defined and analysed in separate chapters. 1) 
To investigate the effect of volatility in agricultural output prices on agricultural land use. 2) 
To analyse the effect of the abolition on milk quota on the pace of agricultural land-use change. 
3) To explain farmland prices, and more specifically the effect of the financial crisis on the 
land market. 4) To investigate the effect that different direct payment mechanisms have on 
land use (crop allocation) decisions. 5) To analyse the effect of crop-specific and whole farm 
income insurance on agricultural land use change. 
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By establishing a system of land-response equations, Chapter 2 assesses the first objective of 
the study. The effect of producer-price volatility, and hence farm profits, on farmers’ land use 
decision-making since 2000 in the Netherlands is investigated. By accounting for the effects of 
price uncertainty on existing and alternative land uses, the effect of output price volatility is 
analysed. Results show that relative price variation matters and serves as a proxy for the  
degree of perceived risk. Within these relative price variations, it matters whether production 
activities are complements or substitutes. For dairy farming, fodder maize and grassland 
appear to be complements. For arable farming, cereals, sugar beets, and potatoes appear to be 
complements, whereas onions and grassland appear to be substitutes. A farmer therefore 
views alternative land uses mostly within the context of either arable or dairy farming, 
depending on his current production activities. This could be due to additional costs related 
to shifts between production systems; in this study referred to as adaptation costs. 
Adaptation costs do not only occur with shifts between production systems, but may also 
occur with changes in farm size. These costs may be related to policy (in our case milk quota), 
socio-economic, farm income and economic-political variables. To address the second 
objective, Chapter 3 analyses whether quota abolition will lead to a more dynamic dairy 
sector. Using a unique dataset comprising farm-level data from the Netherlands between 1971 
and 2011, the pace of changes in agricultural land use is analysed. Employing a duration 
model, we find that quotas hamper the pace of change for expansion in land used for milk 
production. The pace of land use changes is highly farm-specific; younger farm operators with 
a higher education level, who do not work full-time on the farm, and farmers who have a 
successor and do not yet dedicate a large portion of their total land to milk production exhibit 
the highest dynamics in land use change in favour of milk production. In contrast, farmers 
with a low education level and without a successor exhibit the highest dynamics in land use 
change away from milk production. Adaptation costs are therefore found to be higher for this 
latter group of farmers, impeding land dynamics. 
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Using data on around 20,000 agricultural land transactions over the period of 2004-2011, 
farmland prices are explained with the objective to analyse the effect of the financial crisis on 
the land market price, controlling for other factors explaining farm land prices. Four 
categories that potentially influence land prices are analysed: (i) the direct influence via the 
returns from land, (ii) institutional regulations, (iii) the spatial environment and (iv) local 
market conditions. While correcting for spatial lag in the data, two periods are compared to 
distinguish the effect of the crisis on the agricultural land market. The expected net revenue 
obtained from farming explains only part of the price of farm land. Farm type, farm 
characteristics, institutional and transaction regulations, seasonal fluctuations and location all 
have their effect on the price of land. While the difference between the two periods analysed 
is generally small, there is some indication that after the onset of the financial crisis, the local 
market conditions that determine the option value of land have become less important. On 
the contrary, the spatial environment has become more important due to the announcement 
of milk quota abolition in 2008. 
In order to explain the last two objectives, the influence of farm subsidy reform and the 
possibility of insurance mechanisms, mathematical programming models are developed that 
maximize the utility of representative farmers of different sizes by selecting various land use 
allocations. In both models, a two-step calibration method is used to determine a nonlinear 
cost function and farm-specific risk aversion coefficients. The impact of the move to fixed per-
hectare payments (SFP) with a greening component shows both a farm- and a crop-specific 
effect. The 2013 CAP reforms will cause farmers to shift away from crops previously eligible 
for payments, with the shift under the SFP enhanced by the move towards SFP combined with 
a greening payment. In the insurance model, insurance depends on a farmer’s crop allocation, 
while at the same time crop allocation depends on the type of insurance provided. Results 
indicate that, by taking away part of the revenue volatility, whole farm insurance (WFI) alters 
farmers’ land allocation plans towards a larger share of crops with a higher volatility. Both 
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models therefore show a relatively larger use of the most profitable crops (often potatoes in 
arable farming), reducing the amount of land devoted to cereals (wheat and barley combined). 
Smaller farms show relatively larger changes, meaning that the insurance and wealth effects 
of these farms are larger. However, changes in land allocation are not as large as sometimes 
expected, due to, among others, crop rotation requirements. The small but notable 
optimization towards more volatile crops under both SFP, WFI and crop-specific revenue 
insurance indicates that even decoupled farm payments do subsidize production, contrary to 
WTO regulations.  
The last chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 7) provides the main conclusions and a 
discussion of the research and provides further insight in why land use change does or does 
not take place with changes in the environment in which farmers operate. Risk aversion is 
inherently linked to the farmer himself; when production risk is decreased, this opens the 
possibility to increase risk in other areas, such as farm expansion. The effects of increased 
price volatility, reforms in the direct payment system and hypothetical insurance schemes 
analysed in the first, fourth and fifth objective all lead to small but notable changes to 
agricultural land use due to changes in the farmer’s perceived risk. The small changes 
observed in these chapters are partly due to the fact that the total size of the farm is treated as 
fixed and the fact that land allocation is to a large extent imposed in the current production 
system due to, for instance, crop rotation and nitrate regulations. When the total amount of 
farmland is treated as variable, such as in the second and third objective, changes to land 
cannot be explained by changes to the shadow price of land and risk alone. Land use change 
is now also influenced by long-term decision-making based on expectations on future costs 
and revenues, and other factors such as farm characteristics, institutional and transaction 
characteristics and the influence of location and economic conjecture. This shows that land-
use change is complex and caused by different factors that interact with each other, leading 
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farmers to base their land use decisions on more than changes to the shadow price of land 
alone. 
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SAMENVATTING 
De besluitvorming van boeren over landgebruik wordt vaak uitgelegd aan de hand van de 
invloed van relatieve winstgevendheid, risico-aversie, onzekerheid over prijzen en 
opbrengsten op veranderingen in productiebeslissingen. De ruimte voor verandering is echter 
beperkt door de mogelijkheden en beperkingen opgelegd door twee soorten beleid: 
ruimtelijke ordening en het gemeenschappelijk landbouwbeleid (GLB). Tot op zekere hoogte 
vormen ruimtelijke ordening en het GLB de basis voor de indeling van agrarisch land en de 
concurrentie met niet-agrarische vormen van landgebruik. Veranderingen in het beleid 
kunnen daardoor een verandering in landgebruik veroorzaken. Het hoofddoel van dit 
proefschrift is om in tijden van een veranderende wisselwerking tussen het GLB en ruimtelijk 
beleid de drijvende krachten achter landgebruiksveranderingen in de agrarische sector in 
Nederland te onderzoeken. 
De doelstelling van dit proefschrift is het nagaan van de besluitvorming van boeren over 
veranderingen in agrarisch grondgebruik in Nederland, rekening houdend met de 
veranderingen in het GLB. Nederland vormt een relevante context voor dit doel door het 
samengaan van een strikt ruimtelijk ordeningsbeleid en de mate waarin boeren beïnvloed 
worden door veranderingen in het GLB. Nederland is dichtbevolkt, waardoor land schaars is, 
en de concurrentie voor land zowel binnen de landbouwsector als tussen de landbouw en 
andere sectoren bestaat. Verder bestaan er grote datasets met zowel een tijd- als ruimtelijke 
dimensie. Uit het hoofddoel van dit proefschrift zijn de volgende vijf drijvende factoren van 
landgebruiksverandering geselecteerd om te worden behandeld als subdoelen in 
afzonderlijke hoofdstukken: 1) Het effect van schommelingen in agrarische output prijzen op 
agrarisch landgebruik. 2) Het effect van de afschaffing van melkquota op de snelheid van 
veranderingen in agrarisch landgebruik. 3) Het analyseren van prijzen van agrarisch grond, 
en meer specifiek het effect van de financiële crisis op de grondmarkt. 4) Het effect dat directe 
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betalingen hebben op beslissingen over land gebruik. 5) Het effect van gewas specifieke- en 
inkomensverzekeringen op agrarisch grondgebruik. 
Het eerste subdoel van dit proefschrift wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 2 waar een systeem van 
vergelijkingen de reactie op landgebruik analyseert. De invloed van volatiliteit in de 
producentenprijs, en daarmee winst, op de landgebruiksbeslissingen van boeren in 
Nederland sinds 2000 is onderzocht. Door rekening te houden met de effecten van 
prijsonzekerheid op bestaande en alternatieve vormen van gebruik, wordt het effect van 
schommelingen in de producentenprijs geanalyseerd. Resultaten laten zien dat de relatieve 
prijsvariatie van belang is en dient als een maatstaf voor door de boer waargenomen risico. 
Binnen deze relatieve prijsvariaties is het van belang of productieactiviteiten complementen 
of substituten zijn. Voor melkveehouderij zijn ruwvoer en grasland complementen. Voor 
akkerbouw zijn granen, suikerbieten en aardappelen complementen, en uien en grasland 
substituten. Een boer ziet daarom zijn alternatieve vormen van landgebruik meestal binnen 
de context van akkerbouw of melkveehouderij, afhangend van zijn huidige 
productieactiviteit. Dit kan veroorzaakt worden door extra kosten gerelateerd aan een 
overgang tussen productie systemen; waar hierna verwezen wordt als ‘adaptatiekosten’. 
Adaptatiekosten komen niet alleen voor bij een overgang naar een ander productiesysteem, 
maar kunnen ook voorkomen bij veranderingen in de grootte van de boerderij. Deze kosten 
kunnen gerelateerd zijn aan beleid (in dit geval melkquota), socio-economische, inkomens of 
economisch-politieke variabelen. Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert het tweede subdoel; in welke mate 
de afschaffing van het melkquota leidt tot een meer dynamische melkveesector. Gebruik 
makend van een unieke dataset met gegevens op bedrijfsniveau tussen 1971 en 2011 in 
Nederland wordt de snelheid van veranderingen in agrarisch grondgebruik geanalyseerd. 
Analyse met een duration model toont aan dat de snelheid van uitbreiding van land voor 
melkproductie wordt belemmerd door het quotabeleid. De snelheid van veranderingen is 
bovendien erg bedrijfsspecifiek, waarbij jongere boeren met een hoger scholingsniveau, die 
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niet fulltime op het bedrijf werken, waarvan de bedrijfsleider een opvolger heeft en nog geen 
groot deel van het bedrijf aan melkproductie besteden meer dynamiek richting uitbreiding 
van melkproductie ervaren. Bedrijven met een lager scholingsniveau en zonder een opvolger 
ervaren daarentegen een versnelling in landgebruiksveranderingen richting een lager niveau 
van melkproductie. Adaptatiekosten kunnen daarom hoger zijn voor deze laatste groep, wat 
de dynamiek van landgebruiksveranderingen belemmerd. 
Met behulp van 20.000 transacties van agrarisch land over de periode van 2004 tot 2011 
worden prijzen van agrarisch land geanalyseerd met het doel om het effect van de financiële 
crisis op de prijs van de land markt te analyseren, rekening houdend met andere factoren die 
landprijzen beïnvloeden. Vier categorieën die mogelijk land prijzen beïnvloeden worden 
geanalyseerd: 1) de directe invloed van de opbrengst van agrarisch land; 2) institutionele 
factoren; 3) het ruimtelijke milieu; 4) lokale marktcondities. Door te corrigeren voor effecten 
van spatial lag worden twee periodes met elkaar vergeleken om de invloed van de crisis op de 
agrarische grondmarkt te analyseren. De verwachte netto opbrengst gehaald uit agrarische 
productie bepaalt slechts een deel van de prijs van agrarisch land. De sector, karakteristieken 
van het bedrijf, institutionele en transactieregulaties, seizoensfluctuaties en de ligging bepalen 
mede de prijs van agrarisch land. Ondanks het kleine verschil in de periode voor en na de 
financiële crisis, vinden we enige indicatie dat na de start van de crisis de lokale markt 
condities die de optie waarde van land bepalen in belang verminderen. De ruimtelijke 
omgeving is daarentegen steeds belangrijker geworden vanwege de aankondiging in 2008 om 
melkquota af te schaffen. 
De laatste twee subdoelen, de invloed van de hervormingen van de directe betalingen en de 
mogelijkheid van verzekeringen worden geanalyseerd met behulp van mathematisch 
programmeringsmodellen die het nut van representatieve boeren analyseren door het 
optimaliseren van het landgebruik. In beide modellen wordt gebruik gemaakt van een 
kalibratiemethode die zowel de niet-lineaire kostenfunctie als de bedrijfsspecifieke risico-
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aversie coëfficiënt herleidt. De invloed van de hervorming in de directe betalingen met 
vergroeningscomponent laat zowel een bedrijfs- als een gewasspecifiek effect zien. De 2013-
hervormingen van het GLB zorgen ervoor dat de gewaskeuze van boeren wegschuift van 
gewassen die voorheen vereist waren voor het verkrijgen van subsidies. De mate van 
verschuiving wordt groter wanneer er ook rekening wordt gehouden met 
vergroeningsmaatregelen. In het verzekeringsmodel hangen verzekeringen af van de 
gewaskeuze, terwijl de gewaskeuze tegelijkertijd afhangt van het type verzekering. Door een 
deel van de volatiliteit in opbrengst weg te halen beïnvloeden inkomensverzekeringen de 
besluitvorming over landgebruik van een boer richting het planten een groter aandeel van 
gewassen met een hogere volatiliteit. Beide modellen geven daarom een relatief groter 
aandeel van land voor meer winstgevende gewassen (vaak aardappelen in akkerbouw) en 
verminderen het aandeel land voor granen (tarwe en gerst samen). Kleinere boeren laten 
relatief grotere veranderingen zien, door onder meer vereisten aan gewasrotaties. De kleine, 
maar zichtbare, optimalisatie richting gewassen met grotere schommelingen in opbrengst 
onder zowel GLB hervormingen als mogelijkheden om (een deel van) het inkomen te 
verzekeren geven aan dat zelfs volledig ontkoppelde steun een invloed heeft op productie; 
tegengesteld aan de regelgeving van de WTO. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 7) geeft de belangrijkste conclusies en 
een discussie van het onderzoek en biedt meer inzicht in waarom landgebruiksveranderingen 
wel of niet plaatsvinden met veranderingen in het milieu waarin de boer opereert. 
Risicoaversie is inherent aan de boer; wanneer risico in productie vermindert kan risico in 
andere gebieden worden vergroot, zoals in de uitbreiding van de boerderij. De effecten van 
toegenomen prijsvolatiliteit, hervormingen in de directe betalingen en de mogelijkheden om 
(een deel van) het inkomen te verzekeren die geanalyseerd zijn in het eerste, vierde ven vijfde 
subdoel leiden allen tot kleine, maar aanwezige, veranderingen in landgebruik veroorzaakt 
door veranderingen in risico waargenomen door de boer. Dat de waargenomen 
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veranderingen in deze hoofdstukken klein zijn, wordt deels veroorzaakt door het feit dat de 
grootte van het bedrijf vast staat en dat de indeling van land in grootte mate afhangt van het 
huidige productiesysteem vanwege, bijvoorbeeld, gewas rotatie en nitraat wetgeving. Als de 
totale hoeveelheid land wordt behandeld als variabel, zoals in het tweede en derde subdoel, 
kunnen veranderingen in land niet alleen worden uitgelegd aan de hand van veranderingen 
in de marginale opbrengst van land en waargenomen risico alleen. 
Landgebruiksveranderingen worden nu ook beïnvloedt door lange-termijn besluitvorming 
gebaseerd op verwachtingen over toekomstige kosten en opbrengsten, en andere factoren 
zoals karakteristieken van de boer, institutionele en transactie  karakteristieken en de invloed 
van de ligging van het land en de economische conjectuur. Dit laat zien dat 
landgebruiksverandering complex is en wordt veroorzaakt door verschillende factoren die 
met elkaar interacteren, wat leidt tot boeren die hun beslissingen maken op meer dan alleen 
de marginale opbrengst van land. 
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